UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report Nos.: 50-250/96-03 and 50-251/96-03

Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company
9520 West Flagler Street
1101 Market Street
Miami, FL 33102

Docket Nos.: 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.: DPR-31 and DPR-41

Facility Name: Turkey Point Nuclear Plant

Inspection Conducted: March 4-8, 1996

Inspector: Lori C. Stratton 3/15/96
Lori C. Stratton, Safeguards Inspector Date Signed

Approved by: [signature] 3/20/96
Paul Fredrickson, Chief Date Signed
Special Inspection Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine announced inspection was conducted in the various aspects of the Physical Security Program for Power Reactors. Specifically, security program plans and implementing procedures; testing, maintenance and compensatory measures; vital access control of personnel and vehicles; and record and reports. Also, the inspector reviewed the facility's Final Safety Analysis Report in the area of Security.

Results:

In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified. Observation and inspection results confirmed operational effectiveness of the security program. Security plans and procedures reviewed were found to be detailed to fully implement the Physical Security Plan requirements. The licensee's testing and maintenance program was detailed and provided for a thorough review of the system on a timely basis. A review of the licensee's documentation determined that testing and maintenance of security related equipment was completed and in accordance with the Physical Security Plan. Established compensatory measures were documented accordingly and initiated within the required time. The licensee continues to have the discharge area compensated, due to a failure of the Safenet system. Vital access control of personnel and vehicles was accomplished in accordance to licensee procedures. The licensee had just begun a scheduled outage, therefore some vital areas had been devitalized during the course of this inspection. The inspector reviewed associated records and reports to include the Safeguard Event Logs. Upon

review of the Safeguard Event Logs, the inspector noted an increase in weapons/ammunition being found by the security force upon entrance to the protected area. The inspector reviewed the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report in the area of security and found related commitments were being followed by the licensee.

REPORT DETAILS

1.0 Persons Contacted

1.1 Licensee Employees

*T. Abbatiello, Site Quality Manager, Turkey Point Nuclear, (TPN)
*C. Mowrey, Compliance Specialist, TPN
*Q. Ferrer, Security Specialist, TPN
R. Hess, Security System Coordinator, TPN
*D. Hoffman, Security Shift Supervisor, TPN
*G. Hollinger, Licensing Manager, TPN
*R. Hovey, Vice President, TPN
*F. Marcussen, Site Security Supervisor, TPN
*K. Peterson, Acting Site Superintendent, TPN

1.2 Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.

1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

*T. Johnson, Senior Resident Inspector

*Attended Exit Interview

2.0 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors (81700)

2.1 Security Plan and Implementing Procedures

The licensee's Physical Security Plan (PSP), Revision 8, dated March 30, 1994, and implementing procedures were reviewed by the inspector to ensure they were written to meet regulatory requirements.

The inspector noted that the licensee had established a mechanism for establishing, maintaining, and enforcing written security procedures. The licensee also documented the structure of the security organization, which details the duties of officers and other individuals responsible for security.

The inspector verified that the licensee had established adequate procedures as required by the PSP and regulatory requirements. The implementing procedures did not conflict with safety, and did not impede movement and access of operation and support personnel during emergency response situations. The inspector verified that procedures and revisions were approved by the person responsible for the security function and were properly distributed and appropriately protected.

Based on the inspector's review, it was determined that the licensee had developed adequate plans and procedures to support the site's physical security operation.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.

2.2 Testing and Maintenance

The inspector reviewed the licensee's established program for testing and maintenance of the security system. As part of the inspection, the inspector reviewed Security Force Instruction (SFI) 2004, "Operability Testing of DCU Components," Revision 10, dated September 5, 1994. The inspector determined that the test procedure was in-depth and fully tested each component of the security system to ensure ongoing compliance with the approved PSP.

During the inspection, the inspector observed the licensee test an explosive detector located at the Nuclear Entrance Building (NEB). The inspector verified that the officer who tested the equipment followed SFI 2301, "Search Equipment Testing," Revision 9, dated July 9, 1992, satisfactorily. The explosive detector was determined to be acceptable for operation.

In addition, the inspector reviewed random seven day testing records for the month of January and February 1996. Records reviewed included test results for:

- uninterruptible power source
- lighting
- vehicle, personnel, package, and material search equipment communication equipment
- assessment aids
- security computer and central and secondary alarm stations equipment
- protected and vital area barriers and intrusion detection system

All records indicated tests were done in accordance to licensee procedures and within the requirements of the PSP. Also, the inspector reviewed the licensee's 1995 records of the annual probability testing for all security related components and equipment, which were completed in December 1995.

