



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION II  
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

MAR 09 1984

NOTICE OF SIGNIFICANT MEETING

Name of Licensee: Duke Power Company

Name of Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station

Docket No.: 50-413 and 50-414

Date and Time of Meeting: March 13, 1984, 9:30 a.m.

Location of Meeting: Region II offices

Purpose of Meeting: To discuss selected welding issues at the Catawba site

NRC Attendees: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator  
R. C. Lewis, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs (DPRP)  
J. A. Olshinski, Director, Division of Engineering and Operational Programs (DEOP)  
H. C. Dance, Chief, Project Branch 2, DPRP  
V. L. Brownlee, Chief, Project Section 2A, DPRP  
S. Uryc, Investigative Coordinator  
N. Economos, Reactor Engineer, DEOP  
A. R. Herdt, Chief, Engineering Program Branch, DEOP  
J. J. Blake, Chief, Materials and Mechanical Section, DEOP

Licensee Attendees: R. Dick, Vice President of Construction  
W. Henry, QA Manager, Technical Services  
C. Ray, Design Engineering  
D. Stout, Design Engineering

NOTE: Attendance by NRC personnel at this NRC/Licensee meeting should be made known by 11:00 a.m., March 12, 1984, via telephone call to V. L. Brownlee, DPRP, FTS: 242-5583.

Distribution: Victor Stello, Jr., DEDROGR  
J. Lieberman, Director, ROED  
R. DeYoung, Director, IE  
J. Axelrad, Director, Enforcement  
D. G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing  
K. Jabbour, NRR

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BELL84-722 PDR

WELDER "B" BRIEFING

Welder "B" was initially interviewed in connection with the Foreman Override Issue brought up by in camera witnesses at the Licencing Board Hearing. Welder "B" was one of numerous welders interviewed to determine if there was any indication that the foreman override issue was a generic problem at the Catawba site. In response to questioning, Welder "B" provided the following information:

*Violation of interpass temp*

Sometime during 1981, he was welding in the Unit [redacted] on the [redacted]. He was assigned to work on 2 1/2 inch SS socket welds. He said his foreman, [redacted] told him that he wanted the job done quickly and he instructed the welders to start the work. The lead man on the crew, [redacted] was standing guard to watch for inspectors who might come into the area. Welder "B" said he was aware of interpass temperature requirements and when he told [redacted] that they could not weld quickly because of the interpass temperature requirements, [redacted] told them to keep welding or "hit the road". Welder "B" said that he was working as fast as he could on the welds at very high temperatures. He said that he did use a temp stick to check one weld and that the 350 degree temp stick blistered immediately when he touched the weld with the stick. Welder "B" identified three other welders who were working with him at the time.

Welder "B" related another incident which occurred sometime in early [redacted]. He provided the following information concerning that incident:

*burnt pipe*

Welder "B" said that he was asked by [redacted] to go to the [redacted] to help with some socket welds which were being fabricated in the [redacted]. He said that when he walked into the [redacted] he immediately noticed some 3/4 inch SS pipe which had been burned black. When he asked in a general way, who burned the pipe, [redacted] came over to him and took him out of the shop and assigned to work in the [redacted]. He said that when SS is black it is a sign that the material was welded too hot.

COPIES TO:  
J. OLSHINSKI  
A. HERDT  
J. BLAKE  
~~R. HENNING~~ RTD  
J. VORSE X2

WELDER "B" provided the following additional information during a subsequent interview:

He said that the SS sockets he welded on when he violated the interpass temperature were schedule 180 SS, 2/2 $\frac{1}{2}$  inch heavy wall sockets that were probably Class B or C welds. He said he was working in the [REDACTED] that had been set up for him to work in. He said that he believed this incident took place in late B1 or early B2. He said that the sockets were in jack stands and that he estimated he welded approximately [REDACTED] sockets over a period of several days. He believed that these sockets were installed in the general area where he was fabricating them. He said that he did mean to give the impression that several welders were working shoulder to shoulder on the sockets and that he had mentioned the other two welders because they had told him that similar situations happened to them. He described the area where he believed that the welds were installed as being at [REDACTED] and under [REDACTED] across the [REDACTED]. He said he was in a [REDACTED]

NOTE: ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO SURVEY THIS AREA, HOWEVER, NO WELDS WITH WELDER "B"'S STENCIL WERE LOCATED.

