U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report No. 50-293/84-36

Docket No. 50-293

License No. DPR-35 Priority --- Category C

Licensee: Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear
25 Braintree Hill Office Park
Braintree, Massachusetts 02184

Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

Meeting At: NRC Region I King of Prussia, PA

Meeting Conducted: November 20, 1984

Prepared By: M. McBride for — 11/27/84
J. Johnson, Sr. Resident Inspector — Date

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Approved By: J. Tripp — 12/7/84
J. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3A, Projects Branch No. 3 — Date

Meeting Summary:
An Enforcement Conference was held at NRC Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania on November 20, 1984 to discuss the findings of Special Inspection 50-293/84-36. Two incidents involving a lack of attention to source range monitors by control room personnel during refueling activities were discussed during the conference. The adequacy of shift turnovers for control room personnel was also discussed.

The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee management and lasted about one hour.

DETAILS

1. Participants

1.1 Boston Edison Company

W. Harrington, Senior Vice President, Nuclear
A. Oxsen, Vice President, Nuclear
C. Mathis, Nuclear Operations Manager
P. Mastrangelo, Chief Operating Engineer
R. Burrows, Nuclear Operation Supervisor

1.2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission

T. Murley, Regional Administrator
R. Starostecki, Director, Division of Projects and Resident Programs
E. Wenzinger, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3
L. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A
G. Meyer, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Section 3A
J. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector
M. McBride, Resident Inspector
D. Holody, Enforcement Specialist
J. Gutierrez, Regional Attorney
S. Pindale, Reactor Engineer

2. Purpose

An Enforcement Conference was held at the NRC Region I Office to discuss the findings of an NRC special inspection report, 50-293/84-36. The inspection report describes two incidents where source range monitors (SRM) were not adequately utilized during refueling activities.

The first incident occurred on November 1, 1984 when fuel assemblies were loaded into the reactor and control rods moved while control room personnel were unaware that an SRM was bypassed. The second incident occurred on November 7, 1984 when control room personnel did not continuously monitor the SRM's during fuel loading.

3. Discussion

The operability requirements for SRM's during refueling as contained in the Technical Specifications and the FSAR were initially discussed. The need for clarification of the Technical Specification requirements and licensee procedures which implement these requirements was noted.

Concern was expressed over the adequacy of shift turnovers for control room personnel. The licensee agreed to review the current shift turnover checklists to ensure that they contained adequate detail.

3. Discussion (Continued)

The licensee indicated operator experience was a factor in the incidents. The licensee plans to balance shift experience by rearranging personnel and minimizing changes in the shifts. The licensee noted that the upcoming startup is expected to be significantly slower than in previous years, due in part to new licensee administrative reactor water quality limits. The licensee also stated that the Nuclear Operations Manager or the Chief Operating Engineer will be present in the control room during important aspects of the upcoming startup.

The need for checks on licensee performance independent of the NRC was discussed. The licensee stated that periodic independent audits of the operations program have been conducted and that the Onsite Safety and Performance Group Leader will independently review the upcoming startup.

4. Licensee Commitments

During the meeting, the licensee stated that the following actions would be taken:

-- The Technical Specification requirements for SRM operability during refueling will be reviewed for adequacy and suitably modified. Implementing procedures for these requirements will be clarified.

-- Industry practice for obtaining adequate initial count rates on the SRM's by loading fuel assemblies around each SRM will be reviewed and adopted.

-- Control room shift turnover checklists will be reviewed for adequate detail and appropriately modified.

-- The Nuclear Operations Manager or the Chief Operating Engineer will be present in the control room on a 24-hour basis during important aspects of the upcoming reactor startup.

NRC Region I management acknowledged these commitments and indicated that the licensee would be informed of the need for and nature of enforcement action at a later time.