

MONTHLY OPERATIONS REPORT

SEPTEMBER 1984

Throughout the report period, the Oyster Creek Station remained shutdown for the current Maintenance and Refueling Outage.

The Primary Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (ILRT) was completed during the report period. Pressurization of the primary containment started early on September 12, 1984. After repairing a number of identified leaks, a stabilized pressure was established on September 13, 1984, at which time the 24-hour soak period started. The test was successfully completed on September 14, 1984 and depressurization commenced. On September 15, 1984, at a drywell pressure of 2 psig, the torus to drywell vacuum breaker leak rate test was satisfactorily performed, and that same day the containment was completely depressurized and reopened.

The first reactor vessel operating pressure leak test was performed between September 18, 1984 and September 20, 1984. A number of leaks were identified as requiring repairs. The major items identified were as follows:

1. Reactor recirculation pump 'A' flange leak - gasket
2. Mechanical seals on "D" reactor recirculation pump
3. Five (5) reactor recirculation valve packing leaks
4. A bonnet leak on reactor head cooling valve V-31-5
5. The pressure seal on Isolation Condenser valve V-14-34
6. Various instrument rack valve packing leaks
7. Threaded connections on two (2) excess flow check valves
8. A packing leak on core spray manual valve V-20-23

A number of CRDs were also initially identified to be leaking, but after exercising (scraming) the CRDs, the leaks stopped.

Repairs were still in progress at the end of the report period.

A test was performed which confirmed there is a flow blockage problem with reactor main steam line drain valve V-1-107. The valve was subsequently disassembled, overhauled/inspected and reassembled. Subsequent testing, after the inspection, revealed the valve operated properly.

The liquid poison functional test was completed successfully. The system's Squib valves were subsequently replaced.

Both Standby Gas Treatment Systems (SGTS) were out of service at different periods of time during the report period due to modifications required. Further modifications are required for both SGTS prior to startup.

The plant experienced three separate electrical system transients during the report period as follows:

On September 9, 1984, the plant experienced a trip of USS Breaker 1A1M (Turbine Building loads) due to a loose wire on the undervoltage trip device. The bus was cross-tied to regain power until repairs could be completed.

On September 10, 1984, another failure of a breaker trip device (1B2M) caused a substantial loss of power in the plant. The Relay Department needed to work on the primary breakers in the "A" side of the plant's electrical distribution system. In accordance with plant procedures, the 1A3 bus was cross-tied to the 1B3 bus (requires jumpers to be installed). When the 1A3/1B3 buses was cross tied, the operator proceeded to cross-tie the 1A2/1B2 buses. At 2235 hours, breaker 1A2M was opened with no discrepancies noted. When breaker 1A2M was taken to the "pull-to-lock" position, breaker 1B2M tripped, removing all power from USS 1A2 and USS 1B2. Reactor Protection Systems (RPS) Nos. 1 and 2 lost power, resulting in a full scram and reactor vessel and drywell isolation. All reactor recirculation pumps tripped, fuel pool cooling tripped, CRD System tripped, RBCCW System tripped, the Reactor Building Ventilation System secured and SGTS was also lost. Within approximately 30 seconds, the operator opened the 1A2/1B2 tie breaker (USS2T) and reclosed USS1B2M supplying power back to USS1B2. Power for RPS No. 2 was transferred to the transformer due to the output breaker from RPS No. 2 Motor Generator Set tripping. The scram and isolation signals were reset and the appropriate loads were restored. When power was restored SGTS No. 2 started. Normal ventilation was subsequently restored.

Breaker 1B2M was removed from service on the 12-8 shift on September 11, 1984 for inspection (Bus 1A2/1B2 tied together). Inspection revealed the overload device for the "A" phase failed. The faulty overload device was sent to a testing facility to determine the exact cause of the malfunction. The buses were left cross-tied to allow preventive maintenance on the "A" side primary breakers. The electrical system was also left in this configuration so the power supply for the computer used for the ILRT would not be disturbed. The computer had to be repaired due to the loss of power. The buses were separated after the ILRT was completed.

