

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0   5   0   0   0   3   2   7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 1   1
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TITLE (4)  
Failure to Comply with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
10	22	84	34	067	00	11	05	84	Sequoyah, Unit 2		0   5   0   0   0   3   2   8
											0   5   0   0   0

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)										
	POWER LEVEL (10) 01010	20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)			X			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(ix)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)							TELEPHONE NUMBER				
NAME Michael R. Cooper, Compliance Section Engineer							AREA CODE 6115				
							817101-1616144				

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO								

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

Following additional inspections of various safety-related systems at Sequoyah, interactions were found that were not in compliance with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50. Fire watches had already been established in this area, due to commitments already made by TVA dealing with Appendix R. This fire watch satisfies requirements per action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.12 and will remain in effect till full compliance with Appendix R can be achieved. This report is required per license condition 2.H, 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii) and special report requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12. This report covers events reported by telecopy on the following dates: 10/12/84, 10/24/84, 10/29/84, and 10/30/84.

There was no effect on public health or safety.

Previous occurrences - six - SQRO-50-327/84046, SQRO-50-327/84049, SQRO-50-327/84051, SQRO-50-327/84057, SQRO-50-327/84059, and SQRO-50-327/84063.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Inspections at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant have identified the following additional items of noncompliance with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50. These inspections are part of an ongoing project to ensure compliance with Appendix R.

1. A fire in the corridor near the No. 6 stairway on elevation 669 could interact with controlling cables for the component cooling system (CCS) pumps that maintain reactor coolant pump seal integrity. Affected equipment - CCS pump A-A, cables 1PL4727A, 1PL4731A, 1PL4732A; CCS pump B-B, cables 1PL4742B, 1PL4743B, 1PL4744B, 1PL4748B, 1PL4749B; Instrument loop 70-63A, cables 1PV288 and 1PM2236. The listed cables are located on elevation 714, 45-feet above the lower elevation.
2. In the common area on elevation 714 an interaction exists between two paths of cables for reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory control.

Path I

Centrifugal charging pump (CCP) A-A, cables 1PP550A, 1PP552A, 1PP554A, 1PP556A.  
 CCP A-A cooler fan and FCV-67-168, cables 1PL3001A, 1PL3003A.  
 CCP A-A auxiliary lube oil pump, cables 1PL6145A, 1PL6148A.  
 Instrument loop 70-63A, cables 1PM2236, 1PV288.  
 CCS pump A-A, cables 1PL4727A, 1PL4731A, 1PL4732A.  
 CCS pump B-B, cables 1PL4742B, 1PL4743B, 1PL4744B, 1PL4748B, 1PL4749B.

Path II

CCP B-B, cables 1PP562B, 1PP564B, 1PP566B, 1PP568B.  
 CCP B-B cooler fan and FCV-67-170, cables 1PL3011B, 1PL3013B.  
 CCP B-B auxiliary lube oil pump, cables 1PL6155B, 1PL6156B, 1PL6152B.  
 Instrument loop 70-99A, cables 1PV386, 1PM2435.  
 CCS pump C-S, cables 1PL4735S, 1PL4736S.

Pressurizer level loops 68-339 (cable 1PV16I), 68-335 (cable 1PV135II), and 63-320 (cable 1PV255III).

3. In the common area on elevation 714, the auxiliary control room, and the auxiliary instrument room, interactions exist between all three paths of letdown (RCS inventory control).

Cables:    Common Area        Auxiliary Control Room        Auxiliary Instr. Room

Valve

FCV-62-54	1V4414	1V4413	1V4411, 1V4412, 1V4413, 1V4415.
FCV-62-55	1V4320	1V4367	1V4369
FCV-62-56	1PV56	1PM133	1PM132, 1PM133, 1PM134.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

4. A fire in the corridor near the No. 6 stairway on elevation 690 could damage cables for the RCS makeup. Valves FCV-63-41 (cable 1V4798B) and FCV-63-42 (cable 1V4830A).
5. In the common area on elevation 690, column A2-A5/T-U, and in the pipe gallery on elevation 690, column A3-A4/U-W, both level control valves (LCVs) for the volume control tank (VCT) interact. LCV-62-133 (cable 1V2770B) and LCV-62-132 (cables 1V2764A and 1V2760A).
6. In 6900V shutdown board room A, all three paths that accomplish normal letdown isolation interact (RCS inventory control).

