NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

TORUS VACUUM BREAKER INOPERATIVE DUE TO SCAFFOLDING

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 2	1 2	8 5	8 5	0 0 4	0 0	0 3	0 7	8 5		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
ROBERT T. LISENO, MAINTENANCE SUPERINTENDENT	AREA CODE 3 1 5 3 4 2 - 3 8 4 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

During normal plant operation one of the two Reactor Building - pressure suppression chamber vacuum breaker valves was made inoperable and remained so in excess of the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), paragraph 3.7.A.4. It was discovered that scaffolding built for an unrelated evolution had been placed so as to restrict the movement of the valves weight arm. This scaffolding was erected about 12 days previous and the valve is assumed to have been inoperative for the 12 days. The LCO expired after seven days. Corrective action included immediate removal of the interference, counseling of the craft supervisors and foremen involved, and training of all craft supervisors in the need to prevent interference with plant equipment in the course of their work. Each vacuum breaker is capable of 100% relief capacity. Thus, adequate vacuum breaker capacity remained operable throughout the incident for a design basis event. As such, the event did not degrade the health and safety of the public.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	8 5	— 0 0 4	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)* (17)

During normal plant operation one of the two Reactor Building - pressure suppression vacuum breakers was made inoperable and remained inoperative in excess of the LCO requirement of seven days (Technical Specification 3.7.A.4). The valve was made inoperative on or about February 1, 1985 when craft labor erected scaffolding for an unrelated task. This scaffolding interfered with the swing of the vacuum breaker weight arm thereby restricting and possibly preventing the opening of the valve. When discovered by a Shift Supervisor during rounds on February 12, 1985, the valve was immediately made operable by removing the interference. The valve was assumed to be inoperative for about twelve days.

Corrective action for prevention of future occurrences included the following:

A meeting was held with the involved craft supervisors, contract services engineers, and maintenance department management. The individuals directly involved were counseled. Responsibilities of the contractor and Authority supervisory personnel for preventing this type of incident were explained in detail. Examples of other situations that cause similar results of impaired equipment operability were discussed.

The maintenance contractor supervisory personnel will be formally instructed during orientation about this event. Authority supervision will discuss the event with their employees.

Additionally, a memorandum will be issued to all employees explaining the event and the need to be observant of these situations in their preplanning and inspections.

Each vacuum breaker is capable of 100% relief capacity. Thus, adequate vacuum breaker capacity remained operable throughout the incident for a design basis event. As such, the event did not degrade the health and safety of the public.

James A. FitzPatrick
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13093
315 342 3840

Harold A. Glovier
Resident Manager

New York Power Authority

March 7, 1985
JAFP-85-0231

United States Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

REFERENCE: DOCKET NO. 50-333
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 85-004-00

Dear Sir:

We have enclosed the referenced Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10CFR50.73.

If there are any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Robert Liseno at 315-342-3840, extension 220.

Very truly yours,

H. A. Glovier Jr.

HAROLD A. GLOVIER

HAG:RJL:nan

CC: USNRC, Region I (1)
INPO Records Center, Atlanta, Ga. (1)
American Nuclear Insurers (1)
Internal Power Authority Distribution
NRC Resident Inspector
Document Control Center
LER/OR File

IE22
1/1