

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/84-21; 50-301/84-19

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301

Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company
231 West Michigan
Milwaukee, WI 53203

Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Point Beach Site

Inspection Conducted: December 1, 1984 to February 4, 1985

Inspectors: R. L. Hague

R. J. Leemon

Approved By: *I. N. Jackiw*
I. N. Jackiw, Chief
Projects Section 2B

2-9-85
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on December 1, 1984 to February 4, 1985 (Reports No. 50-266/84-21(DRP); 50-301/84-19(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; Licensee Event Reports; and independent inspection. The inspection involved a total of 281 inspector-hours onsite by two inspectors, including 68 inspector hours on offshifts.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *J. J. Zach, Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant
- T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent
- G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent, Operations
- J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent, Technical Services
- W. J. Herrman, Superintendent, Maintenance and Construction
- *R. E. Link, Superintendent, EQR
- R. S. Bredvad, Health Physicist
- R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor
- *F. A. Flentje, Staff Services Supervisor

The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument and Control Sections.

*Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.

2. Operational Safety Verification

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of December 1984 and January 1985. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspectors observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of December 1984 and January 1985, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the emergency diesel generating, containment radiation monitoring, and auxiliary feedwater systems to verify operability. The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

On December 7, 1984, a Unit 1 containment spray header hydraulic snubber (1HS-16) was discovered leaking fluid during a Unit 1 containment inspection. The licensee entered a 72 hour Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO), and removed the snubber for testing and repair. Upon testing,

the snubber was found to be operable. The seals on the reservoir were replaced and the snubber was reinstalled prior to the expiration of the LCO.

On December 11, 1984, fluid leaking from "A" hot leg hydraulic snubber (2HS-22) was discovered on the 10' elevation during a Unit 2 containment inspection. This snubber is inaccessible during power operation. The licensee entered a 72 hour LCO and went off line at 10:23 p.m., December 11, 1984. The snubber was replaced with an identical snubber (2HS-21), which is accessible during operation, and placed the unit back on line at 3:25 a.m., December 12, 1984. Snubber 2HS-22 was tested, found operable, repaired, and returned to the 2HS-21 position on December 12, 1984, ending the LCO.

On December 3, 1984, routine sampling of the "C" boric acid storage tank (BAST) indicated that boric acid concentration was .1% below the technical specification limit of at least 11.5%. Unit 2's safety injection and chemical and volume control systems' suction were immediately shifted to the "B" BAST. Investigation of the dilution disclosed a newly installed reactor makeup water isolation valve was leaking by approximately 100 gallons per week. The valve was tightened down to stop the leakage. The licensee remained aligned to the "B" BAST for another two weeks while monitoring the "C" BAST boric acid concentration to insure that no further dilution was taking place. After this period, the "C" BAST's boric acid concentration was returned to within technical specification limits and the tank was placed back in service.

3. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:

- ° Oil changes on the two motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps
- ° Installation of auxiliary power supply to the technical support center

- Repair oil leak on 2P11A component cooling pump
- Replacement of Diesel fire pump battery
- Startup testing of the new batteries and associated systems

Following completion of maintenance on the auxiliary feedwater pumps and the component cooling water pump, the inspectors verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.

4. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspectors observed the technical specification's required surveillance testing on the quarterly axial offset on Unit 1, inservice testing of service water pumps and motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, and Unit 1 safeguards system logic test, and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities: Unit 1 and 2 reactor protection system testing and radiation monitoring system calibrations.

During the quarterly axial offset monitoring on Unit 1, Reactor Engineering experienced some difficulty with blocked thimble tubes. Throughout the rest of January, instrument and control personnel have been exercising the incore detectors three times a week. This appears to have alleviated the problem with tube blockage. The Unit 1 thimble tubes are scheduled to be replaced during the upcoming spring refueling outage for Unit 1. Unit 2's thimble tubes were replaced during the last outage.

5. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications:

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|-----------|---|
| 301/84-07 | Inadvertent actuation of emergency safeguards equipment |
| 301/84-08 | Containment isolation valve leakage in excess of technical specifications |

6. Independent Inspection

Throughout the inspection period the inspectors have been monitoring the progress of the installation, testing, and calibration of the new batteries and auxiliary safety instrumentation panels (ASIP). All of the required instrumentation to satisfy NUREG-0737 was powered up and calibrated by January 1, 1985. The licensee had a technical specification requiring the new batteries to be operational by December 31, 1984. When it became apparent that this date could not be met, the licensee requested and received an extension of that date to March 1, 1985. Testing of the new batteries, chargers, inverters, and associated switchgear have been progressing satisfactorily and it appears that the extension date will be met.

7. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged these findings.