

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-341/85-07(DRS)

Docket No. 50-341

License No. CPPR-87

Licensee: Detroit Edison Co.  
2000 Second Avenue  
Detroit, MI 48226

Facility Name: Fermi II

Inspection At: Fermi Site, Newport, MI

Inspection Conducted: January 22-24 and February 27, 1985

*C.C. Williams for:*  
Inspector: J. H. Neisler

Approved By: *C.C. Williams*  
C. C. Williams, Chief  
Plant Systems Section

3-1-85  
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on January 22-24 and February 27, 1985 (Report No. 50-314/85-07(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Inspection concerning issues identified to the Fermi resident inspector and to the Detroit Edison Safe Team by a former worker at the Fermi Plant. The inspection involved nineteen inspector-hours onsite and eight inspector-hours in Region III office by one NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Representatives

J. Garin, Safe Team Investigator  
\*R. Markovich, Safe Team Investigator  
\*J. Rotondo, Quality Control Supervisor  
\*D. Whatley, Quality Control Specialist  
F. Waterhouse, Electrical Test Technician

#### Nuclear Regulatory Commission

P. Byron, Senior Resident Inspector  
M. Parker, Resident Inspector

\*Denotes those persons attending the exit meeting.

### 2. Allegations

(Closed) ATS RIII - 84-A-0071: The senior resident inspector at Fermi was approached by an individual who stated that he had some concerns relative to falsification of records during the test program in that certain time delay relays had been documented as having been tested when in fact the test had not been completed. The individual suggested that the resident inspector listen to the Detroit Edison Safe Team tape of his exit interview. He asked the resident inspector to postpone any inquiry into the allegation until he departed the site the next day for a new job at another facility.

The alleged agreed to meet with the senior resident inspector later that day to discuss and document his concerns relative to the items he had revealed during his Safe Team interview. He did not keep the appointment with the senior resident inspector.

The alleged was subsequently interviewed by a Region III inspector at another site. During that interview, he alleged wiring and junction box deficiencies for the reactor feed water turbine pumps, termination deficiencies in the relay room, test deficiencies in two HVAC cabinets and target-rock valve deficiencies. Each of these allegations is discussed below.

Reactor Feed Water Turbine Pumps - The alleged stated that pull boxes and terminals are "very congested and sloppy conditions" that they contained "oil, water and debris." He stated that these conditions were related to his supervisor at MATSCO. He was allegedly told "not to worry, they would handle it during maintenance."

The reactor feed water turbine pumps and their wiring systems are not safety-related components at Fermi 2 per Fermi FSAR Table 3.2-1.

Nonsafety-related components are not within the NRC's scope of responsibility. The inspector informed the licensee of the contents of this allegation so that he, the licensee, could take any appropriate corrective action in accordance with his procedures for nonsafety-related activities. Extensive review of the issue of cleanliness in safety-related areas by the NRC has not identified significant issues in this area. General cleanliness in the plant is judged to be above average at this time.

The inspector identified no further concerns in this area since safety-related activities are controlled by an approved quality assurance program and they have been implemented.

Relay Room - The alleged stated that because of lifting terminals equipped with mechanical crimp-type connections during preoperational testing the conductors had been damaged. "These have been lifted enough times that these contain broken, nicked, missing, and/or deformed strands creating hot spots".

The inspector examined documentation showing that the licensee has inspected (in August 1984 after the allegation was received) and corrected damaged and/or deficient terminations in cabinets within the relay room. These surveillances were not in response to the allegation but were in response to the licensee's routine system walkdowns and NRC inspection activity. The inspector reviewed Quality Assurance Surveillance Reports No. 5732, dated August 24, 1984; 5723, dated August 23, 1984; 5715, dated August 20, 1984; 5705, dated August 20, 1984; 5710, dated August 20, 1984; 5702, dated August 20, 1984; 5700, dated August 20, 1984; 5699, dated August 20, 1984; 5697, dated August 16, 1984; 5696, dated August 16, 1984; 5695, dated August 16, 1984; 5676, dated August 16, 1984; 5674, dated August 16, 1984; and 5675, dated August 16, 1984. In each surveillance, the inspector noted that discrepancies were identified on nonconformances and that the nonconformances were dispositioned and closed out as corrective action was completed. No problems relative to frayed or broken conductors were identified in these reports.

Terminations in relay cabinets were the subject of an NRC inspection (among others) subsequent to April 1984, as identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-341/84-50. The report does not identify any terminations where the conductor has excessive broken strands, although other issues such as loose lugs and terminations were identified by the NRC. Licensee action relative to open items identified by NRC inspectors has been reviewed and accepted.