Based on review of procedures and observation during the course of the inspection, the inspector concluded that the licensee had an established maintenance capability that was responsive to the testing and maintenance program.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.

2.3 Compensatory Measures

The inspector reviewed security related work orders for the period of October 1, 1995 to present, and learned that the licensee had compensatory measures in place in accordance to their PSP and implementing procedure SFI 2006, "Opening and Closing of Compensatory Posts," Revision 5, dated May 21, 1992.

The inspector did note that a long standing compensatory measure beginning late November 1995 was in place at the discharge area due to the Safenet being disabled. The licensee informed the inspector that towards the end of this outage, a short term corrective measure was planned to repair the Safenet. As a long term corrective measure, the licensee plans to install the Fiber Optic

Intelligence and Detection System (FOIDS) this summer to secure the discharge area from intruders. First though, the manufacturer of FOIDS intends to install a test section over the roughest area of the discharge to observe performance and determine correct applicability. Due to the performance of Safenet, the licensee had a high number of compensatory hours for 1995.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.

2.4 Vital Area Access of Personnel and Vehicles

During the course of this inspection, the inspector observed personnel entering vital areas and noted that the licensee maintained positive control of individuals and limited unescorted access to authorized personnel who needed access to perform their duties. On March 5, 1996, the licensee devitalized the Unit 4 main steam platform, due to entering Mode 5 of the refueling outage. The inspector verified that protected area access control and perimeter protection remained in effect. The licensee prohibits vehicle access to vital areas.

The inspector noted that the number of vital area doors left unsecured remains low.

Upon review of procedures and direct observation of licensee activities, the inspector determined there were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.

2.5 Locks, Keys, Combinations

The inspector evaluated the licensee's locks, keys, and combinations program by reviewing ADM-406, "Security Keys and Lock System," dated February 14, 1995. Also the inspector interviewed the individual responsible for the program and found him to be knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities. The inspector examined the GSA approved safe where extra keys, cores, and combinations were held in addition to the three key repositories located onsite. The licensee also commits to rotation of protected and vital area mechanical locks every twelve months, which the inspector verified by reviewing associated documentation. The inspector also noted that the licensee documents change of keys, locks, cores, and combinations when an employee who previously had access is terminated for cause.

Through review of documentation, interview with licensee representatives, and observation, the inspector determined there were no violations of regulatory requirements noted in this area.

2.6 Records and Reports

The inspector reviewed Safeguards Event Logs (SELs) for the period June 1, 1995 to present and determined there had been an increase in events of weapons and ammunition being found by the Security Force at the entrance of the protected area. Five events for the period of August 22, 1995 to December 30, 1995 were denoted in the SELs and are as follows:

-	August 22, 1995	loaded handgun at the NEB
-	October 6, 1995	loaded handgun at the NEB
-	December 4, 1995	9mm ammunition at the Main Vehicle Gate
-	December 15, 1995	loaded handgun, loaded magazine, extra ammunition at the Main Vehicle Gate
-	December 20, 1995	loaded handgun at the NEB

The inspector noted that Security was performing functions appropriately in stopping these weapons/ammunition from entering the protected area; however, there appeared to be a desensitization of plant employees regarding the site's policy of bringing contraband onsite. The licensee stated they would evaluate the trend for appropriate corrective actions.

There were no violations of regulatory requirements noted on this area.

3.0 Review of Updated Final Safety Analysis (UFSAR) Commitments

A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in an manner contrary to the UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares plant practices, procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR descriptions. During a portion of the inspection period (March 4-8, 1996), the inspector reviewed the applicable sections of the UFSAR and Security Program Plans that related to the inspection areas discussed in this report. The inspector verified that the UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters.

4.0 Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on March 8, 1996, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. The licensee was informed that no violations of regulatory requirements were noted during this inspection. In addition, the inspector noted the increase in weapons/ammunition found by Security before entry into the protected area. The licensee acknowledged this concern and stated the trend would be evaluated for appropriate action. Also, the inspector was informed by the licensee that short term corrective measures would be place for the disable Safenet by the end of this outage. Long term corrective measure would begin implementation by this summer in the form of a test section of the new fiber optic system. The inspector commented on the professionalism and knowledge of the security staff and noted the efficiently organized key and lock program. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.