

ENCLOSURE

Description of Violations

Jersey Central Power and Light Company  
Morristown, New Jersey 07960  
Docket No. 50-219  
License No. DPR-16

Certain activities under your license appear to be in violation of AEC regulations and license requirements. These apparent violations are considered to be of Category II severity.

1. Technical Specification 4.5 refers to containment system leakage rates. Section 4.5F.1(d) provides a limit for "any one penetration or isolation valve 5%  $L_{t0}$  (20)."

Contrary to this requirement main steam isolation valves failed to meet allowable leakage requirements as follows:

- a. NS03B on September 9, 1973 with measured leakage in excess of 100 SCFH. (JCP&L letters to DL dated September 21, 1973 and December 7, 1973 (Revised))
  - b. NS04A and B on September 27, 1973 with measured leakage of 96.59 and 15.15 SCFH respectively. (JCP&L letter to DL dated October 12, 1973)
  - c. NS04A on January 16, 1974 with measured leakage of 31.7 SCFH. (JCP&L letter to DL dated January 25, 1974)
2. Technical Specification 2.3.(1)a "APRM" states in part the limiting safety system setting shall be as follows:

"For recirculation flow,  $W < 61 \times 10^6$  lb/hr:

$< ((1.12 \times 10^{-6}) W + 51.76)$  percent of rated neutron flux for total peaking factors  $< 3.01$

$< ((1.12 \times 10^{-6}) W + 51.76) \left( \frac{3.01}{PF} \right)$  percent of rated neutron flux for total peaking factors,  $PF > 3.01$ ."

Further Technical Specification 2.3(2)a "APRM Control Rod Block" states in part,

"For recirculation flow,  $W < 61 \times 10^6$  lb/hr:

$< ((1.12 \times 10^{-6}) W + 37.72)$  percent of rated neutron flux for total peaking factors  $< 3.03$

$< ((1.12 \times 10^{-6}) W + 37.72) \left( \frac{3.03}{P.F.} \right)$  percent of rated neutron flux for total peaking factors,  $P.F. > 3.03$ ."

Contrary to this requirement, on October 6, 1973, with a recirculation flow of  $30 \times 10^6$  lbs/hr, APRMS were set such that 100% of the APRMS corresponded to 1400 MW(t), accounting for peaking factors of 4.15 which resulted in a setting less conservative than specified above. (JCP&L letter to DL dated October 16, 1973)

3. Technical specification 2.3.7 states, the limiting safety system setting for the low pressure main steam line MSIV closure shall be "> 850 psig."

Contrary to this requirement during surveillance, trips failed to occur at the required set point setting as follows:

- a. RE 23A, B, C and D (JCP&L letter to DL dated December 24, 1973)
- b. RE 23C (JCP&L letter to DL dated January 15, 1974)

We note that your ongoing audit and review has disclosed that a head correction factor had not been applied such that these switches have been set in violation of the Technical Specifications since initial startup.

4. Technical Specification Table 3.1.1 specifies protective instrumentation requirements. Section 3.1.1.B.6 provides settings for high radiation in main steam tunnel as follows:

"< 10X Normal background."

Contrary to this requirement, on December 27, 1973 Monitor No. RNO5A failed to trip when tested. (JCP&L letter to DL dated January 9, 1974)

5. Technical Specification 3.5.A.6 states in part.....  
"the primary containment atmosphere shall be reduced to less than 5.0% O<sub>2</sub> with nitrogen gas within 24 hours after the reactor mode selector switch is placed in the run mode."

Contrary to this requirement, at 10:00 A.M. January 22, 1974 the torus atmosphere contained 6.2% O<sub>2</sub> and the mode switch had been placed in run at 10:00 A.M. January 21, 1974. (JCP&L letter to DL dated January 26, 1974)

6. Technical Specification 2.3.5 "Reactor High Pressure, Isolation Condenser Initiation" states the limiting safety system setting shall be "< 1060 psig with time delay < 15 seconds."