HVAC Cabinet H21P296A or E - According to the allegor, this cabinet contains an interlock system including Agastat relay timers (60 minute timers). The allegor stated that he was assigned to work with another technician to test and set the Agastat timer relays. He said that they had finished testing and setting two of three timers and were halfway through testing the third timer when he was told by the other technician to "just sign off on it." The allegor stated that he refused saying, "that he never had done that and he wasn't going to start now." He stated that the other technician said "Oh, just sign off like this" and initialed a portion of the test that had not been done. The allegor indicated that he finished the test and signed the portions that he had completed. When he turned the package in to his supervisor, he told his supervisor about the above mentioned incident. He was told not to worry about it.

The inspector examined startup test records of all Agastat time delay relays in HVAC relay cabinets H21P296A and H21P296E. None of the test data sheets had the allegor's or the other technician's initials or signature. This test documentation shows that the allegor did not work on these relays as finally tested. The test data sheets appeared to have been properly signed off by the test technicians, reviewers and by the quality control specialist who is present for tests involving safety-related components.

The inspector interviewed the test technician identified by the allegor as having signed off a test step prior to completion. The technician stated that he did not remember the incident related by the allegor and that he had never falsified a document at Fermi or at any of the other sites at which he had worked. He indicated that because of QC coverage during testing that it would be difficult to violate procedures for testing and verification by signing off tests prior to completion.

The inspector reviewed Fermi procedures CA10.000.048, Generic Checkout and Initial Operation Test Procedure - Time Delay Relays. This procedure and its checklist provide step by step instructions for performing test of both types Agastat time delay relays at Fermi.

This allegation cannot be substantiated with the information received from the allegor. Test data sheets for the Agastats show that the allegor and the other technician did not participate in the initial startup testing of the time delay relays in HVAC cabinets H21P296A or E as stated by the allegor. It should be noted that the test procedures for setting Agastats were adequate and the testing is performed under QC observation. Since testing is controlled by adequate procedures and quality inspection appears to be acceptable for this type of test, the inspector has no further concerns in this area and this allegation is considered to be closed.

Target-Rock Valves - The allegor stated that he was responsible for checkout and initial operation testing for 11 of 16 "Target-Rock" valves on the post accident sampling system. He indicated that the same wiring and cleanliness problems mentioned in Reactor Feed Water Turbine Pumps and Relay Room above, existed in this area. In addition, he stated that the valves had missing screws under the valve covers.

The inspector reviewed documentation including operating and maintenance orders showing some of the Target-Rock valves have been reworked since April 1984, and that others are in the process of being reworked during preoperational testing. The operating and maintenance orders specifically instructed maintenance personnel to replace missing No. 10 bolts (machine screws). In addition, the maintenance orders included cleanliness inspection hold points per Procedure 12.00048. Work on these valves is an ongoing function during plant testing, and maintenance orders call out replacement of screws or bolts. Furthermore, Target-Rock valves were the subject of a reported construction deficiency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e) to the NRC Region III on December 13, 1984, and are presently being tracked by the licensee and Region III.

Based on the allegor's comments, this allegation could not be substantiated at this time. These valves are in the process of being reworked by qualified personnel, adequate inspections are being performed and the valves are being tracked by both the licensee and the NRC; therefore, the inspector has no further concerns in this area.

Safe Team Interview Tape No. 543 - The inspector listened to the tape recording of the Safe Team interview with the allegor. During the interview, the allegor did not identify any specific concerns regarding safety-related items at Fermi. He stated that there appeared to be too much haphazard work due to laziness and "don't-care" attitude and felt more emphasis should be placed in this area instead of drug and alcohol abuse.

During the taped interview, the allegor stated that there was a problem of falsification of records at Fermi and at other nuclear plants. When questioned by the interviewer, he could not or would not present specific areas where records were falsified. Although eight months later he cited specific cabinets where he believed problems occurred to an NRC interviewer.

The allegor stated that he had worked at Fermi for about two years. He had been a Level I test technician most of that time. Prior to work at Fermi, he had worked in an assembly plant assembling control panels.

Since the allegor did not identify any specific concerns relative to safety-related components or functions at Fermi. The licensee took appropriate followup action regarding the statements made by the allegor during the interview. The inspector's review of the tape and the licensee's followup action identified no issues from the taped interview that would require NRC followup.

#### Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives at the conclusion of the inspection of January 24, 1985. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representative acknowledged the findings as reported herein.