

ENCLOSURE 1

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2

TVA-SQN-TS-62

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices inoperable:

- a. Restore the protective device (s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker within 72 hours and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped, or
- b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 18 months:
 1. For at least one 6.9 kV reactor coolant pump circuit, such that all reactor coolant pump circuits are demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 72 months, by performance of:
 - (a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-256 and
 - (b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed using Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-257.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- (c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 1 of the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested per Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-257.
2. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each type of lower voltage circuit breakers. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. The functional test, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-258, shall consist of injecting a current input at the specified setpoint to each selected circuit breaker and verifying that each circuit breaker functions as designed. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.
3. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of each type of fuse on a rotating basis. Each representative sample of fuses shall include at least 10% of all fuses of that type. The functional test, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-270, shall consist of a non-destructive resistance measurement test which demonstrates that the fuse meets its manufacturer's design criteria. Fuses found inoperable during these functional tests shall be replaced with OPERABLE fuses prior to resuming operation. For each fuse found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all fuses of that type shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all fuses of that type have been functionally tested.*
- b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-266 in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

*Surveillance requirement 4.8.3.1.a.3 may be suspended until the completion of Cycle 2 provided that the following surveillance requirement is implemented:

A fuse inspection and maintenance program will be maintained to ensure that:

1. The proper size and type of fuse is installed,
2. The fuse shows no sign of deterioration, and
3. The fuse connections are tight and clean.

PAGES 3/4 8-17 THROUGH 3/4 8-33
FOR TABLE 3.8-1 ARE DELETED

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices inoperable:

- a. Restore the protective device (s) to OPERABLE status or de-energize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker within 72 hours and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent protection circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped.
- b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices shown in Table 3.8-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 18 months:
 1. For at least one 6.9 kV reactor coolant pump circuit, such that all reactor coolant pump circuits are demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 72 months, by performance of:
 - (a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-256
 - (b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed using Surveillance Instruction SI-257.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

- (c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 1 of the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested per Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-257.
2. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of at least 10% of each type of lower voltage circuit breakers. Circuit breakers selected for functional testing shall be selected on a rotating basis. The functional test, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-258, shall consist of injecting a current input at the specified setpoint to each selected circuit breaker and verifying that each circuit breaker functions as designed. Circuit breakers found inoperable during functional testing shall be restored to OPERABLE status prior to resuming operation. For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all the circuit breakers of the inoperable type shall also be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all circuit breakers of that type have been functionally tested.
3. By selecting and functionally testing a representative sample of each type of fuse on a rotating basis. Each representative sample of fuses shall include at least 10% of all fuses of that type. The functional test, Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-270, shall consist of a non-destructive resistance measurement test which demonstrates that the fuse meets its manufacturer's design criteria. Fuses found inoperable during these functional tests shall be replaced with OPERABLE fuses prior to resuming operation. For each fuse found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of at least 10% of all fuses of that type shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or all fuses of that type have been functionally tested.*
- b. At least once per 60 months by subjecting each circuit breaker to an inspection and preventive maintenance in accordance with Surveillance Instruction SNP SI-266 in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations.

*Surveillance requirement 4.8.3.1.a.3 may be suspended until the completion of Cycle 2 provided that the following surveillance requirement is implemented:

A fuse inspection and maintenance program will be maintained to ensure that:

1. The proper size and type of fuse is installed,
2. The fuse shows no sign of deterioration, and
3. The fuse connections are tight and clean.

PAGES 3/4 8-18 THROUGH 3/4 8-32
FOR TABLE 3.8-1 ARE DELETED

ENCLOSURE 2

JUSTIFICATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
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Description

This proposed technical specification change deletes table 3.8-1, "Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protection Devices," from section 3/4.8.3.1.

Justification

Presently a technical specification change is required to update this table before any related modifications are implemented. Deletion of this table will eliminate future technical specification changes of that nature and will allow more expeditious completion of required modifications. This table is already included in the applicable surveillance instructions (SI). Sequoyah's Workplan Control Form requires all affected procedures to be revised to document any modification. Therefore, the SI will provide valid and updated lists of the associated plant equipment. Also, any modifications related to the overcurrent devices will require an Unreviewed Safety Question Determination to ensure the integrity and safe operation of the plant. This change in the philosophy for technical specifications is similar to the change for snubbers identified in Generic Letter 84-13.

Based on the attached significant hazards determination: (1) the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92; (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC Environmental Statement.

ATTACHMENT

PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION

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1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the safety analysis report significantly increased? No.

This technical specification change is for documentation purposes and does not affect the plant configuration or surveillance testing requirements. Therefore, the probability of any previously evaluated accident is not increased.

2. Is the possibility for an accident of a new or different type than evaluated previously in the safety analysis report created? No.

Since technical specification table 3.8-1 is included in the present SI, it is still readily available for reference or review. Deletion of the table from technical specifications will have no effect on the plant's design or operation. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different type accident is not created.

3. Is the margin of safety significantly reduced? No.

The associated plant systems will not be changed. Therefore, the design criteria is satisfied and the margin of safety is not reduced.