Path I

FCV-62-69, cables 1V4420A, 1V4421A, 1V4425A.

Path II

FCV-62-70, cables 1V4432A, 1V4433A, 1V4437A.

Path III

FCV-62-72, cables 1V4470A, 1V4471A, 1V4477A.  
 FCV-62-73, cables 1V4485A, 1V4486A, 1V4492A.  
 FCV-62-74, cables 1V4500A, 1V4501A, 1V4507A.

7. In 480V shutdown board room 1B2, interaction exists between both paths of centrifugal charging pumps (CCPs).

Path I

CCP A-A: cables 1PP550A, 1PP552A, 1PP556A.  
 CCP A-A auxiliary lube oil pump: cables 1PL6145A, 1PL6148A.  
 CCP A-A cooler fan and 1-FCV-67-168, and instrument loop 30-83: cable 1PL3003A.  
 Instrument loop 70-63A: cable 1PM2236.

Path II

CCP B-B: cable 1PP564B.  
 CCP B-B auxiliary lube oil pump: cables 1PL6152B, 1PL6155B, 1PL6156B.  
 CCP B-B cooler fan and 1-FCV-67-170, and instrument loop 3-182: cables 1PL3012B, 1PL3013B.  
 Instrument loop 70-99: cable 1PM2435.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

8. In battery board room I, an interaction exists between all three paths of cables for RCS inventory control.

Path I

FCV-62-79: cables 1V4420A, 1V4421A.

Path II

FCV-62-70: cables 1V4433A, 1V4432A.

Path III

FCV-62-72: cables 1V4470A, 1V4471A.

FCV-62-73: cables 1V4485A, 1V4486A.

FCV-62-74: cables 1V4500A, 1V4501A.

9. In 6900V shutdown board room A, an interaction exists for both paths of CCPs.

Path I

CCP A-A: cables 1PP550A, 1PP552A, 1PP553A, 1PP554A, 1PP556A, 1PP557A, 1PP555A.  
 CCP A-A auxiliary lube oil pump: cables 1PL6145A, 1PL6146A, 1PL6147A, 1PL6148A.  
 CCP A-A cooler fan and FCV-67-168: cables 1PL3002A and 1PL3003A.  
 CCS pump A-A: cable 1PL4725A.  
 Instrument loop 70-63A: cable 1PM2236.

Path II

CCP B-B: cable 1PP564B.  
 CCP B-B auxiliary lube oil pump: cables 1PL6152B, 1PL6155B, 1PL6156B.  
 CCP B-B cooler fan and FCV-67-170: cable 1PL3013B.  
 CCS pump C-S: cables 2PL4733B, 2PL4734B, 2PL4737B.  
 Instrument loop 70-99A: cable 1PM2435.

10. In 480V transformer room 1A, an interaction exists between both CCPs.

CCP A-A auxiliary lube oil pump: cable 1PL6149A.  
 CCP B-B auxiliary lube oil pump: cable 1PL6152B.

11. In the common area and corridor of elevation 669, column A1-A14/S-T, an interaction exists between both paths of CCP.

Path I

CCP A-A: cables 1PP550A, 1PP552A.  
 CCP A-A auxiliary lube oil pump: cables 1PL6145A, 1PL6149A.  
 CCP A-A cooler fan: cables 1PL3001A, 1PL3003A, 1PL3004A.  
 FCV-67-168: cables 1PL3001A, 1PL3003A, 1PL3004A.

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11. (continued)

Path II

CCP B-B: cables 1PP562B, 1PP564B.  
 CCP B-B auxiliary lube oil pump: cables 1PL6152B, 1PL6156B.  
 CCP B-B cooler fan and FCV-67-170: cables 1PL3011B, 1PL3013B, 1PL3014B.

12. In 480V shutdown board room 2A, interactions exist between the following equipment for RCS inventory: CCP B (cables 1PP568B, 1PP566B, 1PP562B), thermal barrier booster pump B (cables 1PL6134B, 1PL6133B, 1PL6131B, 1PL6132B), CCP B auxiliary lube oil pump (cables 1PL6153B, 1PL6154B), 1-FCV-63-5 (cable 1V2335B control).

