



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos.: 50-413/84-82 and 50-414/84-36

Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414

License Nos.: NPF-24 and CPPR-117

Facility Name: Catawba Units 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: July 26 - August 25, 1984

Inspectors: C. W. Burger, for 9/28/84
P. K. VanDooen Date Signed

C. W. Burger, for 9/28/84
P. H. Skinner Date Signed

Approved by: V. L. Brownlee 10/1/84
V. L. Brownlee, Section Chief Date Signed
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection involved 142 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of followup of NRC and licensee identified items (Units 1 and 2); site tours (Units 1 and 2); maintenance observations (Unit 1); surveillance observations (Unit 1); plant operation (Unit 1); TMI Action Items (Unit 1); and followup of ASLB issues (Unit 1).

Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

841114014B 841001
PDR ADOCK 05000413
Q PDR

REPORT DETAILS

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

R. L. Dick, Vice President, Construction
G. W. Grier, Corporate QA Manager
J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
H. L. Atkins, QA Engineering Supervisor
W. H. Bradley, QA Supervisor
T. B. Bright, Engineering Manager
E. M. Couch, Project Administrator
J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services
L. R. Davison, Project QA Manager
S. W. Dressler, Projects Engineer
J. W. Glenn, QA Engineer
C. W. Graves, Jr., Superintendent, Operations
C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer
D. P. Hensley, QA Technician
J. F. Knuti, Operating Engineer
P. G. Lercy, Licensing Engineer
R. A. Morgan, Sr., QA Engineer
C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer
W. G. Rixon, Project Control
K. W. Schmidt, QA Engineer
G. T. Smith, Superintendent Maintenance
R. White, CSRG Chairman
J. W. Willis, Sr., QA Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 24, 1984, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the findings identified by the inspectors.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (Units 1 and 2)

- a. (Open) Unresolved Item (413/83-31-01 and 414/83-26-01): Review of Corrective Action System. This item concerned followup inspection to assure discrepancies identified on Nonconforming Item Reports (NCIs), Discrepancy Reports (R2As) and Component Support Information Records (M51Cs) were being properly handled. The inspector reviewed sample records in each construction technical area to determine if discrepancies were being handled properly. The inspection reviewed implementation audits and followup actions for procedures Q1, Rev. 18; R2, Rev. 9; and R-6, Rev. 0.

The inspector reviewed results of a QA department study of R2As dated October 31, 1983. In addition, the inspector held discussions with various site personnel regarding the corrective action programs. The inspector discussed actions relative to the discrepancies identified on systems turned over or being turned over to operations personnel. The licensee indicated that Criterion XVI evaluations documented on R6A forms were being evaluated but the turnover procedure, S2, did not formally address the requirement. The inspector also noted that QA procedure R6, Rev. 2 addresses the evaluation process but does not clearly address what considerations have to be specifically documented on the R6A form. The licensee indicated that forthcoming procedure changes would address these two issues. This item will remain open pending implementation of these procedure changes. The corrective action system appears to have been satisfactorily implemented. This program has also been reviewed by NRC Region II inspectors, see report Nos. (50-413/83-37 and 50-414/83-32).

During the review of this item, the inspector noted that timely handling of information relative to nonconforming items identified in Unit 2 which may affect Unit 1 turn over systems, was not formally addressed in appropriate procedures. It did appear that appropriate information was being forwarded and the R6 program addresses affects of one Unit on another, but the inspector considers that a more timely formalized approach is needed due to similarity of Unit 1 to Unit 2 and the dual status involving different QA programs for each Unit at Catawba.

The licensee agreed to review the QA program and make appropriate changes to assure a formalized approach to timely forwarding of information to Unit 1 personnel. This item will be tracked separately as Inspector Followup Item (413/84-82-01 and 414/84-36-01): Handling of Nonconforming Items Identified on Unit 2 for Unit 1 Applicability.

- b. (Closed) Unresolved Item (413/84-28-03 and 414/84-16-03): Filter Frame Rivets. The inspector observed completed field modifications and reviewed licensee evaluation and records of the previously identified discrepancies. Licensee evaluation showed the discrepancies to be insignificant and previously planned field modifications have corrected the discrepancies. Licensee actions are considered satisfactory.
- c. (Closed) Unresolved Item (413/84-46-06 and 414/84-22-01): Technical Specification for Safe Shutdown Facility and Systems. Technical Specification 3.7.13 has been issued as part of Catawba license. This specification addresses the Standby Shutdown Facility (Safe Shutdown Facility and Systems). Based on the issuance of this Technical Specification, this item is closed.