On September 25, 1984, a substantial Electrical System transient occurred in the plant when a 4160 volt breaker was closed with the cable ground straps on the load side of the breaker still installed. Cable replacement at the Intake Structure for the Emergency Service Water (ESW) pumps had been completed and part of the post maintenance testing was to

bump-test each ESW pump to check for proper rotation. The bump-test for ESW pump No. 2 was attempted with the ground straps inadvertently left installed on the load side of the breaker. Upon closing the breaker a fault was induced on "1C" bus. This immediately caused a trip of the 1C and 1D buses, since the buses were tied together to support breaker relay testing. Diesel generator No. 2 fast started and assumed loads on the "D" side of the Electrical System in the plant. Diesel generator No. 1 did not fast start due to the ground fault induced on "1C" bus. To clear the fault on "1C" bus, the breaker for ESW pump No. 2 was racked back out and the bus lockout reset. At that time, diesel generator No. 1 fast-started properly. Power was then restored to the "C" side of the Electrical System. Also at the time of the trip, power to "C" battery bus was being supplied by the battery charger because a battery discharge test was in progress. Thus, when the trip occurred, power was lost to the charger and therefore, no DC power to equipment supplied from "C" battery was available. When "1C" 4160 volt bus was re-energized, power to DC "C" bus was also restored. This restored breaker tripping power (DC), and those reactor recirculation pumps that were running tripped. Normal loads were subsequently restored. It was noted that all safeguard equipment operated properly during the incident. A full investigation/critique was conducted by M&C along with a full inspection to determine the extent of the damage as a result of the incident.

The power transients identified a number of problems. During the power transient of September 25, 1984, damage occurred to the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) and the SIGMA computer. Both computers have loss of power protection but not transient voltage protection. The Technical Functions Division has been requested to provide the proper electrical protection for the computers.

During the power transients reported this month, it was discovered that there is insufficient emergency DC power lighting in the Control Room to provide enough illumination for the operators. The Technical Functions Division is working to resolve the problem. This item should be addressed and corrected as soon as possible due to its potential impact on operator actions required during a loss of offsite power incident.

During the power transient associated with USS breaker IB2M, the Control Room alarm system reflash unit failed due to lack of ground protection. A request was made to Tech. Functions to provide ground protection for the reflash units.

The relays associated with the reactor recirculation pump speed control logic are being replaced due to a speed control problem which developed with "C" pump. An investigation revealed the problem was due to dirty contacts on the relays.

Wiring modifications and testing to resolve the special containment isolation valve (sneak-circuit test) concern continued during the report period. All testing was completed the first week in October, 1984.

Fire diesel pump No. 1 was inoperable twice during the report period. It was inoperable for a one-day period due to what appeared to be a speed control (RPM) problem. An investigation revealed the speed of the pump was proper. The pump was inoperable the second time for a 7-day period due to a discharge pressure problem.

Friction testing of the CRDs rebuilt during the outage was satisfactorily completed. Repair to various CRD position indications was completed also.

Air compressor No. 1 and No. 2 were out of service at different periods of time during the report period. Air compressor No. 1 was inoperable from August 21, 1984 to September 7, 1984 due to an inner stage relief valve problem and a motor heater problem. Air compressor No. 1 was also out of service for less than a one-day period for preventive maintenance. Air compressor No. 2 was inoperable for a two-day period to repair a TBCCW leak and another two-day period to repair an oil leak.

Limitorque testing (MOVATS) of motor-operated valves and local leak rate testing (LLRT) of containment isolation valves continued during the report period. Testing revealed a DC voltage problem with isolation condenser valves V-14-31, 33 and 34. Replacement of the power cables started during the report period. MOVATS testing also revealed a clutch problem with some of the motor operated valves. Repairs are in progress. Repairs identified as required due to LLRT also continued during the report period. MSIV NS03A and NS03B were satisfactorily LLRT.