13. On elevations 714, 734, and 749, unit 2 initial reactivity control (reactor trip) cables interact with each other.

Elevation 714 - cables 2PS181B and 2PS184B interact with 2PS161A and 2PS164A.

Elevation 734 - cables 2PS181B, 2PS184B, 2B37B interact with 2PS161A, 2PS164A, 2B23A, and 2B36A.

Elevation 749 - cables 2PS181B, 2PS184B, 2B37B interacts with 2PS161A, 2PS164A, 2B23B, and 2B36A.

14. On elevations 714, 734, and 749, unit 1 initial reactivity control (reactor trip) cables interact with each other.

Elevation 714 - cables 1PS181B and 1PS184B interact with 1PS161A and 1PS164A.

Elevation 734 - cables 1PS181B, 1PS184B, 1B24B and 1B37B interact with 1PS161A, 1PS164A, 1B23A and 1B36A.

Elevation 749 - cables 1PS181B, 1PS184B, 1B24B and 1B37B interact with 1PS161A, 1PS164A, 1B23A and 1B36A.

15. In the 6900V shutdown board room 2B-B, cables for all the auxiliary feedwater pumps, the level control valves, and the steam supply valves interact with each other. Wide range indication cables for unit 2 also pass through this area. This equipment is for steam generator inventory control.

16. On elevation 734 in the emergency gas treatment room, the following list of 'A' and 'B' train cables interact. These are valves providing reactor coolant system inventory control.

Train 'A' - 2-FSV-68-394: cable 2V5681A and 2-FSV-68-397: cable 2V5685A.

Train 'B' - 2-FCV-63-24: cable 2V4934, 2-FCV-63-174: cable 2V5131,  
 2-FCV-74-2: cable 2V2840B and 2V2842B, 2-FSV-68-395: cable 2V5661B,  
 2-FCV-62-56: cable 2PM132, 2-FCV-62-55: cable 2V4371,  
 2-FCV-62-85: cable 2V4461.



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17. In 6900V shutdown board room 'B' train, the following list of train 'A' cables interact with 'B' train. This equipment is associated with reactor coolant system inventory control.

Train 'A'

CCP A-A room cooler: cable 2PL3003A.  
 CCP A-A auxiliary lube oil pump: cables 2PL6145A, 2PL6148A, 2PL6149A.  
 2-FCV-62-98: cable 2V2235A.  
 2-FCV-67-146: cables 2V2422A, 2V2423A, 2V2425A.  
 2-LCV-62-135: cable 2V2073A.  
 2-FCV-63-7: cable 2V2329A.  
 2-FCV-74-1: cable 2V2787A.  
 2-FSV-68-394: cable 2V5681A.  
 2-FSV-68-397: cable 2V5685A.  
 Thermal barrier booster pump A-A: cable 2PL6123A.  
 2-FCV-70-143: cable 2V2295A.

18. Less than 20-foot separation exists between the 2A2-A 480V shutdown board room (train 'A') and the listed train 'B' cables.

2PM2435 (LI-80-99A), 2PL3013B (CCP B-B room cooler), 2PL6152B, 2PL6155B (CCP B-B auxiliary lube oil pump), 2PP562B, 2PP563, 2PP564B, 2PP566B, 2PP568B (CCP B-B), 2V2243B (2-FCV-62-99), 2PM108, 2PM110 (2-FCV-62-93), 2V2103B (2-LCV-62-136), 2V2323B (2-LCV-62-6), 2V2690B (2-FCV-63-25), 2V2706B (2-FCV-63-40), 2V4793B, 2V4794B (2-FCV-63-41), 2V4930B, 2V4931B, 2V4934B (2-FCV-63-24), 2V2847B (2-FCV-74-2), 2V5661E (2-FSV-68-395), 2PM134 (2-FCV-62-56), 2V4411 (2-FCV-62-54), 2V4412 (2-FCV-62-54), 2V4367, 2V4368 (2-FCV-62-55), 2PL6131B, 2PL6133B, 2PL6134B (RCP TBBP B-B), 2V4457B, 2V4458B (2-FCV-62-85).

