NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [ ] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

[0 1] [O H D B S 1] (2) [Ø Ø - Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø - Ø Ø] (3) [4 1 1 1 1] (4) [ ] (5)
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
[0 1] REPORT SOURCE [L] (6) [Ø 5 Ø Ø Ø 3 4 6] (7) [Ø 6 Ø 4 8 1] (8) [0 2 1 9 8 5] (9)
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

[0 2] (NP-33-81-40) At 1410 hours during the performance of ST 5031.14, it was noted that
[0 3] the relay status lamp 302A did not change state when a trip signal was applied. As a
[0 4] result, the trip output to AF 599 (auxiliary feedwater discharge to Steam Generator
[0 5] 2) from the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Channel 2 was inopera-
[0 6] ble. This placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specifiation 3.3.2.2.
[0 7] There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personel.
[0 8] SFRCS Channels 1/3 and Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 were operable.
7 8 9 80

[0 9] SYSTEM CODE [I E] (11) CAUSE CODE [E] (12) CAUSE SUBCODE [A] (13) COMPONENT CODE [I N S T R U] (14) COMP. SUBCODE [X] (15) VALVE SUBCODE [Z] (16)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR [8 1] 21 22 — 23 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. [Ø 3 2] 24 26 / 27 OCCURRENCE CODE [Ø 3] 28 29 REPORT TYPE [X] 30 — 31 REVISION NO. [2] 32

ACTION TAKEN [C] (18) FUTURE ACTION [X] (19) EFFECT ON PLANT [Z] (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD [Z] (21) HOURS (22) [Ø Ø Ø Ø] 37 40 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED [Y] (23) 41 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. [Y] (24) 42 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER [N] (25) 43 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER [C 5 6 Ø] (26) 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

[1 0] The cause was determined to be a failed relay driver card in SFRCS Channel 2. Under
[1 1] MWO IC-458-81, the defective relay driver board was replaced. The channel was de-
[1 2] clared operable on 6/4/81 at 2240 hours.
2 [1 3]
[1 4]
7 8 9 80

[1 5] FACILITY STATUS [E] (28) % POWER [Ø 7 3] (29) OTHER STATUS (30) [NA] 13 44 METHOD OF DISCOVERY [B] (31) 45 46 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) [During performance of ST 5031.14] 80
7 8 9 10 12

[1 6] ACTIVITY RELEASED [Z] (33) CONTENT OF RELEASE [Z] (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) [NA] 11 44 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) [NA] 45 80
7 8 9 10

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
[1 7] NUMBER [Ø Ø Ø] (37) TYPE [Z] (38) DESCRIPTION (39) [NA] 13 80
7 8 9 11 12

PERSONNEL INJURIES
[1 8] NUMBER [Ø Ø Ø] (40) DESCRIPTION (41) [NA] 12 80
7 8 9 11

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
[1 9] TYPE [Z] (42) DESCRIPTION [NA] 10
7 8 9

8503060534 850219
PDR ADOCK 05000346
S PDR

IE22 1/1 80

PUBLICITY
[2 0] ISSUED [N] (44) DESCRIPTION (45) [NA] 10 68 69 NRC USE ONLY 80
7 8 9

DVR 81-076

NAME OF PREPARER Jan C. Stotz

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-81-40

DATE OF EVENT: June 4, 1981

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Inoperable trip output to AF 599 (auxiliary feedwater discharge to Steam Generator 2) from Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Channel 2 during performance of ST 5031.14 Section 6.3

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1 with Power (MWT) = 2046 and Load (Gross MWe) = 669

Description of Occurrence: On June 4, 1981 at approximately 1410 hours during the performance of ST 5031.14, SFRCS Monthly Functional Test, Section 6.3, it was noted that the relay status lamp 302A did not change state when a trip signal was applied. The above mentioned relay status lamp determines the trip status of an open signal to AF 599 (auxiliary feedwater discharge to Steam Generator 2) from SFRCS Channel 2. This would have prevented AF 599 from receiving an open signal had it first received a close signal on a double ended main steam line break followed by a repressurization of Steam Generator 2. This placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.3.2.2 which required the inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within one hour while in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The unit was in Mode 1 at the time of the occurrence. After what was initially determined to be satisfactory testing performed, the channel was declared operable, however, further evaluation of the necessary repairs led to the conclusion that the testing requirements were not adequate. The channel was again declared inoperable to perform response time testing. Upon satisfactory completion of response time testing, the channel was declared operable.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of the occurrence was determined to be a failed relay driver card in SFRCS Channel 2.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. SFRCS Channels 1/3 and Auxiliary Feedwater Train 1 were operable at the time of the occurrence.

Corrective Action: Maintenance Work Order IC-458-81 was issued to investigate in which case it was found that Relay Driver Board (P/N GN177) location 2-1 was defective. The defective relay driver board was replaced. The SFRCS Monthly Functional Test was again performed for this channel satisfactorily. The channel was declared operable on June 4, 1981 at 2240 hours.

Failure Data: There have been no previous failures of this type.

TOLEDO EDISON

February 19, 1985

Log No. K85-391
File: RR 2 (NP-33-81-40)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Revision 2 to Licensee Event Report 81-032. The revisions to the report are indicated by a "2" in the left margin of each page.

Please replace your previous copy of this report with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

Stephen M. Quennoz

Stephen M. Quennoz
Plant Manager
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler,
Regional Administrator,
USNRC Region III

Mr. Walt Rogers
DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

IE22
1/1

JCS/001