

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. E. C. 84-20

Docket No. 50-271

License No. DPR-28

Licensee: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
RD 5, Box 169, Ferry Road
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

Facility Name: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

Meeting at: NRC Region I Office, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

Meeting Conducted: September 12, 1984

NRC Personnel:

J. E. Tripp

J. E. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects
Section No. 3A

9/25/84

date

J. E. Tripp
for

E. C. Wenzinger, Chief, Project
Branch No. 3

9/25/84

date

Meeting Summary: Meeting on September 12, 1984 (Meeting Report No. E. C. 84-20). An Enforcement Conference was convened at the request of NRC Region I to discuss the results of Inspection Report 50-271/84-20 with representatives of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation. The meeting accounted for 9 man hours by NRC Region I personnel.

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DETAILS

1. Meeting Attendees

Licensee Representatives

W. P. Murphy, Vice President and Manager of Operations
J. J. Desilets, Operations Supervisor
R. D. Pagodin, Engineering Support Supervisor
D. A. Reid, Operations Superintendent

NRC

J. M. Allan, Deputy Regional Administrator
R. W. Starostecki, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs (DPRP)
L. E. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A, DPRP
W. J. Raymond, Resident Inspector
D. J. Holody, Enforcement Specialist
J. M. Gutierrez, Regional Attorney

2. Meeting Purpose and Topics of Discussion

The Enforcement Conference was held at the request of NRC Region I to discuss the apparent violations related to a loss of secondary containment integrity while moving irradiated fuel which were identified in Inspection Report 50-271/84-20 dated August 31, 1984. Region I personnel discussed their concerns regarding the apparent violations.

Licensee personnel explained the circumstances regarding the issues, discussed the results of their evaluation of the event, and described the corrective and preventive actions taken. The licensee acknowledged that secondary containment had not been maintained as required by Technical Specification 3.7.C.1 on July 17, 1984. The licensee indicated that they considered the failure of a contractor plant worker to follow established administrative procedures to be the sole cause of the apparent violation and that this failure could not have been anticipated. The licensee discussed the limited safety significance of this violation considering the maximum potential release which could occur during a fuel handling accident. The licensee disagreed with the NRC staff on the question of whether a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation should have been performed prior to implementation of Mechanical Bypass Request 84-14. The licensee discussed the similarities between the events on July 17, 1984 and a loss of secondary containment on March 21, 1983, and presented the bases for his conclusion that there were significant differences between the two events.

3. Results

The NRC staff stated that the licensee would be notified regarding the enforcement action which would result from the apparent violations. The staff acknowledged the licensee's open and informative dialogue which took place during the meeting.