Contrary to this requirement on January 17, 1974 during testing three time delay relays failed to close within the 15 second limit. (JCP&L letter to DL dated January 29, 1974)

7. Technical Specification 4.7.A.6 states "The diesel generators' starting batteries shall be tested and monitored the same as the station batteries Technical Specification 4.7.B." Section 4.7.B.1 states in part, "The specific gravity and voltage..... the temperature.....and the overall battery voltage shall be measured weekly."

Contrary to this requirement, tests performed at the interval May 10, 21, and June 8, 1973, did not constitute a weekly frequency.

8. Technical Specification 6.2.A states "Detailed written procedures with appropriate checkoff lists and instructions shall be provided for the following conditions:"

Technical Specification 6.2.A.4 references "Preventive or corrective maintenance operations which could have an effect on the safety of the reactor."

Contrary to this requirement on December 13, 1973, jumpers were improperly installed, resulting in a loss of 125V DC power supplying instrumentation to safeguards systems. The referenced operation was conducted without a procedure. It is noted that a procedure was subsequently written and approved by PORC.

The following apparent violation is considered to be of Category III severity.

9. Paragraph 6.6.2 of the Technical Specifications requires that you notify the Director of the Regional Regulatory Operations office within 24 hours by telephone and telegraph followed by a written report within 10 days to the Director of Licensing.

Contrary to the above, the following abnormal occurrence was not reported within 24 hours, as required:

Abnormal Occurrence 73-23(1) dated September 25, 1973.

Further, 10 day reports for the following abnormal occurrences were not submitted within the specified interval:

- (1) AO 73-22 (10 day report) dated September 21, 1973
- (2) AO 73-24 (10 day report) dated October 12, 1973
- (3) AO 73-32 (10 day report) dated January 7, 1974
- (4) AO 73-34 (10 day report) dated January 9, 1974

OFFICE ▶						
SURNAME ▶						
DATE ▶						

V2A.

To:

James P. O'Reilly  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
Region I  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From:

Jersey Central Power & Light Company  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219  
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject:

Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/26

The following is a preliminary report being submitted  
in compliance with the Technical Specifications  
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

*J. T. Carroll, Jr.* 4/12/74  
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

~~8344114416 (EPP)~~

B/S76



OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION,  
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence  
Report No. 50-219/74/26

IDENTIFICATION  
OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph N/A,  
**FAILURE OF EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP  
(52C) TO START WHEN CALLED UPON.**

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as de-  
fined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15 D.

CONDITIONS PRIOR  
TO OCCURRENCE:

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown
<input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby	<input type="checkbox"/> Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During
<input type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/> Operation	

POWER	CORE - 1843.	MWT
	ELEC. - 637	MWE
FLOW	RECIRC. - $61 \times 10^6$	g/hr
	FEEDW. - $6.9 \times 10^6$	g/hr
STACK GAS	- 36,600	MG/SEC

DESCRIPTION

OF OCCURRENCE: ON FRIDAY APRIL 12, 1974 IN ATTEMPTING A NORMAL START  
OF THE CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM, THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF  
EVENTS OCCURRED:

- 1) A START SIGNAL GIVEN TO CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM II
- 2) CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP SIC STARTED
- 3) EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP 52C FAILED TO START  
AND "EMERG. SERVICE WATER PUMP C FAILURE" ALARM INITIATED  
AFTER THE 4180 SEC. TIME DELAY.

- 4) EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP B2D WAS THEN STARTED AND OPERATED SUCCESSFULLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.4.c.4.

- 5) CONTINGENT SPRAY SYSTEM II WAS SECURED.
- 6) AN OPERATOR WAS DISPATCHED TO THE 4160 V SWITCHGEAR ROOM AND IT WAS DISCOVERED THE THE THERMAL OVERLOAD RELAY HAD TRIPPED ON THE 52c BREAKER. THE OVERLOAD RELAY WAS RESET.

