UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

AUG 31 1984

DO NOT DISCLOSE
Contains Identity of
Confidential Source

MEMORANDUM FOR: CASE FILE

FROM: B. Uryc, Investigative Coordinator

SUBJECT: CATAWBA: VIOLATION OF INTERPASS TEMPERATURE

CASE NO: RII-84-A-0012

Region II was monitor the Duke Power Company (DPC) investigation which was initiated as a result of Region II providing information relative to concerns developed during the followup of the foreman override issue (see Inspection Report 50-413/84-31 for details on the development of this issue).

As part of the Region II monitoring process a decision was made to telephonically contact those DPC employees who expressed concerns to DPC to determine if they were satisfied with the DPC actions relating to their concerns and if they had been advised that if they were not satisfied that they could contact the NRC. Additional information concerning the development of the decision to contact these individuals by telephone is contained in Inspection Report 50-413/84-88.

The DPC Investigation Director arranged for Region II to receive the home telephone numbers of those individuals who expressed concerns. During the period August 18-30, 1984, twenty seven of the 37 individuals were contacted on the dates indicated and they stated that they were satisfied with the resolution of their concerns by DPC and that they had been advised that if they were not satisfied that they could go to the NRC.

NAME	DATE CONTACTED	CONTACTED BY
[redacted]	08/19/84	B. Uryc
	08/27/84	J. Lankford
	08/18/84	J. Lankford
	08/27/84	J. Lankford
	08/20/84	J. Lankford
	08/21/84	J. Lankford
	08/19/84	B. Uryc
	08/28/84	B. Uryc
	08/18/84	J. Lankford
	08/18/84	B. Uryc
	08/18/84	B. Uryc
	08/21/84	B. Uryc
	08/25/84	B. Uryc
	08/30/84	B. Uryc
	08/19/84	B. Uryc
	08/19/84	B. Uryc
	08/21/84	B. Uryc
	08/27/84	J. Lankford
	08/28/84	B. Uryc

DO NOT DISCLOSE
Contains Identity of

NAME	DATE CONTACTED	CONTACTED BY
[redacted]	08/19/84	J. Lankford
	08/18/84	B. Uryc
	08/30/84	B. Uryc
	08/19/84	B. Uryc
	08/18/84	J. Lankford
	08/27/84	J. Lankford
	08/28/84	B. Uryc
	08/19/84	B. Uryc

The below listed individuals were not contacted because they either had no telephone or their telephone number is unlisted:

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

One individual, [redacted] could not be contacted and attempts will be made to contact all of the individuals who were not contacted.

Bruno Uryc

NOTE: [redacted] was contacted by J. Bryant on 08/31/84 - no problems w/ resolution of concerns, she fact said he was very satisfied.

DO NOT DISCLOSE
Contains Identity of
Confidential Source

SEP 04 1984

Disc w/RA re contacting those individuals not contacted —

Decision made not to try and contact these individuals because of large sampling already done (all w/positive results re satisfaction) and fact that licensee advised us that they contacted all individuals - who all stated they were satisfied

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION
(X) RECORD OF CONVERSATION
( ) CASE REVIEW / STATUS
( ) OTHER

PARTICIPANTS

CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED YES NO

FILE NO 84-0012

DATE AUG 31 1984

TIME

SUMMARY ALGR called early PM. When I returned his call his wife said he just left for work. I asked her if he was having an problem and she said everything was fine. I told her to have ALGR call me collect 9/1 at home.

SEP 04 1984 - TC w/ALGR, Everything fine. [redacted] not made. Thanked NRC for tremendous help we've provided.

PAGE 1 OF 1

PREPARED BY BRUNO URYC, JR.