Cable replacement at the Intake Structure and for some of the plant's Unit Substations was completed. Testing of these replacement cables was in various stages of completion at the end of the month.

The Operations Department has requested an investigation into the abnormally high number of grounds experienced on the plant's electrical DC systems. It was also requested that all unidentified spare wires in the Control Room be identified and labeled.

Station battery "A" failed its associated discharge test early in the report period. New batteries are on order but are not expected to be in prior to plant startup. Station battery "A" is not a safety bus but the turbine lube oil emergency oil pump is powered from "A" battery. A special test of the emergency oil pump will be performed prior to startup to determine the reliability of the battery.

Repairs and replacement, as required, of the electrical contacts for both reactor protection systems was completed during the report period. Testing was completed satisfactorily.

Radiation surveys have indicated that the radiation field around the scram discharge volume (SDV) is starting to increase. Some sections of the piping are up to 350 mrem/hr. The area around the SDV requires frequent access for surveillance testing and operational checks. In the interest of ALARA, the Technical Functions Division was requested to expedite the engineering required to install shielding on the appropriate sections of the system. The Operations Department also attempted to lower the radiation field through flushing with no success.

Various attempts to hydro the feedwater heater section of the Feedwater System were unsuccessful due to leakage past "B" feedwater string outlet valve V-2-11. After repairs to V-2-11, a successful hydro was completed on October 4, 1984.

Cable replacement to both of the service water pumps was completed during the report period. Additionally, the expansion joint on No. 1 Service Water pump was replaced and the discharge head on No. 2 Service Water pump was replaced.

The installation of new cables for the Emergency Service Water pumps and installation of the new flow elements (annubars) was completed. The systems were filled. Testing is in progress.

The drywell and torus nitrogen purge system was satisfactorily tested by the system's vendor during the report period.

Resins have been replaced in five of the condensate demineralizers. The demineralizers with the new resins are presently valved out of service. The remaining two demineralizers will receive new resins after the flush of the Feedwater System is completed.

A leak in the chlorination line to the Service Water System required the system to be secured on September 13, 1984 after it was in service for a one-day period. Chlorination of the Circulating Water System lines was re-established, but repairs to the service water chlorination line are still in progress.

Licensee Event Reports submitted during the month of September 1984 are as follows:

Licensee Event Report 50-219/84-018

On August 9, 1984, the flow rate through SGTS No.2 was found to be below the limit given in section 4.5.K.1.b.3 of the Technical Specifications. The flow rate was determined using a 16-point traverse method as opposed to installed instrumentation. The Technical Specification range of acceptable flow rates is 2340-2860 CFM; flow rate during the test was found to be 2334 CFM. The manual damper in the system was adjusted, system retested, and the resultant flow rate was 2687 CFM.

Licensee Event Report 50-219/84-019

On August 17, 1984, while performing a surveillance test of SDV drain valves V-15-121 and V-15-134, both valves failed to close upon command. A maintenance crew was dispatched and discovered that the mechanical override to valve V-15-121 had been positioned such that the air operator could not close the valve. V-15-134 failed to close due to binding. The mechanical override for V-15-121 was repositioned and V-15-134 was overhauled. The surveillance was repeated and both valves performed satisfactorily.