- 7) CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR ATTEMPTED A RESET OF CONTINGENT SPRAY SYSTEM II

- 8) THE SYSTEM OPERATED PROPERLY WITH NO IRREGULARITIES.
- 9) THE SYSTEM AFTER THIS SUCCESSFUL OPERABILITY WAS SECURED.

THE SYSTEM WAS GIVEN AN ADDITIONAL OPERABILITY CHECK LATER IN THE DAY AND OPERATED SUCCESSFULLY WITH NO PROBLEMS OR ALARMS.

PRIOR TO THIS EVENT ON THURSDAY APRIL 11, 1974, THE CONTINGENT SPRAY SYSTEM II WAS INITIATED TO OBTAIN TEST WATER SAMPLES AND TO PUMP TEST WATER. AT THIS TIME WHILE RUNNING THE SYSTEM THE "EMER. SERVICE WATER PUMP C TRIP" ALARM WAS RECEIVED. THE PUMP CONTINUED OPERATING AND AN OPERATOR WAS DISPATCHED TO THE EMER. SERV. WATER PUMP TO INVESTIGATE. THE OIL LEVEL AND THE STRAINING TEMPERATURES WERE NORMAL. HOWEVER, THE OPERATOR DID NOT CHECK THE

THERMAL OVERLOAD RELAY AT THE PUMP BREAKER IN THE  
4160 V SWITCHGEAR ROOM. AT THIS TIME IT WAS THOUGHT THAT  
THE ALARM WAS A FAULTY INDICATION AND A JOB ORDER WAS  
ISSUED TO HAVE IT CHECKED OUT. WHEN THE SYSTEM WAS  
SECURED THE ALARM DID NOT CLEAR. THIS ALARM WAS STILL  
ON WHEN THE PUMP<sup>START</sup> WAS ATTEMPTED AT THE TIME OF  
THE INCIDENT.



APPARENT CAUSE  
OF OCCURRENCE:

Design  
 Manufacture  
 Installation/  
Construction  
 Operator

Procedure  
 Unusual Service Condition  
 Inc. Environmental  
Component Failure  
 Other (Specify)

A CHECK OF THE LOGIC CIRCUIT SHOWED THAT THE INITIAL ALARM OF "EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMP C TROUBLE" SHOULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED THE PUMP FROM STARTING. THE INCIDENT IS STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION AND THE EXACT CAUSE YET TO BE DETERMINED.

ANALYSIS OF  
OCCURRENCE:

THE CONTAINMENT SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY WITH ONE CONT. SPRAY AND ONE EMERG. SERVICE WATER PUMP IN EITHER LOOP. THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IS IN THE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY OF THE EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMPS IN ONE OF THE TWO REDUNDANT CONT. SPRAY SYSTEMS.

CORRECTIVE  
ACTION:

THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE PORC AFTER THE APPROPRIATE REVIEW OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS EVENT.

FAILURE DATA:

UNDER INVESTIGATION.

Prepared by:

J.R. Salling

Date:

APRIL 12, 1974

APR 11 1974

Jersey Central Power and Light Company  
Attention: Mr. Ivan Finfreck  
Vice President of Power  
Generation  
Madison Avenue at Punchbowl Road  
Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Docket No. 50-219  
License No. DPR-16

Reference: Your letter dated March 13, 1974  
In response to our letter dated February 11, 1974

Gentlemen:

Thank you for informing us of the corrective and preventive actions you documented in response to our correspondence. The information contained in your letter is being reviewed. In the event that there are further questions regarding this information, we will review them at our next inspection.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

James P. O'Reilly  
Director

bcc: RO Chief, FS&EB  
RO:HQ (4)  
DL (4)  
RO Files  
DR Central Files  
RS (3)  
PDR  
Local PDR  
NSIC  
DTIE  
State of New Jersey

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Mann  
4/10/74  
4/10/74

Knapp  
4/10/74

Nelson  
4/11/74

O'Reilly  
4/11/74

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