19. The following train 'A' equipment interacts with train 'B' equipment in the 480V shutdown board 1B2-B at elevation 734 in auxiliary building.

Train 'A' cables: 2PL612A, 2PP550A, 2PP552A, 2PP554A, 2PP556A.

Train 'B' cables: 2PL4737B, 2V2321B.

20. Interactions exist between the following 'A' train cables such that a fire could prevent isolation of normal letdown path. Cables involved are: 2V4423A, 2V4425A (2-FCV-62-69), 2V4435A, 2V4437A (2-FCV-62-70), 2V4473A, 2V4477A (2-FCV-62-72), 2V4488A, 2V4492A (2-FCV-62-73), and 2V4503A, 2V4509A (2-FCV-62-74).

21. Interactions exist between shutdown logic panels 1A-A and 2A-A and the 'B' train cables listed below.

Cables involved: 1B25II, 1B30II, B34II, B16II, 2B26II, 2B31II, 2B32II, 1B26II, 1B31IV, IPP765B, IPP753B, IPP762B.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

22. Interactions exist between 'A' and 'B' train cables located in the auxiliary building on elevation 734 in the 480V shutdown board room 2A2-A. A fire at this location could take out all 480V 'A' train shutdown boards and all 480V 'B' train shutdown boards. Cables involved are:

Train 'A' - 2PP756A, 2PP750A, 2B11III, 2B16IV, 2B12I, 2B17I, 2PL4978A, 2PL4913A, 2PL4925A, 2PL4958A, 2PL5055A, 2PL5056A, 2PL5057A, 2PL5058A, 2PP759A, 2PL4935A, 2PL4938A.

Train 'B' - 2PP483B, 2PP480B, PP377B, PP477B, 2PP460B, PP738, 2PL4914B, 2B25IV, 2B30IV, 2B26II, 2B31II.

23. Interactions exist such that a fire could cause the loss of both normal and alternate control power for 480V shutdown boards 1A1-A, 1A2-A, 1B1-B, 1B2-B.

Cables involved: 1B12III, 1B17III, 1B11I, 1B16I interface with B13IV, 1PL4901B, 1B26IV, 1B31IV, 1PL5075B, 1PL5076B, 1PL5077B, 1PL5078B, 1PL4982B, 1PL4985B, 1PL4965B, 1PL4926B, 1B25II, 1B30II, 1PP762B, 1PP753B, 1PL4942B, 1PL5067B, 1PL5068B, 1PL5069B, 1PL5070B, 1PL5063B, 1PL5064B, 1PL5065B, 1PL5066B, and 480V shutdown board 1B1-B.

24. Interactions exist such that a fire could cause the loss of 'A' and 'B' train 480V shutdown boards. These interactions are located in auxiliary building on elevation 734 in 480V shutdown board room 1B2-B. Cables involved are:

Train 'A' - B30I, PP373A, PP374A, PP468A, PP469A, 2PP478A, 1PL4900A, PP378A, 1PP475A, 1PP478A, 1PP454A, 2PP498A, 2PP454A, 1B11I, 1B16I, 1B12III, 1B17III, 1PP493, 1PP496, 1PP498, 2PP493, 2PP496, 2PP498.

Train 'B' - 1PL4901B, 1PL4914B, 1PL4945B, 1PP765B, 1PL4966B, 1PP753B, 1PP762B, 1PL5071B, 1PL5072B, 1PL5073B, 1PL5074B, 1PL4965B, 1B25II, 1B30II, B13IV, 1PL5067B, 1PL5068B, 1PL5069B, 1PL5070B, 1PL5075B, 1PL5076B, 1PL4985, 1PL5077B, 1PL5078B; equipment: C-A vent board 1B1-B, 480V shutdown board 1B2-B.

25. Interactions between 'A' and 'B' train cables exist in auxiliary building on elevation 714 at A8-Q. A fire at this location could cause the loss of breaker control to breakers 1922, 1914, 1924, and loss of operation for ACB 1912. (This could prevent the diesel generators from being put on line.) Cables involved: 1PP475A, 2PP454A, 2PP475A, 1PP460B, 1PP430B, 2PP480B.