DATE AUG 31 1984

ACTION REQUIRED

REVIEWED BY

DATE

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DO NOT DISCLOSE
Contains Identity of
Confidential Source

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION
( ) RECORD OF CONVERSATION
( ) CASE REVIEW / STATUS
(X) OTHER
IDENTIFICATION OF INTERVIEWEES

PARTICIPANTS

CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED YES NO

FILE NO RII-84-A-0012

DATE

TIME

SUMMARY

INDIVIDUAL A - [redacted]

INDIVIDUAL B - CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

INDIVIDUAL B-1 - CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

INDIVIDUAL B-2 - CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

INDIVIDUAL B-3 - CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

INDIVIDUAL C - [redacted]

INDIVIDUAL D -

INDIVIDUAL E -

INDIVIDUAL F -

INDIVIDUAL G -

INDIVIDUAL H -

INDIVIDUAL I -

DO NOT DISCLOSE
Contains Identity of
Confidential Source

PAGE OF

PREPARED BY

DATE

ACTION REQUIRED

REVIEWED BY

DATE

OFFICIAL USE ONLY — DO NOT DISCLOSE

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION
( ) RECORD OF CONVERSATION
( ) CASE REVIEW / STATUS
( ) OTHER

PARTICIPANTS

CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED YES NO

FILE NO 84-0012

DATE

TIME

SUMMARY [redacted] not satisfied with action taken against Supervisor's -

[redacted] - satisfied

people generally were offered Confidentiality by DPC in their discussions.

PAGE OF

PREPARED BY BRUNO URYC, JR.

DATE

ACTION REQUIRED

REVIEWED BY

DATE

OFFICIAL USE ONLY — DO NOT DISCLOSE

(9)

MAR 26 1984

Duke Power Company
ATTN: Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President
Nuclear Production Department
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: MEETING SUMMARY - DOCKET NOS. 50-413 AND 50-414

This letter refers to the meeting conducted at our request in the NRC Region II Office on March 13, 1984. The purpose of the meeting was to present information developed by members of the Region II staff concerning allegations that a foreman of a specific welding crew engaged in activities that were contrary to approved construction procedures and subsequently caused members of the crew to utilize unacceptable welding procedures.

The Region II staff developed this information during the final stages of followup activity involving the issue of generic foreman override which was brought up during the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing. With no evidence of widespread foreman override, the Region II staff then focused on developing the separate new issue relative to possible irregularities by this particular foreman and his crew. The ASBL was advised of the resolution of the generic foreman override issue and that the Region II staff intended to continue appropriate inspection efforts on the newly developed issue.

We felt this meeting was necessary so that we could inform you of this information which may potentially involve safety issues requiring your prompt attention, evaluation, and safety-related corrective action. It is our opinion that this meeting served its intended function of providing your representatives with a general understanding of the nature and scope of the allegations so that you could begin the initial steps of an in-depth inquiry into this matter. The Region II staff will continue its own evaluation of the concerns identified and will consider appropriate enforcement action, if any, resulting from our evaluations. Enclosed is a summary of the meeting topics.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of NRC's "Rules of Practice", Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in NRC's Public Document Room. Copies of this document will also be provided to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearing the safety and environmental issues and the parties to the Catawba Operating Licensing proceeding on these issues.

8404060235 5pp.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them.

Sincerely,

Richard C. Lewis, Director
Division of Project and
Resident Programs

Enclosure:
Meeting Summary

cc w/encl:
R. L. Dick, Vice President - Construction
J. W. Hampton, Station Manager

bcc w/encl:
NRC Resident Inspector
Document Control Desk
State of North Carolina

RII	RII	RII
VLBrownlee:jw	HCDance	RCLewis
3/23/84	3/23/84	3/23/84

MAR 26 1984

ENCLOSURE

MEETING SUMMARY

Licensee: Duke Power Company

Facility: Catawba

Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414

License Nos.: CPPR-116 and CPPR-117

Subject: Allegations Concerning Alleged Improper Welding Practices

A management meeting was held in the NRC Region II Office on March 13, 1984, to present to licensee representatives (herein after referred to as "licensee") information developed by members of the Region II staff concerning allegations that a foreman of a specific welding crew engaged in activities that were contrary to approved construction procedures and subsequently caused members of the crew to utilize unacceptable welding practices. The nature and scope of the allegations were detailed to the licensee in order for the licensee to have sufficient information to begin formulating the initial steps of a detailed inquiry.

