



SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report Nos.: 50-302/96-02

Licensee: Florida Power Corporation
3201 -34th Street, South
St. Petersburg, FL 33733

Docket Nos.: 50-302

License Nos.: DPR-72

Facility Name: Crystal River Nuclear Plant Unit 3

Inspection Conducted: March 18-22 and April 3-5, 1996

Inspector: Lori C. Stratton, Safeguards Inspector

5/1/96
Date Signed

Approved by: Paul E. Fredrickson, Chief
Special Inspection Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

5/1/96
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the various aspects of the Physical Security Program for Power Reactors. Specifically inspected were: testing, maintenance and compensatory measures; training and qualification; security program plans and implementing procedures; and records and reports. Also, the inspector reviewed Safeguards Information and the facility's Final Safety Analysis Report in the area of Security.

Results:

In the area of testing and maintenance, the inspector noted the absence of a lighting procedure that would clearly define and document lighting surveys and maintenance needs related to lighting. On March 20, the inspector and a security officer toured the protected area and found an area of darkness that did not meet the licensee's Physical Security Plan commitment of 0.2 footcandle. This is noted as Violation 96-02-01. Other lighting areas evaluated by the inspector were within regulatory requirements. Additional testing and maintenance records reviewed were well documented and in accordance with the licensee's Physical Security Plan.

The main vehicle gate associated with the newly installed vehicle barrier system was inoperable during the course of this inspection. The gate was in the access position, and compensatory measures had been taken by the licensee. The inspector determined that during the time period the gate remained in the access position, it was not maintained and failed to meet the requirements of

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the licensee's Physical Security Plan and 10 CFR 73.55(g)(1). This violation is noted as 96-02-02. The compensatory measures the licensee established for the degraded vehicle barrier gate were inadequate and neither met the guidance delineated in Nuclear Energy Institute 96-01, "Guidelines for Operational Planning and Maintaining Integrity of Vehicle Barrier Systems," dated February 1996 and Regulatory Guide 5.68, "Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants," dated August 1994, nor did they provide a suitable alternative. On March 22, 1996, the licensee added additional compensatory measures as immediate corrective action to address the violation. On March 28, 1996, the vehicle barrier gate was repaired and was operational as of April 5, 1996.

In the area of training and qualification, the inspector reviewed random records and determined that the licensee was meeting the criteria specified in their NRC approved Training and Qualification Plan for those records reviewed. In the area of implementing procedures, the inspector determined the licensee failed to have an adequate procedure in place that documented specific compensatory measures for the vehicle barrier system in the event of a failure. On March 22, 1996, the licensee added those specific compensatory measures to their procedure as an immediate corrective action to this violation. This issue is documented as part of Violation 96-02-02.

Upon review of the Physical Security Plan, Rev. 6-7 and observation during the course of this inspection, the inspector noted that the absence of the secondary alarm station and the licensee's compensatory measures to counterbalance that absence did not meet the requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.54(p) and 10 CFR 73.55(e). On April 2, 1996, the licensee met with NRC in Region II, Atlanta, Georgia to discuss those specific compensatory measures. During the course of the inspection conducted April 3-5, the inspector met with licensee representatives to determine if compensatory measures proposed for short term and long term would be appropriate. This item is noted as Violation 96-02-03.

Other security procedures reviewed by the inspector were adequate and implemented the requirements specified in the licensee's Physical Security Plan. Upon review of the licensee's Safeguard Event Logs, the inspector noted an access authorization issue which allowed a contractor employee access into the protected area without a complete background investigation. This violation is characterized as a non-cited Violation 96-02-04.

During a review of the new security system to be installed, the inspector noted that a licensee engineer failed to secure a Safeguards Information container after leaving the area. This is noted as Violation 96-02-05.

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