



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos.: 50-321/85-03 and 50-366/85-03

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366

License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Approved By:

V. Panclera
V. Panclera, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects

1/25/85
Date Signed

SUMMARY:

An enforcement conference was held in the Region II Office on January 11, 1985. Messrs. J. P. O'Reilly and J. A. Olshinski opened the meeting by expressing a concern over an observed trend in plant operations that is characterized by the events surrounding the apparent failure to comply with Technical Specifications (TSs) as pertaining to reactor coolant system leakage, as well as by previous occurrences relating to the performance of maintenance activities. Georgia Power Corporation attributed the personnel errors to the overwhelming amount of work that occurred in 1984. They acknowledged the NRC concern that the middle supervisory echelon may not be as actively involved in the day-to-day plant operations as desired. The licensee plans to correct this problem by limiting the amount of work in 1985 so personnel are back in routine operations and administrative duties of supervisors are minimized, allowing them to get into the plant more often. A re-evaluation of their existing proactive programs is also underway.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Attendees

Georgia Power Company

J. T. Beckham, Jr., Vice President and General Manager-Nuclear Operations
H. C. Nix, Jr., General Manager-Plant Hatch
L. T. Gucwa, Manager Nuclear Engineering and Chief Nuclear Engineer
R. D. Baker, Nuclear Regulatory Engineering Manager
B. L. Keck, Engineering Supervisor-Plant Hatch
F. G. Gorley, Operations Supervisor on Shift-Plant Hatch
D. Rose, Shift Supervisor-Plant Hatch
L. Swinson, Assistant Plant Operator-Plant Hatch

NRC Region II

J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
J. A. Olshinski, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
P. R. Bemis, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
R. D. Walker, Deputy Director, DRP
V. L. Brownlee, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2, DRP
A. F. Gibson, Chief, Operations Branch, DRP
V. W. Panciera, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2B, DRP
R. V. Crlenjak, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Holmes-Ray, Resident Inspector, Hatch
J. M. Puckett, Director, Enforcement and Investigation
Coordination Staff
F. Jape, Chief, Test Program Section, DRS
R. E. Carroll, Jr., Project Engineer, DRP
D. Stadler, Reactor Engineer, DRS
G. M. Nejfelt, Reactor Inspector, DRS

2. Enforcement Meeting

Both Messers. J. P. O'Reilly and J. A. Olshinski opened up the meeting by pointing out that this conference did not concern any big safety issues, but because of an observed trend towards a lack of appropriate attention in plant operations, it was felt that such a meeting was required as preventative enforcement. It was requested that Georgia Power Company (GPC) address this trend of operations as seen in the events surrounding the apparent failure to comply with TSs as pertaining to reactor coolant system leakage, as well as in previous occurrences relating to the performance of maintenance activities.

GPC presented the sequence of events pertaining to the December 13-14, 1984 event in which a delay in calculating the 0000 hour drywell floor drain leak rate resulted in the plant being in a TS action step approximately four hours before being recognized by the operators.

In this presentation (which is outlined in Attachment 1) the licensee concluded that since those actions required by the TSs were taken within the specific time limits, the only problem they saw was the failure of the operator to complete the procedure for calculating the 0000 hour leak rate.

It was explained to GPC that the NRC interpretation of the TS words, to demonstrate reactor coolant system leakage to be within required limits by monitoring primary containment floor drain and equipment sump levels and flow rates, means not only to collect data but to perform required calculations as well. Additionally, it was pointed out that the operators had no way to be sure that the observed increase in drywell pressure and temperature was due entirely from packing leakage. Furthermore, the expected packing leakage combined with the 2000 hour reactor coolant system leakage should have prompted the entry into the TS action step.

Attention was then focused on those additional matters relating to errors made during the performance of maintenance activities. The licensee made it known that senior management is concerned with this problem and is committed to correct it. They then proceeded to explain that 1984 was the busiest year in the plant's history for plant personnel, in that there were back-to-back and simultaneous outages. Consequently, there was more work done and therefore, the number of errors increased. They also pointed out that the error rate at Hatch was not significantly different from the industry average for comparable units. It was stated that the goal at Hatch in 1985 was to limit work items to only those that are required. This would allow personnel to get back into routine operations, thereby, eliminating a lot of personnel errors. In addition, GPC is re-evaluating their existing programs to see where (if any) improvements are required.

The NRC Region II staff recognized that the Hatch senior management is committed to correct the problem, but there is a need for middle level plant management to be more actively involved in day-to-day plant activities.

GPC acknowledged the NRC viewpoint and pointed out that they are hopeful that the combination of limiting the amount of work (thereby, minimizing administrative duties) and the following through with their existing proactive programs, will free up the middle supervisory echelon and get them out in the plant as a committed member of the team.