26. Interactions exist between 'A' and 'B' train cables and a fire could render both 'A' and 'B' train 480V shutdown boards inoperable. Cables involved are:

Train 'A' - 2PL4975A, 2PP750A, 2PL4957A, 2B11III, 2B12I, 2PL5051A, 2PL5052A, 2PL5053A, 2PL5054A, 2PL5059A, 2PL5060A, 2PL5061A, 2PL5062A, 2PP756A, 2PL5047A, 2PL5048A, 2PL5049A, 2PL5050A, 2B17I, 2B16III.

Train 'B' - 2B25IV, 2B30IV, 2B26II, 2B31II.

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27. Interactions exist between 'A' train 6.9 KV shutdown board and 'B' train component cables. Cables involved: 2PL4733B, 2PL4734B, 2PL4737B (CCS Pump C-S), and 2V2321B (2-FCV-63-6).
28. Interactions exist between 'A' and 'B' train cables which could prevent isolation of excess letdown line. Cables involved: 2V4411, 2V4412, 2V4414 (2-FCV-62-54), 2V4367, 2V4368, 2V4370 (2-FCV-62-55), and 2PM133, 2PM134 (2-FCV-62-56).
29. Interactions exist between control cables, 'A' and 'B' train, for operating auxiliary feedwater terry turbine. Cables involved are 1SG220A and 1SG221B.
30. Interactions exist in auxiliary building at elevation 714 between 'A' and 'B' train cables. Cables involved:  
  
Train 'A' - 2PL4725A, 2PL4726A, 2PL4727A, 2PL4731A, 2PL4732A, 2V5685A, 2V5690A, 2V5691A, 2V5695A, 2V5696A.  
  
Train 'B' - 2PL4738B, 2PL4739B, 2PL4742B, 2PL4734B, 2PL4744B, 2PL4748B, 2PL4749B, 2V5676B, 2V5670A, 2V5671B, 2V5675B.
31. Interactions exist between 'A' and 'B' train cables in the auxiliary building at elevation 714. These cables are part of the RCS inventory control safety function. Cables involved:  
  
Train 'A' - 2PL3001A, 2PL3003A, 2PL4725A, 2PL4726A, 2PL4727A, 2PL4731A, 2PL4732A, 2PL6145A, 2PL6148A, 2PL6149A, 2PM1041I, 2PM1046, 2PM1053, 2PM1086III, 2PP550A, 2PP551, 2PP552A, 2PP554A, 2PP555A, 2PP556A, 2V161, 2V255III, 2V2235A, 2V2422A, 2V2423A, 2V2424A, 2V2425A, 2V2073A, 2V2329A, 2V4828A, 2V4830A, 2PV43A, 2V2787A, 2V4423A, 2V4435A, 2V4473A, 2V4488A, 2V4503A, 2V5680A, 2V5681A, 2V5685A, 2V5690A, 2V5691A, 2V5695A, 2V5696A, 2PL6120A, 2PL6122A, 2PL6123A, 2V2295A, 2V4448A, 2V4596.  
  
Train 'B' - 2PL3011B, 2PL3013B, 2PL4738B, 2PL4739B, 2PL4742B, 2PL4743B, 2PL4744B, 2PL4748B, 2PL4749B, 2PL6152B, 2PL6155B, 2PL6156B, 2PM1070II, 2PM1076K, 2PV135II, 2PV386, 2PP562B, 2PP563, 2PP564B, 2PP566B, 2PP568B, 2V2243, 2PM108, 2PM110, 2PM111, 2PM112, 2PM115, 2PV50, 2V2103B, 2V2321B, 2V2323B, 2V2690B, 2V2706B, 2V4796B, 2V4798B, 2V4933, 2V5130, 2V5131, 2PV163B, 2V2847B, 2V5660B, 2V5661B, 2V5670B, 2V5671B, 2V5675B, 2V5676B, 2PM134, 2PV56, 2V4370, 2V4414, 2PL6131B, 2PL6134B, 2PL6133B, 2V5743B, 2V5745B, 2PV56.
32. An interaction exists between Nuclear Source Range Detector NC-31 (cables 2PV11I, 13I, 2NM21I, 23I, 26I, 27I, 28I, 29I, 30I) and source range detector NC-32 (cables 2PV131III, 2PV133II, 207II, 208II, 209II, 210II). This interaction is located at A8-812/Q-X in the auxiliary building on elevation 714.
33. At various location in the auxiliary building on elevations 669, 690, 714, and 734, the floors have not been sealed to provide a fire barrier between elevations. (Ventilation Duct Penetrations, Conduit/Pipe Penetrations/Stairways.)



