NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | LICENSEE CODE: N J O C P 1 (2) | LICENSE NUMBER: 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | CAT (5)

CON'T 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE: L (6) | DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9 (7) | EVENT DATE: 0 2 2 2 8 3 (8) | REPORT DATE: 1 1 0 2 8 4 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 Local leak rate testing revealed that ten containment isolation valves
0 3 and one gasket failed to meet their acceptance criteria. The failure of
0 4 Drywell Vent Isolation Valves V-27-3 and 4 and Drywell Head gasket to
0 5 meet required acceptance criteria could have resulted in exceeding 10CFR
0 6 100 limits during design basis accident conditions. All other contain-
0 7 ment isolation valves failing leak testing were in series with redundant
0 8 valves which passed. Reportable per Tech Specs, paragraph 6.9.2.a.2.

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	C D (11)	X (12)	Z (13)	V A L V E X (14)	F (15)	D (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 3	—	0 0 9	/	0 1	X	—	1

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
B (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	N (25)	A 5 8 5

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Drywell Purge valve V-27-1 stem was out of alignment. Other valves had
1 1 deterioration of internals. All valves were either repaired or replaced.
1 2 Although appearing to be in good condition, the Drywell head gasket was
1 3 replaced. All penetrations passed their subsequent local leak rate
1 4 tests.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	H (28)	0 0 0 (29)	NA	B (31)	Local Leak Rate Test Program

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	NA	

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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

November 2, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report

This letter forwards Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-09/01X-1, a Licensee Event Report revision, in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.a.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF/dam
Enclosures

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-09/01X-1

Report Date

November 2, 1984

Occurrence Date

February 22, 1983

Identification of Occurrence

The results of local leak rate testing identified ten containment isolation valves and one gasket that failed to meet their acceptance criteria. This constitutes operation of the unit or affected systems when any parameter or operation subject to a limiting condition is less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in Technical Specifications, paragraph 4.5.F.d.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in Technical Specification, paragraph 6.9.2.a.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in cold shutdown with reactor coolant temperature less than 212^{o}F and the reactor vented at the time the occurrence was identified. The reactor was in various operating modes prior to the occurrence.

Description of Occurrence

Local leak rate testing identified the following ten (10) valves and one (1) gasket with leakage in excess of the acceptance criteria of 12.08 SCFH @20psig. The results of the leak rate test program for these valves and gasket are as follows:

DESCRIPTION	PENETRATION	DATE TESTED	LEAKAGE @20 PSIG (SCFH)
Instrument Air and Nitrogen System	V-6-395	3/4/83	30.49
MSIV	NS04A	2/14/83	16.34
MSIV	NS04B	2/14/83	17.21
MSIV Drain Valves	V-1-106, 107	2/14/83	19.44
Drywell Headseal	Gasket	2/16/83	544.68
Drywell Purge	V-27-1	2/18/83	20.24
Drywell Sump Discharge	V-22-28, 29	3/17/83	12.4
Drywell Vent	V-27-3, 4	2/27/83	37.03

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Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the leakage is as follows:

I. V-6-395, V-1-106, V-1-107, V-22-28, V-22-29, V-27-3, V-27-4, NS04A, and NS04B had deterioration of valve internals.

II. Drywell Headseal - cause unkown, seal appeared to be in good condition.

III. V-27-1 stem was found to be out of proper alignment.

Analysis of Occurrence

For valves V-27-1, V-6-395, NS04A, NS04B, V-1-106, and V-1-107 at least one redundant valve for each containment penetration met the acceptance criteria.

The purpose of the Containment System is to provide a barrier to limit the release of radioactive material to the environment to less than 10CFR100 limits during design basis accident conditions. The failure of Containment Isolation Valves V-27-3, 4 and the Drywell Head Seal Gasket to meet required acceptance criteria could have resulted in these limits being exceeded. All other individual containment isolation valves which failed leak testing were in series with other redundant isolation valves which did meet the acceptance criteria.

Corrective Action

Valves V-1-106, 107, and V-6-395 have been replaced with new valves. NS04A and NS04B had their seats lapped, stems replaced, and packing changed. V-27-1 stem was adjusted. V-22-28 received a new seat, stem, and plug. V-22-29 had its seat lapped. V-27-3, 4 received new seats and the Drywell Head had a new seal installed.

All penetrations passed their subsequent Local Leak Rate Tests.