Individual B-1, a person who requested his identity be protected, was interviewed and he advised of the following incidents:

B-1 stated he worked for [redacted] on the [redacted] and that during the time he was on the [redacted] he felt that [redacted] did apply pressure to the crew to get the job done quickly. He said that he felt that a lot of the pressure being applied by [redacted] came from [redacted] the General Foreman.

B-1 stated that in early 1982, he was assigned to work with a welder named [redacted]. He said that [redacted] instructed [redacted] to work on a two inch socket without the proper paper work. This particular job had been left over from the day shift, and [redacted] completed the welding on the socket. [redacted] told [redacted] that he would get the paper work for the weld. As it turned out, the day shift did not complete the weld because it was being held for an ANI inspection hold point. When it was found that the weld had been completed, [redacted] was cited for missing a hold point. [redacted] never admitted he instructed [redacted] to do the work without paperwork and [redacted] took the blame for the weld.

B-1 stated that he assisted another welder named [redacted] weld some SS sockets in a fabrication booth in the [redacted]. He said they were working on two inch SS sockets and [redacted] did a number of sockets in a short period of time. He said that [redacted] had to exceed the interpass temperature to get the welding done in such a short period of time.

B-1 stated that sometime during [redacted] he walked into a [redacted] and observed a welder named [redacted] welding on some one inch SS sockets. He said that when [redacted] pulled his TIG stinger off the weld he saw that the entire weld area was glowing red. He said that this was clearly a violation of interpass temperature requirements. He said that he asked [redacted] why he was heating the

the weld so hot and [REDACTED] replied that [REDACTED] had been pushing him to get the work done. B-1 stated that he believed that the socket [REDACTED] was working on was going to be installed in the pipe chase.

B-1 stated that sometime after [REDACTED] left the crew, another lead man named [REDACTED] was assigned to to the crew. He said that he and another welder were assigned to weld some Class B SS sockets in the [REDACTED]. They were working on the sockets when [REDACTED] and another welder named [REDACTED] came down and told them that [REDACTED] sent them to finish the work. B-1 said that later in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had sent him down to help [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] clean the welds. He said that he observed that the sockets had been over heated because there was some black residue on the weld area. He observed [REDACTED] clearing the black residue off the welds with a wire brush on an air grinder. He said that he helped [REDACTED] clean several welds which were burned black.

B-1 stated that in early [REDACTED] he was called to a work area by another welder who pointed out a valve to him and told him that [REDACTED] had removed several arc strikes from the valve. The welder told him that [REDACTED] did not have the paperwork to remove the strikes. B-1 stated that this valve was located between the steam generators on the right side of Unit 2, about 30-40 feet from the air lock at 570 elevation.

Individual B-2, a person who requested that his identity be protected, was interviewed and he advised of the following incidents:

He said he worked on the [REDACTED] shift for [REDACTED] and that he often felt that [REDACTED] was indirectly telling him to do work that violated procedure. He said he was often told to get the job done and that he should do whatever was needed to get the job done. He said that he took this to mean that he should violate procedure if it got the job done.

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B-2 stated that on one occasion, he was assigned to complete some welds which were left over from the [REDACTED] shift. He said there were two welds, one on each side of a valve. He said when he looked at the valve he noticed there were several arc strikes on the valve. He called [REDACTED] over to show him the arc strikes and when [REDACTED] saw the arc strikes he asked for his file and removed the arc strikes. He said that [REDACTED] told him that if the strikes were not too bad to file them off because it would save the company time and money. B-2 identified the valve as follows: 1 NJ 398, located at 351 degrees at elevation 365.

Individual B-3, a person who requested that his identity be protected, was interviewed and he advised of the following incidents:

He worked on the [REDACTED] shift with [REDACTED] and he was aware that [REDACTED] was under a lot of pressure from [REDACTED] to get the job done. He said that [REDACTED] was not intentionally doing any wrong, it was just that he did not fully understand procedures and as a result he often told his crew to do things without knowing the procedure requirements.