Attachment:
Enforcement Conference between GPC and
U. S. NRC, dated 1/11/85

ATTACHMENT

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
BETWEEN GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
AND
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - REGION II
ON PLANT HATCH UNIT 2
COMPLIANCE WITH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
LEAKAGE REQUIREMENTS

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

JANUARY 11, 1985

ATTENDEES

Georgia Power Company

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Title</u> |
|--------------------|---|
| J. T. Beckham, Jr. | Vice President and General Manager- Nuclear Operations |
| H. C. Nix, Jr. | General Manager-Plant Hatch |
| L. T. Gucwa | Manager Nuclear Engineering & Chief Nuclear Engineer |
| R. D. Baker | Nuclear Regulatory Engineering Manager |
| B. L. Keck | Engineering Supervisor-Plant Hatch |
| F. G. Gorley | Operations Supervisor on Shift-Plant Hatch |
| D. Rose | Shift Supervisor-Plant Hatch |
| L. Swinson | Assistant Plant Operator-Plant Hatch |

U. S. NRC-Region II

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Title</u> |
|-------------|--------------|
|-------------|--------------|

AGENDA
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
BETWEEN GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
AND
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - REGION II
ON PLANT HATCH UNIT 2
COMPLIANCE WITH REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
LEAKAGE REQUIREMENTS

ATLANTA, GEORGIA

JANUARY 11, 1985

- I. Introduction and Meeting Purpose (NRC - J. A. Olshinski)
- II. Identification of Issues of Concern (NRC/GPC)
- III. GPC Discussion of Concerns (GPC - J. T. Beckham, Jr.)
 - A. Events of December 13-14, 1984 related to Hatch-2 reactor coolant leakage (GPC - H. C. Nix)
 - 1. Sequence of Events
 - 2. Safety Significance
 - B. Overall Work Practices at Plant Hatch Involving Human Error (GPC - H. C. Nix)
 - C. Proactive Actions (GPC - H. C. Nix)
- IV. General Discussion (NRC/GPC)
- V. Closing Remarks (NRC - J. A. Olshinski)

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

STATUS OF UNITS

12/13/84*

- o 2000 Unit 1 shutdown for refueling
Unit 2 full power - no shutdown LCO's
24 hour avg floor drain leak 3.8 gpm Long-term trend up.
4 hour avg 4.15 gpm no short-term trend

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- o 2009 RCIC isolates on suppression chamber delta-T
(2E51-F007 inboard isolation valve)
- o 2140 Shift change. Oncoming Shift Supervisor noted and started monitoring increased drywell temps and pressure and attributed this to F007 valve.
- o 2221 Reset isolation - opened F007 valve. (not fully backseated per information tag). Initiated MW0 to electrically backseat F007 valve.
- o 2400 Data collected on Floor Drain integrator per procedure. (HNP-2-1050).

12/14/84

- o 0230 Valve electrically backseated and trends on temperature and pressure started down.
- o 0400 Data collected on Floor Drain integrator per procedure (HNP-2-1050) again and realized that leakage rate for previous reading had not been calculated.
- o 0410 Calculations showed leakage rates of 6.0 gpm for the 4-hour period ending at 0000 and 5.17 for the 0400 period.

LCO initiated by Shift Supervisor retroactively to 0000. Orderly shutdown initiated per standing order which invoked ACTION (c) of Specification 3.4.3.2
- o 0500 Red phone notification of shutdown LCO.
- o 0510 Notified resident inspector
- o 0600 Drywell floor drain leakage rate was calculated to be 3.6 gpm and LCO and shutdown was terminated.

* Central Standard Time. Times are approximate.

Leakage Detection Capabilities

- drywell pressure
- drywell temperature
- fission product monitor
- sump pump out interval
- sump pump run time
- sump level

Safety Significance

Basis of Technical Specifications

- o Detect and identify normal equipment leakage
- o Assure early detection of unidentified pressure boundary leakage to provide sufficient times to take corrective action.

Basis of Confirmatory Order

- o Provide augmented assurance due to uncertainties associated with identified pipe flaws.

Conclusions

1. An increase in leakage was identified associated with 2E51-F007 due to packing leaks.
2. Corrective actions were taken to reduce the leakage rate and a shutdown LCO was initiated.
3. Reported by red phone and to resident inspector.
4. Actions required by Technical Specifications were taken.


Identify the Problem

- o 1984 was the busiest year in plant history for plant personnel.
 - Back to back and simultaneous outages
 - More work was done and therefore the number of errors will increase even if the rate remains constant
- o Hatch is not significantly different from the industry average for comparable units.

1983 PERSONNEL ERROR RATE

BASED ON LERS FROM 12 BWR'S

INDUSTRY AVERAGE




HATCH 1

HATCH 2

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1984 PERSONNEL ERROR RATE

BASED ON LERS FROM 12 BWR'S



Resolve the problem

o What we have done and will do to improve proficiency in order to reduce personnel errors:

- Proactive Programs

*Integrated schedule - matching resources to commitments

*Training Programs

*Project II scheduling and outage management

*Procedure 34 (head off errors)

*WCC (scheduling group)

*Computerization of work orders

*Reduce numbers of contractors (prime maintenance support contractors)

*Quality of work life (safety STOP program and rec. facilities and quality circles)

*General employee information meetings

*Supervisors information meetings

*Trending of deficiency reports

*Formal root cause reporting of trips to corporate management

*Decontamination and housekeeping of plant to improve monitoring

*Instituting new procedure system

*INPO Accreditation Program

Emphasis on:

Priorities

Safety
Quality
Quantity

Duties

Plan
Organize
Execute
Test

Conditions of Employment

Fitness for duty
Attendance
Qualifications