The initial information leading to these specific allegations was developed during the course of Region II inspection activities regarding the generic "foreman override issue" that was examined during the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearing. The Region II staff's initial inspection activity concerning the generic "foreman override issue" involved individual personal interviews with 18 welders employed at the Catawba site. During these interviews, several individuals indicated they were aware of, or involved in personnel related incidents with one particular foreman. One of the individuals, who subsequently became known as "Welder B", provided specific first hand information of irregularities involving the same foreman. This led to Region II inspectors to focus their inspection activity on that particular foreman inasmuch as there was no substantive information to indicate that the generic "foreman override issue" existed as a site-wide problem.

The Region II staff presented the ASLB with the information provided by "Welder B" and informed the Board that this matter would be pursued by the Region II staff as a separate allegation in accordance with Regional policy.

The Region II staff focused their inspection efforts on the specific welding crew and its foreman. Information developed during the inquiry indicated that the specific crew in question normally experienced a high rate of personnel turnover and that a large number of welders had been assigned to that crew at one time or another as matter of normal crew management. Selected interviews were subsequently conducted both on and off site in attempts to develop additional information. As a result of these interviews, information was developed which indicated the following:

1. Welders working on stainless steel sockets may have violated interpass temperatures.

2. Arc strikes may have been removed from a valve without proper documentation.

3. Socket welds may have been made out of procedure in that one side of the socket was completely welded and then the other side welded.

4. The lead man on the crew reportedly acted as a "look out" for licensee QC inspectors when welding procedures were being violated.

5. Welders perceived the foreman to be applying pressure for quantity.

6. The foreman allegedly instructed welders to weld without being in possession of proper welding documentation.

Regional management was briefed and a decision was made to advise the licensee based on the possibility that safety related systems may be involved and the immediate attention was warranted by the licensee. The licensee was advised that several of the individuals interviewed requested and were granted confidentiality during their interviews and that the staff would not release the identity of these individuals. The identity of the foreman in question was provided to the licensee during this meeting inasmuch as he is the current focal point of this matter. In addition, during the foreman's interview with the staff, he was asked if he had any objections to his identity being used in a public document and he replied that he did not. The Region II staff also felt that the foreman's identity was crucial information required by the licensee in order to have a starting point for their inquiry into this matter and that providing this information was appropriate in this instance.

The licensee was advised that Region II staff will be closely following their activity in this matter and continuing parallel independent inspection activity to review the technical implications of these allegations.

The above matters were discussed during the meeting and amplified as required in response to specific questions posed by the licensee. The licensee was made aware of the Region II staff's concerns as a result of these matters and advised by the staff to begin an immediate review of these issues to determine what problems are raised as a result of the issues; the possibility that these activities extended beyond this particular welding crew; and, what corrective actions would be required for adequate resolution.

The licensee was informed that this meeting was not an enforcement conference; however, if there are findings of violation of procedures, codes, or regulatory requirements, enforcement action could result. The licensee was requested to keep the Region II staff fully advised on the progress of their inquiry and they indicated that they would keep the staff advised of the progress and actions planned in this matter.

Attachment:
Attendance List

MAR 2 6 1984

ATTACHMENT

ATTENDANCE LIST

Attendance at the Duke - NRC meeting on March 13, 1984, at the NRC's Region II Office included:

Duke Power Company

R. L. Dick, Vice President Construction, Acting Project Manager
W. O. Henry, QA Manager - Technical Services
C. Ray, Jr., Principal Mechanical/Nuclear Engineer
D. Stout, Design Engineer

NRC - Region II

R. C. Lewis, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs (DPRP)
J. A. Olshinski, Director, Division of Engineering and Operational Programs (DEOP)
H. C. Dance, Chief, Project Branch 2, DPRP
V. L. Brownlee, Chief, Project Section 2A, DPRP
B. Uryc, Investigative Coordinator
N. Economos, Reactor Engineer, DEOP
A. R. Herdt, Chief, Engineering Program Branch, DEOP
J. J. Blake, Chief, Materials and Mechanical Section, DEOP