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   3   2   7   8   4   -   0   6   7   -   0   0   0   9   OF   1   1	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

34. An interaction exists between Nuclear Source Range Detector NC-310 and NC-320. Cables involved are: 1PV11I, 1PV13I, 1NM26I, 27I, 28I, 29I, 30I, and 1NM2011I, 2031I, 2061I, 2071I, 2081I, 2091I, 2101I, 1PV1311I, and 1PV1331I. These cables are located on elevation 714 of the auxiliary building.
35. Interactions exist between 'A' and 'B' train cables and components in the auxiliary building on elevation 690. Cables involved are:
- Train 'A' - 2PL3001A, 3003A, 4725A, 4726A, 2731A, 4739A, 6145A, 6149A, 2PM1041I, 1046, 1053, 108611I, 2PP550A, 2PP552A, 2V2232A, 2233A, 2070A, 2070A, 2071A, 2326A, 2327A, 2680A, 2681A, 2695A, 2696A, 4830A, 2292A, 2293A.
- Train 'B' - 2PL3011B, 3013B, 4739B, 4742B, 4743B, 4748B, 6152B, 6156B, 2PM10701I, 1076K, 2PP562B, 2PP564B, 2V2240B, 2PM108, 111, 112, 115, 2V2100B, 2101B, 2320B, 2321B, 2687B, 2688B, 2703B, 2704B, 4798B, 5745B.
- Common (Train 'A' and 'B'): 1PL4735S, 4736S.
36. Interactions exist between 'A' and 'B' train cables in the auxiliary building on elevation 669. Cables involved are:
- Train 'A' - 2PL3001A, 3003A, 3004A, 3006A, 6145A, 6149A, 2PM1053, 2PP550A and 552A.
- Train 'B' - 2PL3011B, 3013B, 3014B, 3016B, 6152B, 6156B, 2PM108, 111, 112, 115, 1076K, 2PP562B, 564B, 2V2321B.
37. Interactions exist between 'A' train and 'B' train cables in the auxiliary building on elevation 690 in the unit 2 penetration room. Cables involved are:
- Train 'A' - 2V2292A, 2326A, 2680A, 2695A, 2232A, 2293A, 2681A, 2696A, 2233A, 4830A, 2327A, 2070A, 2071A.
- Train 'B' - 2V2100B, 2101B.
38. Interactions exist between 'A' train and 'B' train cables in the auxiliary building on elevation 690 in the unit 2 pipe chase. Cables involved are:
- Train 'A' - 2V2327A, 2326A, 4830A, 2293A, 2681A, 2696A, 2233A, 2292A, 2680A, 2695A, 2232A.
- Train 'B' - 2V2320B, 2688B, 2704B, 2687B, 2703B, 2240B, 4798B, 5745B, 2242B, 2241B.
39. An interaction exists between cables for diesel generators 1B and 2A from the 480V shutdown boards to the 480V diesel auxiliary board. Cables 1PL4982B and 4985B interact with cables 2PL4975A and 4978A. These cables are separated by greater than thirty-one (31) feet; however, no suppression exists in the large area of concern. These cables are located in the auxiliary building on elevation 749, column A8 near the ceiling of the refuel floor.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   3   2   7   8   4   -	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0   6   7   -	0   0   1   0	0   0   1   0	OF	1   1	1   1

