



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

DEC 12 1984

Report No.: 70-1151/84-15

Licensee: Westinghouse Electric Corporation  
Nuclear Fuel Division  
Columbia, SC 29250

Docket No.: 70-1151 (Fuel Division)

License No.: SNM-1107

Facility Name: Westinghouse Electric Corporation

Inspection Conducted: November 6-9, 1984

Inspector:

*J. L. Kreh*  
J. Kreh

*11-29-84*  
Date Signed

Approved by:

*J. R. Decker for*  
W. E. Cline, Chief  
Emergency Preparedness Section  
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

*11-29-84*  
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 24 inspector-hours onsite and one inspector-hour offsite in the area of emergency preparedness.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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## REPORT DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Employees

- \*W. L. Goodwin, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- \*D. E. Matthews, Manager, Safety
- W. E. Byrd, Manager, Security
- G. D. LaBruyere, Conversion Area Manager
- \*E. K. Reitler, Jr., Technical Coordinator, R&E Engineering
- \*R. E. Fischer, Senior R&E Engineer (Emergency Preparedness Coordinator)
- R. K. Burklin, R&E Engineer
- \*J. B. Hooper, Accident Prevention Technician

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, security force members, and office personnel.

#### Other Organizations

M. F. Tkacik, Radiation Safety Officer, Richland Memorial Hospital  
E. H. Goff, Battalion Chief, Columbia Fire Department

\*Attended exit interview

### 2. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 9, 1984, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

### 3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

(Closed) Violation (70-1151/83-24-01): Failure to implement the Site Emergency Plan requirement for maintenance agreements with offsite agencies. The inspector reviewed the licensee's renewed agreement (effective for two years beginning December 1, 1983) with Richland Memorial Hospital. The licensee had added various emergency preparedness items, including the renewal of letters of agreement, to the plant "tickler file" system in an effort to prevent recurrence of this type of noncompliance.

### 4. Offsite Support Agencies (88050)

The inspector held discussions with the licensee representatives regarding the coordination of emergency planning with offsite agencies. Written agreements existed with those offsite support agencies specified in the Site Emergency Plan (SEP), and the agreements had been renewed as required and appropriate. The inspector determined through discussions with licensee representatives that the licensee was periodically contacting local and State support agencies for purposes of offering training and maintaining mutual familiarization with emergency response roles.

The inspector visited Richland Memorial Hospital and interviewed cognizant staff there regarding medical treatment for radioactively contaminated workers as specified in the formal agreement between the hospital and the licensee. Hospital staff appeared to have an excellent working knowledge of their emergency response role with respect to the licensee's facility. The inspector was given a tour of the emergency treatment facilities, and briefly reviewed the hospital's "Procedures Manual for Medical Emergencies Involving Radioactive Contamination" (October 1984 revision). Hospital personnel had recently used these procedures successfully in handling a contaminated injury from the V. C. Summer plant.

The inspector interviewed a representative of the Columbia Fire Department following a fire drill (see paragraph 6). That representative expressed satisfaction with the working relationship between his agency and the licensee. He indicated that the licensee had provided opportunities for Columbia Fire Department personnel to become familiar with the facility.

5. Emergency Plans, Procedures, Facilities, and Equipment (88050)

Based on discussions with a licensee representative and a documental review, the inspector determined that there had been no significant changes in the SEP since the last emergency preparedness inspection (October 1983).

The licensee's emergency call list is maintained in implementing procedure CSEP-0013 ("Emergency Notification of Onsite and Offsite Organizations"). When personnel at the main guard house were requested to produce their emergency call list, they showed the inspector a "Special Orders" manual which contained a (undated) list with significant discrepancies relative to, and a different format from, Revision 3 (dated 10-5-84) of CSEP-0013 (viz., no home phone number for the Plant Manager, wrong home number for one person, and five names missing). The licensee's explanation was that there was normally a lag time between issuance of revisions to CSEP-0013 and incorporation of changes to Security's call list. It should be noted that the SEP and its implementing procedures were available at the guard house, and that Security personnel would make notifications only upon authorization of the Emergency Coordinator, who would provide names and, if necessary, phone numbers. However, in order to facilitate a timely response to an emergency, the licensee agreed to henceforth maintain a copy of the latest revision of the CSEP-0013 call list in the "Special Orders" book.