OPERATING DATA REPORT
OPERATING STATUS

1. DOCKET: 50-219
 2. REPORTING PERIOD: September, 1984
 3. UTILITY CONTACT: JOSEPH R. MOLNAR 609-971-4699
 4. LICENSED THERMAL POWER (MWt): 1930
 5. NAMEPLATE RATING (GROSS MWe): $687.5 \times 0.8 = 550$
 6. DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING (NET MWe): 650
 7. MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (GROSS MWe): 650
 8. MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (NET MWe): 620
 9. IF CHANGES OCCUR ABOVE SINCE LAST REPORT, GIVE REASONS: NONE
 10. POWER LEVEL TO WHICH RESTRICTED, IF ANY (NET MWe): N/A
 11. REASON FOR RESTRICTION, IF ANY: NONE
- | | <u>MONTH</u> | <u>YEAR</u> | <u>CUMULATIVE</u> |
|-----------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------------|
| 12. REPORT PERIOD HRS | 720.0 | 6576.0 | 129504.0 |
| 13. HOURS RX CRITICAL | 0.0 | 0.0 | 84623.9 |
| 14. RX RESERVE SHTDWN HRS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 468.2 |
| 15. HRS GENERATOR ON-LINE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 82693.8 |
| 16. UT RESERVE SHTDWN HRS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 17. GROSS THERM ENER (MWH) | 0 | 0 | 136224729 |
| 18. GROSS ELEC ENER (MWH) | 0 | 0 | 46056905 |
| 19. NET ELEC ENER (MWH) | -4906 | -22678 | 44263005 |
| 20. UT SERVICE FACTOR | 0.0 | 0.0 | 63.9 |
| 21. UT AVAIL FACTOR | 0.0 | 0.0 | 63.9 |
| 22. UT CAP FACTOR (MDC NET) | 0.0 | -0.6 | 55.1 |
| 23. UT CAP FACTOR (DER NET) | 0.0 | -0.5 | 52.6 |
| 24. UT FORCED OUTAGE RATE | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.7 |
| 25. FORCED OUTAGE HRS | 0.0 | 0.0 | 8916.2 |
26. SHUTDOWNS SCHEDULED OVER NEXT 6 MONTHS (TYPE, DATE, DURATION): NA
 27. IF CURRENTLY SHUTDOWN ESTIMATED STARTUP TIME: 10/19/84

AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL
NET MWe

DOCKET #50-219
UNITOyster Creek #1
REPORT DATEOCTOBER 03, 1984
COMPILED BYDONALD V. NOTIGAN
TELEPHONE #609-971-4695

MONTH SEPTEMBER, 1984

<u>DAY</u>	<u>MW</u>	<u>DAY</u>	<u>MW</u>
1.	0	16.	0
2.	0	17.	0
3.	0	18.	0
4.	0	19.	0
5.	0	20.	0
6.	0	21.	0
7.	0	22.	0
8.	0	23.	0
9.	0	24.	0
10.	0	25.	0
11.	0	26.	0
12.	0	27.	0
13.	0	28.	0
14.	0	29.	0
15.	0	30.	0

REFUELING INFORMATION - September, 1984

Name of Facility: Oyster Creek Station #1

Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: Presently shutdown for Refueling

Scheduled date for restart following refueling: October 19, 1984

Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a Technical Specification change or other license amendment?

Received Amendment 75 to Technical Specifications to support Cycle 10 operations.

Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting information:

All information to support Cycle 10 operations had already been submitted.

Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures:

1. General Electric Fuel Assemblies - fuel design and performance analysis methods have been approved by the NRC. New operating procedures, if necessary, will be submitted at a later date.
2. Exxon Fuel Assemblies - no major changes have been made nor are there any anticipated.


The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core = 560
(b) in the spent fuel storage pool = 980

The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies:

Present: 1,800 Planned: 2,600

The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity:

Full core offload capability will be lost after the 1985 outage. Batch discharge capability will be lost after the 1987 outage. Expanded spent fuel pool rack capacity (2,600) is scheduled for 1984.



GPU Nuclear Corporation
Post Office Box 388
Route 9 South
Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388
609 971-4000
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

October 15, 1984

Director
Office of Management Information
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Monthly Operating Report

In accordance with the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Operating License No. DPR-16, Appendix A, Section 6.9.1.C, enclosed are two (2) copies of the Monthly Operating Data (gray book information) for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

If you should have any questions, please contact Mr. Drew Holland at (609) 971-4643.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:dain
Enclosures

cc: Director (10)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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