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

40. Interactions exist between cables for diesel generators 1A and 2A (cables IPP477A and 2PP477A) and for diesel generators 1B and 2B (cables IPP482B and 2PP482B) in the auxiliary control room on elevation 734 of the auxiliary building. These cables provide indication (red and green light) of breaker position.
41. Cables contained in cable trays PO-A, PN-A, and PM-A pass through the auxiliary control room and interact with cables in cable tray PA-B. These cables are involved with the normal to auxiliary transfer of control from the main control room to the auxiliary control room of both redundant divisions and cables associated with vital battery board II and III loads. The cables and cable trays are located in the auxiliary control room on elevation 734 of the auxiliary building.
42. General interactions exist between onsite electrical supply cables IPP478A, 2PP478A, 373A, 374A, 378A, 468A, 469A, 498A, IPP475A, 2PP454A, 475A, IPP454A, and most of the 'A' train and 'B' train reactor coolant system inventory control cables. These cables are located on elevation 714 in the auxiliary building at A36A8 and C to R.
43. Potential interactions exist in the auxiliary building on elevations 669, 690, and 714 in a twenty-foot area around the elevator, stairwell, and hatch between 'A' and 'B' train reactor coolant system inventory control cables. Cables involved:  
  
Train 'A' - 2PL6120A, 6122A, 2V5691A, 5696A.  
  
Train 'B' - 2PM115, 2V2321B, 2V2240B, 2241B, 2320B, 2687B, 2688B, 2703B, 2704B, 4798B, 2P26131B, 2PL6133B, 2V5671B, 5676B.
44. Potential interactions exist in the auxiliary building on elevations 669, 690, 714, and the unit 2 stairwell between 'A' and 'B' train reactor coolant system inventory control cables due to open areas between the floors. Cables involved:  
  
Train 'A' - (Elevation 669) 2PL3001A, 6145A, 2PM1053, 2PP550A, 552A, (Elevation 690) 2PL4731A, 2PM1041I, 2PM1046, 2PM1053,, (Elevation 714) 2PL4725A, 4726A, 4732A, 2PM1041I, 1086III, 2V2422A, 2423A, 2424A, 4830A, 2PV43A, 2V5690A, 5691A, 5695A, 5696A.
45. Interactions exist within the onsite electrical supply in the vital battery board room I on elevation 734 of the auxiliary building. The following EQUIPMENT: 125 volt vital BBI, 120 volt vital instrument panel I, CABLES: B15I, 2B12I, 2B17I, 2PVII, B10I, 1PVII, 1B11I, 1B16I, B55I, B56I, B57I, B31I, B30I, B57I, 1B12III, 1B17III, and CONDUIT: 2B15I, 1B2, 1B15III interact with the following CABLES: 1B26IV, 1B31IV, 1B25II, 1B30II, and CONDUIT: 1B29II, 1B34IV. This interaction could cause the loss of both unit 1 'A' and 'B' train 480V shutdown boards and cable 1PL4914B associated with the normal feed to battery charger II.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		0   6   7	-	0   0	1   1	OF	1   1

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A sj (17))

46. An interaction exists in the common area on elevation 690 of the auxiliary building between 'B' train ERCW cables and 'A' train CCP cables. Cables involved are:

ERCW 'B' Train - 1PP700B, 712B, 2PP700B, 712B.

CCP 'A' Train - 1PP550A, 1PP552A, 1PL6145A, 6149A, 3001A, 3003A, 4725A, 4726A, 4731A.

An interaction also exists between path 1 and path 2 for the CCPs in this same area. Cables involved are:

Path 1 - 1PL6149A.

Path 2 - 1PP564B, 1PL6152B, 6156B, 3011B, 3013B, 4739A, 4735S, 4736S, 2PL4739B.

The action statement for Technical Specification 3.7.12 was satisfied by utilizing fire watches in the affected areas that were established by other Appendix R commitments. This action included the establishment of a roving fire watch in areas with fire detection and a dedicated fire watch in areas without fire detection.

Corrective Actions

An implementation schedule for corrective actions will be submitted to the NRC by January 1, 1985. The fire watches established will remain in effect until full compliance with the requirements of Appendix R can be achieved.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
Post Office Box 2000  
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

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November 5, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.  
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT  
SQRO-50-327/84067

The enclosed licensee event report, Special Report, and Facility Operating License Required Report per Section 2.H provide details concerning items of noncompliance with Appendix R of 10 CFR 50. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph (a)(2)(ii).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace  
Plant Manager

Enclosure  
cc (Enclosure):

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