

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit #1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0	PAGE (3) 1 OF 2
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TITLE (4)  
Automatic Initiation of Reactor Building and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1	0	1	8	4	0	1	1	0			0 5 0 0 0
8	4	8	4	0	1	0	2	8			0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) N	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	80.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	80.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	80.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(ix)	

POWER LEVEL (10) 11010

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Robert Randall, Supervisor, Technical Support	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 1 5 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	E	J F U		Yes					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

During normal operation on October 1, 1984, at approximately 1759 hrs, a momentary grid disturbance occurred when the Oswego Steam Station attempted to put a synchronous condenser in service. This disturbance produced a dip in the 115KV transmission line causing frequency relays (81L/81H) to trip on RPS MG sets 162 and 172 (RPS 11 and RPS 12 Power Supplies). This caused MG set 162 to transfer to D.C. drive, but MG set 172 failed to transfer due to a blown fuse. This failure to transfer resulted in a loss of #12 RPS bus, which tripped radiation monitors that actuated the Reactor Building and Control Room Emergency Ventilation Systems. The MG sets 162 and 172 automatically returned to AC power 2 minutes after normalization of the 115 KV high line. The plant was subsequently returned to normal operation.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Nine Mile Point Unit #1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  05000220	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		84	016	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

TEXT

During normal operation on October 1, 1984, at approximately 1759 hrs, a momentary grid disturbance occurred when the Oswego Steam Station attempted to put a synchronous condenser in service. This disturbance produced a dip in the 115KV transmission line causing frequency relays (81L/81H) to trip on RPS MG sets 162 and 172 (RPS #11 and RPS #12 Power Supplies). This caused MG set 162 to transfer to D.C. drive, but MG set 172 failed to transfer due to a blown fuse. This failure to transfer caused a loss of power on #12 RPS bus, which caused a "1 out of 2 de-energize to actuate logic system" to actuate the Reactor Building and Control Room Emergency Ventilation Systems. The MG sets 162 and 172 automatically returned to AC power 2 minutes after the normalization of the 115 KV high line and within 65 minutes both Emergency Ventilation Systems were returned to normal operation. An investigation was performed by the Instrument and Control Department to determine why MG set 172 failed to transfer to D.C. drive. The failure of the fuse was attributed to age. After this fuse was replaced, MG set 172 was tested to assure operability of this system to transfer to D.C. drive as designed. The plant was subsequently returned to normal operation.

ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There are no potential safety consequences arising out of this event because, all of the engineered safety features involved in this event operated as designed; therefore there was no possibility of damage to the plant or danger to the plant personnel arising out of this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The RPS Channel #12 was reset, which restored the Reactor Building Ventilation System to normal operation. The Control Room Emergency Vent System was also reset, and the Instrument and Control Department was called to perform an investigation on the failure of MG set 172 to transfer to D.C. drive. The blown fuse was replaced and MG set 172 was tested to assure operability of this system to transfer to D.C. drive as designed.

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST  
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

November 2, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-220  
LER 84-16


Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following  
Licensee Event Report:

LER 84-16      Which is being submitted in accordance with  
10 CFR 50.73, (a) (2) (iv), "Any event or  
condition that resulted in manual or automatic  
actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF),  
including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)".

A 10 CFR 50.72 report was made at 1850 hrs on October 1, 1984.  
This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022,  
dated September 1983.

Very truly yours,

  
Thomas E. Lempges  
Vice President  
Nuclear Generation

RGR/lo  
Attachments (3 copies)  
cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley  
Regional Administrator

IE22  
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