- d. (Closed) Violation (413/84-28-01 and 414/84-16-01): Failure to Establish Adequate Procurement Controls. The responses for this item were submitted on April 19, 1984 and May 3, 1984. The inspector reviewed the responses and verified implementation of corrective actions described in the responses and considers licensee actions to be acceptable.
- e. (Closed) Violation (413/84-56-01 and 414/84-26-01): Failure to Adequately Control Procured Structures. The response for this item was submitted on August 14, 1984. The inspector reviewed the response and verified implementation of corrective actions described in the response and considers licensee actions to be acceptable.
- f. (Closed) Violation (413/83-26-01): Failure to Maintain Records of Testing Activities. The response for this item was submitted on November 4, 1983. The inspector reviewed the response and verified implementation of corrective actions described in the response and considers licensee actions to be acceptable.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Independent Inspection Effort (71302, 92706) (Units 1 and 2)

The inspectors conducted tours of various plant areas. During these tours, various plant conditions and activities were observed to determine that they were being performed in accordance with applicable requirements and procedures. No significant problems were identified during these tours and the various evolutions observed were being performed in accordance with applicable procedures.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Maintenance Observation (71302) (Unit 1)

Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with the requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection: (1) that the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; (2) quality control records were maintained; (3) that the activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; and, (4) parts and materials used were properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Surveillance Observations (61726) (Unit 1)

During the inspection period, the inspector verified that plant operations were in compliance with at least 20 different Technical Specification requirements. Typical of these were confirmation of compliance with the Technical Specification for reactor coolant chemistry, refueling water storage tank, control area ventilation, source range instrumentation monitoring, and overpressure protection. The inspector verified that operations and testing were performed in accordance with approved procedures, instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operations were met, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Plant Operations (71707, 71501B) (Unit 1)

During the inspection period the inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators. The inspector verified the operability of selected systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the reactor, auxiliary, turbine and other buildings and areas were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions including potential fix hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibration and to verify that maintenance work requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector verified that the security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security procedures.

On July 21, 1984, due to a combination of operator errors and inadequate procedural control Boric Acid Transfer Pumps 1A and 1B were damaged and resulted in replacement of both pumps. This is reported in LER 84-01 and also in Catawba Incident Investigation Report No. C84-013-1. One of the problem areas contributing to this event was that the procedure for operation of these pumps in this mode did not contain any requirements to assure that upon starting a pump from the control room without control room indication that the pump parameters locally, i.e., flow, pressure, etc., were correct. Although this was subsequently addressed for this particular case, other cases may exist that could contribute to a similar failure. The inspector discussed this with the operations personnel and they stated they would review procedures to correct this potential problem. This will be tracked as an inspector followup item (413/84-82-02) to assure that procedure revisions are made when required.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. TMI Action Item Verification and Followup (92706) (Unit 1)

This inspection was conducted to verify the adequacy of implementation of licensee commitments made to the NRC. The commitments were made in response to the requirements of NUREG-0660, NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident, published May 1980, Revised August 1980; NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, published November 1980; and NUREG-0694, TMI-Related Requirements for New Operating Licenses, published June 1980.

The verification adequacy was based upon personal observations in the plant and review of licensee drawings, procedures and documents.

I.A.1.1 Shift Technical Advisor (STA)

NUREG 0737 states that "the STA shall have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline and have received specific training in the response and analysis of the plant for transients and accidents. The STA shall also receive training in plant design and layout, including the capabilities of instrumentation and controls in the control room". The inspector reviewed this area and can find no training requirements specified in the Catawba administrative procedures that identifies the training that is required for an STA. Since all STA's have participated in the classes for senior reactor operators and several have passed their exams and been licensed, the inspector considers this training to fulfill his training requirement. However, the program for identifying the training required for an STA should be defined. This was discussed with the licensee and he will identify in his training administrative procedures the specific training requirements for the STA position. This item will be tracked as an inspector followup (413/84-82-03) pending documentation of this program.

9. Licensee Identified Items 50.55(e) (Units 1 and 2) (99020)

- a. (Closed) CDR (413/84-17): Seismic Design Criteria not Applied to Fire Protection Piping for ESF Filters. The response to this item was submitted on July 18, 1984. The inspector reviewed the response and verified implementation of corrective actions described in the response and considers licensee actions to be satisfactory.
- b. (Closed) CDR (413/84-11): Welding Discrepancies between Fabrication Drawings and Equipment on Bahnsen Ventilation Units. The response for this item was submitted on May 22, 1984. The inspector reviewed the response and verified implementation of corrective actions described in the response and considers licensee actions to be satisfactory.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Followup of Licensee Action on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (92701) (Unit 1)

- a. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (413/83-26-02): Resolution of Comments on TP/1/A/1200/04. The inspector reviewed the resolution of the comments previously made by the inspector. This review also included the changes to the FSAR that resulted from these comments. Based on this review, this item is closed.
- b. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (413/83-26-04): Resolution of Comment on TP/1/A/1450/01. The inspector reviewed the resolution to the comment previously made by the inspector. Based on this review, this item is closed.

11. Followup of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Partial Initial Decision

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in a Partial Initial Decision (PID) issued on June 22, 1984, required action to be performed by the licensee and/or staff concerning several areas at Catawba. The inspector verified that some of these actions have been satisfactorily completed. These actions include upgrading of procedures for control of filler metal (PID pg. 87), followup of recommendations concerning Welding Concern No. D18 regarding socket weld sizes (PID pg. 106-107), followup of recommendations concerning Welding Concern No. E-2 regarding socket weld gaps (PID pg. 121), and modifications to procedure for walk-down inspections to remove limitations (PID pg. 172-173). The licensee actions on these issues are considered satisfactory.

No violations or deviations were identified.