The inspector selectively examined emergency kits/equipment and found them to be well maintained in general, with inspection and inventory performed quarterly. Portable radiological instruments were found to have been calibrated semiannually, as required by the SEP. Procedure RA-205 ("Respiratory Protection") requires monthly inventory and inspection of all SCBA equipment, and specifies that air bottles are to be refilled if found to have less than 1500 psi. The inspector noted that several SCBA air bottles had pressures not meeting the refill criterion. Although the licensee indicated that monthly inspections were being performed as required, licensee management representatives agreed to take appropriate action to rectify the identified problem and to prevent recurrence. This matter will be reviewed during a future inspection.

Inspector Follow-up Item (70-1151/84-15-01): Ensuring that SCBA air bottles are maintained as full as reasonably achievable.

The inspector reviewed the plant evacuation routes and assembly points, and found no impediments. Onsite medical facilities, equipment, and supplies were examined and found to be adequate.

The inspector reviewed those procedures (CSEP-0004 and CSEP-0016B) which addressed the retrieval of criticality-accident badges and the collection of air samples outside the plant following an accident. The inspector examined one of the licensee's onsite air sampling stations (No. 3) and found that it appeared to be operating normally (continuous sampling at approximately 2 cfm).

#### 6. Tests and Drills (88050)

The inspector's observations as well as a review of records confirmed that the licensee conducted tests and drills in accordance with SEP Section 7.3. Two internal memoranda (both dated 11-7-83) documented the critiques of the 10-6-83 contaminated-casualty drill and the 10-26-83 fire drill. The former of the two critiques found that there had been vehicular radio problems (subsequently corrected), and the latter identified a need for several minor changes to the training program for the Emergency Brigade. No plan or procedure revisions resulted from either of those critiques.

A contaminated-casualty drill was conducted on 10-31-84, in coordination with Richland Memorial Hospital, as an exercise of CSEP-0012B ("Contaminated Casualty Transfer") and the hospital's procedures for handling such cases. The inspector discussed this drill with licensee representatives as well as hospital staff. Both parties indicated that no significant problems were identified. The licensee held a verbal critique after the drill, but a written critique was not yet available.

The inspector observed a fire drill (November 7) involving 10 members of the Columbia Fire Department and approximately 16 licensee personnel (some of the latter were observers). Unlike past onsite drills, this one involved an actual staged fire in order to inject a degree of realism. Three barrels of a gasoline/diesel fuel/water mixture were ignited just south of the UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Recertification Building. The Emergency Brigade demonstrated adequate fire-fighting techniques, although a delay in extinguishing the fire was experienced because the hydrant valve was opened only partially. Columbia Fire Department personnel arrived at the scene within ten minutes of notification and undertook, fully suited and in SCBAs, a search-and-rescue mission (inside the Recertification Building) involving a worker injured and contaminated by an explosion (simulated). Coordination among

the Emergency Brigade, offsite fire fighters, and Health Physics personnel was adequate. An on-the-spot critique was conducted following the drill. The only significant negative finding was the valve problem mentioned above. This matter appeared to be correctable through training.

7. Onsite Fire Protection Equipment and Procedures (88050)

Based on observation of the fire drill (paragraph 6) and interviews with instructional staff, the inspector concluded that the licensee had a highly effective program for fire control. Approximately 55 persons were trained and qualified for the Emergency Brigade, according to licensee records. Applicable procedures were reviewed, and selected equipment and facilities were examined; no problems were identified.

8. Inspector Follow-up (92701)

- a. (Open) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 70-1151/83-24-02: Reviewing SEP and CSEP-0005 to assure that medical action criteria (for criticality accidents) are adequate. Analysis was still in progress. The licensee was considering the reduction of action levels by about 30% to account for the gamma component.
- b. (Closed) IFI 70-1151/83-24-03: Reviewing the inspection program for fire extinguishers. The licensee determined that the problem found with one fire extinguisher was an isolated case and that no generic action was needed.