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YES IN yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!

On February 22, 1985, at 1823, the Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (RCIC), received both Division 1 and Division 2 (outboard and inboard) isolation signals on high RCIC steam line flow. Unit 1 was in Operational Condition 1 at 97% power.

The high flow signal occurred when steam at reactor pressure (approximately 1000 psig) was released into the RCIC steam line from the piping between the RCIC inboard and outboard isolation valves. This steam was trapped when the inboard valves were closed, per procedure, to begin to return RCIC to service following maintenance. Opening the outboard valve released the steam into the RCIC steam line, causing the high flow signal.

When the isolation signal was received, the outboard isolation valve was open, and it closed satisfactorily. After verifying that there was no damage to the RCIC piping, the isolation was reset, and warming up of RCIC was continued without further incident.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)			LER NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional MRC Form 386A's) (17)

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On February 22, 1985, at 1823 the Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (RCIC, BN) received both Division 1 and Division 2 (outboard and inboard) isolation signals on high RCIC steam line flow. This occurred while Unit 1 was in Operational Condition 1 at 97% power.

At the time of the event, RCIC was being warmed up following maintenance work to replace an oil seal on the RCIC water leg pump. During this work, the outboard RCIC steam line isolation valve (1E51-F008) had been closed while the inboard RCIC steam line isolation valves (1E51-F063 and 1E51-F076) had been left open, allowing steam at reactor pressure (approximately 1000 psig) to enter the piping between the inboard and outboard valves. Upon completion of the work, the inboard valves were closed per procedure LOP-RI-05 for returning RCIC to service. This caused steam at reactor pressure to become trapped in the piping between the inboard and cutboard isolation valves. This steam was released to the RCIC steam line when the outboard valve was subsequently opened, causing a high steam flow signal to be generated.

The isolation logic for high RCIC steam line flow has a three second time delay built into it to prevent spurious isolations when fast-starting RCIC. Therefore, a sustained high steam flow had to have been maintained for greater than three seconds in order to receive the isolation signal in this event. The outboard RCIC steam line isolation valve, which opened to release the steam into the RCIC steam line, normally strokes full travel in 15 to 20 seconds. It is believed that the steam was released relatively slowly as this valve gradually opened, thus sustaining the high flow necessary to trip the isolation logic.

Both Divisions 1 and 2 received RCIC steam line isolation signals as a result of the high steam line flow. However, only the outboard valve was open, and it closed satisfactorily.

II. CAUSE

The cause of the RCIC steam line isolation was a valid high steam flow signal generated when steam was admitted to the RCIC steam line as described above. The event occurred at 1823 on February 22, 1985, while Unit 1 was in Operational Condition 1 at 97% power. The isolation was reset 11 minutes after it occurred.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE

Upon receiving the high steam line flow isolation signal, the RCIC steam line isolated satisfactorily. This action was conservative from the standpoint of primary containment (PC, NH) integrity. The High Pressure Core Spray system (HP, BG) was operable throughout this event and would have been available to supply coolant to the reactor, if needed.

NRC Form 366A (9-83)	Form 366A							GULATORY COMMISSION OMB NO. 3150-0104 31/85			
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IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The integrity of the RCIC system piping was verified and the isolation was reset at 1834 on February 22, 1985. Warming up of the RCIC system proceeded with no further incidents.

V. PREVIOUS EVENTS

An event similar to the one described here was reported in Licensee Event Report number 373/84-060-00. A Division 1 isolation of the RCIC steam line on high flow occurred when pressure was released into the RCIC steam line from the piping between the inboard and outboard RCIC steam line isolation valves.

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

Richard J. Rohrer, 815/357-6761, extension 575.

March 21, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #85-022-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

G. J. Diederich

Station Superintendent
LaSalle County Station

GJD/MLD/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director INPO-Records Center File/NRC

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