

ENCLOSURE 1

DESCRIPTION OF VIOLATIONS

Jersey Central Power and Light Company
Morristown, New Jersey 07960
Docket No. 50-219
License No. DPR-16

Certain activities under your license appear to be in violation of AEC requirements. These apparent violations are considered to be of Category II severity.

1. Technical Specification 3.3.C.1 states, "The average rate of reactor coolant temperature change during normal heatup and cooldown shall not exceed 100° F in any one hour period.

Contrary to the above, permanent chart records recorded over a one hour period indicated a recorded temperature change of 110° F and 120° F per hour for pump temperatures as selected for a September 25, 1974 cooldown following a reactor scram. Additionally, wide range pressure indication for the same interval indicated a cooldown rate of 104° F per hour.

2. Technical Specification 3.5.A.1 states in part, that "Primary containment integrity shall be maintained at all times when the reactor is critical...except while performing low power physics tests...at power levels not to exceed 5 Mwt."

Contrary to the above:

- a. Butterfly valve V-26-16 was found leaking on April 9, 1974 and not fully closed during a local leakrate test. (JCP&L letter to DL dated April 19, 1974, Subject AO 74-25)
- b. Cleanup System DC isolation valve V-16-14 failed to close on October 4, 1974. (JCP&L letter to DL dated October 11, 1974, Subject AO 74-50)

3. Technical Specification 4.5.F.I.2 states in part, "The following reactor coolant systems isolation valves shall be tested by an isolation signal during each refueling outage, and are required to close in the time specified...Main steam isolation valves \geq 3 seconds and \leq 10 seconds...."

Contrary to the above, main steam isolation valve NS04B closed in 13.0 seconds during routine full closure surveillance conducted July 14, 1974. (JCP&L letter to DL dated July 23, 1974, Subject AO 74-38)

4. Technical Specification 3.5.B.1 states in part, "Secondary Containment integrity shall be maintained at all times unless all of the following conditions are met." Referenced conditions exclude reactor operation.

Contrary to the above, while performing secondary containment leak rate testing on November 8, 1974, isolation valve V-28-6 did not fully close. (JCP&L letter to DL dated November 18, 1974, Subject AO 74-58)

5. Technical Specification 2.3.3 states the limiting safety system setting for the reactor high pressure, Scram shall be "≤ 1060 psig.

Contrary to this requirement during surveillance, trip failed to occur at the required setpoint setting as follows:

RE03D tripped at 1070 psig
(JCP&L letter to DL dated July 18, 1974, Subject: AO 74-36)

6. Technical Specification 2.3.7 states the limiting safety system setting for the low pressure mainstream line MSIV closure shall be "≤ 850 psig."

Contrary to this requirement during surveillance, trips failed to occur at the required setpoint as follows:

- a. RE 23 A, B, C and D (JCP&L letter to DL dated July 19, 1974, Subject AO 74-37)
- b. RE 23 C and D (JCP&L letter to DL dated July 26, 1974, Subject AO 74-41)
- c. RE 23 A, B, C and D (JCP&L letter to DL dated August 2, 1974, Subject AO 74-42)
- d. RE 23 B (JCP&L letter to DL dated August 12, 1974, Subject AO 74-43).

- e. RE 23 A, B, C and D (JCP&L letter to DL dated August 19, 1974, Subject AO 74-44)
 - f. RE 23 A (JCP&L letter to DL dated October 4, 1974, Subject AO 74-49)
 - g. RE 23 B and C (JCP&L letter to DL dated October 11, 1974, Subject AO 74-51)
 - h. RE 23 A (JCP&L letter to DL dated October 21, 1974, Subject AO 74-52)
 - i. RE 23 A, B, C and D (JCP&L letter to DL dated November 11, 1974, Subject AO 74-56)
7. Technical Specification 2.3.4 states the limiting safety system setting for the reactor high pressure relief valve initiation shall be "> 1070 psig."

Contrary to this requirement, during surveillance trips failed to occur at the required setpoint as follows:

1A83A, 1A83B, 1A83C and 1A83E (JCP&L letter to DL dated July 23, 1974, Subject AO 74-39)

We note that items 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were reported to Regulatory as indicated above. Your corrective measures were reviewed during this inspection. We have no further questions on these matters at this time.

D. L. Capton, Senior Reactor Inspector, Reactor Operations Branch

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
OYSTER CREEK (DN 50-219)
RO INSPECTION 50-219/74-18

This was the first routine inspection I have personally conducted, in some time at this facility. I find the licensee improved in the following areas:

1. Housekeeping
2. Staffing
3. Resolution of chromated water storage

Seven violations, (six reported by the licensee) and one issue related to GORB audit availability on site were identified. The licensee is improving in performance slowly. Numerous switch drift problems were also reviewed during this inspection.

I feel that much work remains in the area of procedures, QA, and maintenance to provide acceptable performance. Based on these findings I do not foresee a significant change in enforcement history for at least another year.

I additionally anticipate problems in the following area based on discussions with the JCP&L Staff.

1. Fuel performance
2. Operator Retraining

Gary Snyder, acting for
Ed Greenman
Reactor Inspector