

16 Aug 1993

Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414

MEMORANDUM FOR: David B. Mathews, Project Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: Carl H. Berlinger, Chief
Electrical Engineering Branch
Division of Engineering
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Plant Name: Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2
Utility: Duke Power Company
Licensing Status: OR
Resp. Directorate: PD II-3
Project Manager: R.E. Martin
Review Status: Complete
TAC Nos.: M-86367 and M-86368

In response to letter TIA 93-13 of May 12, 1993, from E. Merschhoff, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, RGN-2, to G. Lainas, Assistant Director for Region II Reactors, Division of Reactor Projects I/II, NRR, requesting review and concurrence in a Duke Power Company (DPC) response to an Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSFI) finding of February 14, 1992, both the EDSFI finding and the DPC response to it were forwarded to EELB for staff review and concurrence.

The EDSFI performed at Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (CNS) from January 13 to February 14, 1992 identified the following safety significant deviation from a written commitment: "NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, states on page 8.3.2-5 that acceptance [of a design] is based on meeting the specific guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.32, which endorses the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 308." IEEE Std. 308, states in Section 5.3.1 that protective devices shall be provided to limit the degradation of Class 1E power systems. The licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) states on page 8-75 that the system meets the requirements of this standard. The FSAR, in Section 8.3.1.1.2.2, states that protective devices on the 600-Vac essential power system (EPS) are set to achieve a selective tripping scheme so that a minimal amount of equipment is isolated by an adverse condition such as a fault.

Contrary to these commitments, some of the circuit breakers are not coordinated. After performing a review, described in the licensee's submittal, the licensee concluded that because the

CATSEV

- 2 -

consequences were small, the initiating events infrequent, and corrections costly, nothing need be done and the plant is safe enough the way it is, despite the lack of coordination between EPS breakers.

The staff does not agree with the licensee's conclusion for reasons given in the attached safety evaluation and recommends that the licensee be required to fulfill to their FSAR commitments.

Enclosure 1 is the staff's safety evaluation. Enclosure 2 is the SALP input.

Carl H. Berlinger, Chief
Electrical Engineering Branch
Division of Engineering
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Safety Evaluation
2. SALP Input

CONTACT: C. Morris, EELB/DE
504-2778

EELB:DE:NRR	RPB:ADM	SC:EELB:DE:NRR	C/EELB:DE:NRR
CMorris	TechEd	EWWeiss	CHBerlinger
08/ /93	08/ /93	08/ /93	08/ /93