

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Point Beach Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 1 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
Inadvertent Actuation of Emergency Safeguards

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1	1	0 8	8	4	0 0 7	1	2	0 7	None		0 5 0 0 0
1	1	0 8	8	4	0 0 7	1	2	0 7	None		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)					
	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)					
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)						
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)						
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME C. W. Fay, Vice President-Nuclear Power		AREA CODE	NUMBER
		4 1 4	2 7 7 - 2 8 1 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During a refueling shutdown on November 8, 1984, while performing 4160 V breaker auxiliary switch wiring inspection, the normal feeder breaker for distribution bus 2A03 was opened prior to providing an alternate power supply for bus 2A03. This resulted in a loss of power to buses 2A03 and 2A05. The loss of voltage on 2A05 resulted in the actuation of emergency Diesel generator G01.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Point Beach Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 1	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 4	- 0 0 7	- 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On November 8, 1984, at 0130 hours, the normal feeder breaker 2A52-45, for 4160 V distribution bus 2A03, was being removed from service to facilitate inspection of the breaker auxiliary switch wiring. This inspection was being performed under a Maintenance Request. A licensed operator attempted to supply power to 2A03 from bus 1A03 by shutting bus tie breaker 1A52-40. Breaker 1A52-40 did not shut, however, due to interlocks which prevent its shutting from the control room if both 1A03 and 2A03 are energized. Another licensed operator opened breaker 2A52-45 before he realized that 1A52-40 did not actually shut. This resulted in a loss of power to buses 2A03 and 2A05. Emergency Diesel generator G01 started and its feed breaker to 2A05 shut on the loss of voltage. All systems and components operated as designed. Breaker 2A52-45 was shut to restore normal power. A special maintenance procedure (SMP) was written and approved to complete the breaker inspection.

A combination of personnel errors contributed to this event. First, the Maintenance Request did not require a SMP even though a SMP was required for this task by the plant's Administrative Control Policies and Procedures Manual. Additionally, an approved SMP was used to perform the inspection on the Unit 1 breakers. This event will be reviewed by supervisory personnel to point out the need to ensure a SMP is used when required.

The operators made several errors while attempting to shut breaker 1A52-40. It was not initially realized that the breaker could only be shut locally if both buses 1A03 and 2A03 were energized. After going to close on the remote breaker operator, proper verification that the breaker was shut prior to tripping breaker 2A52-45 was not performed. This event is similar to Licensee Event Report 84-005-00 for Docket No. 50-301 where improper electrical bus switching resulted in a loss of power and automatic actuation of an emergency Diesel generator. As a result of these two similar occurrences, an Operations special order has been promulgated to reiterate guidelines for electrical bus switching operations. This special order requires that all electrical bus breaker operations be performed by one person whenever possible and be directly supervised by the Duty Shift Superintendent or the Duty Operating Supervisor. Additionally, it requires the operators to determine what equipment is to be operated, proper sequence of events and expected response prior to performing the switching operation and to verify by indications and instruments that the operation is proceeding as expected. To ensure that this special order is properly understood by all licensed operators, the Duty Shift Superintendents will review it with their crews. Additionally, an electrical equipment operating instruction will be generated which should prevent future recurrences. No further action is considered to be required.



Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY
231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046, MILWAUKEE, WI 53201

December 7, 1984

Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement,
Region III
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

DOCKET NO. 50-301
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-007-00
INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY SAFEGUARDS
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 84-007-00 which provides a description of an inadvertent actuation of an emergency diesel generator while in a shut-down condition reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature, including the reactor protection system."

Very truly yours,

Vice President-Nuclear Power

C. W. Fay

Enclosure

Copy to NRC Resident Inspector

DEC 10 1984

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