B-3 stated that overheating of SS sockets was a common problem on the [REDACTED] and that he himself had welded sockets without checking the interpass temperature. He said that some of his sockets turned black and he knew that they were too hot. He said he could not provide specifics as to what welds or the time frame other than most of the overheating problem took place prior to the time Duke identified the problem and began using purge on SS welds. He said that he believed this occurred during the 80/81 time frame. He said when the overheating problem was addressed/identified, numerous welds were cut out of the system. He said that after they began using the purge, he would still occasionally see burnt SS sockets.

He said that he was frequently assigned to work on difficult jobs that were left over from the [redacted] shift. Many of the welds were in difficult positions or awkward places. He said he often had to weld these jobs and he would weld one side completely then the other side of the weld, as opposed to welding complete passes. He said that this was not an authorized procedure and no one told him to use this procedure. He said that to the best of his knowledge he welded this way on 60 to 70 SS sockets, mostly one inch or less. He said that while he was doing this particular procedure, [redacted] would watch for the inspectors, that is [redacted] was a look out. B-3 said that although this was not an authorized/approved Duke procedure, it was not in violation of the ASME code. He said he used this procedure because it was too difficult to weld complete passes on this hard-to-get-at welds. He said that [redacted] never told him to weld in this manner, and that [redacted] never wanted to know how he was getting the job done, especially the difficult work. [redacted] was aware that he was using this unauthorized procedure, and [redacted] was also aware of some of the unauthorized work he was doing. He said that [redacted] never told him to violate procedure, and that he did it on his own to get the job done.

B-3 stated that he was removed numerous arc strikes without paperwork and that these arc strikes were minor and superficial. He said that he never repaired any major arc strikes without proper paperwork.

B-3 stated that most of the problems that occurred on the [redacted] took place prior to the time that [redacted] was assigned as General Foreman. He said he could provide no specifics concerning time or welds on which he worked utilizing the unauthorized procedure.

[redacted] was interviewed and he provided the following information:

He said he was not aware of any problems on the [redacted] and that [redacted] has never put any pressure on him to do work that violated procedure. He said that he was not aware of [redacted] acting a lookout.

[REDACTED] said that he worked for [REDACTED] for approximately 2½ years and that he left the crew in April 83. He said that [REDACTED] worked the crew hard, but he was not aware of [REDACTED] ever telling anyone to violate procedure.

[REDACTED] was interviewed and he provided the following information:

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has only told him to weld out of procedure on one occasion. He stated that he was working on a 2 inch SS socket and that he had just completed one pass on the socket when [REDACTED] came up and held his hand close to the weld. [REDACTED] told him to continue welding because the socket had cooled down. [REDACTED] said that in his opinion the socket was still too hot, but he went ahead and continued welding as directed by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that this weld was located in the Unit 1 hatch area, just inside the airlock near the ladder that goes to the bottom floor. It was a 90 degree bend and he believed it was a Class C socket.

[REDACTED] stated that sometime around Thanksgiving 83, he saw a welder named [REDACTED] welding on a one inch SS socket in the basement of the Turbine Building on the Number 1 side. He said that he saw a black coloring on the cap of the weld and that [REDACTED] cleaned the weld and it subsequently passed inspection.

[REDACTED] said that he was not aware of [REDACTED] acting as a lookout for anyone.



[REDACTED] was interviewed and he provided the following information:

He stated that he has never intentionally told anyone to work out of procedure; he has never told [REDACTED] to act as a look out for inspectors; he has never done any work out of procedure; and, that he was not aware that any member of his crew was doing work that violated procedure.

He has never felt any pressure from [REDACTED] and he feels that he has good working relations with [REDACTED]. He said that he has never threatened any of his crew to get the job done and that he was not aware that anyone on his crew felt pressured to the point that they may have felt they had to violate procedure to get the job done.

He said he has had to tell some workers to get back to work because he thought they were loafing and that some welders did take advantage of the time requirements involved in interpass temperature requirements.

He said that only time he felt any pressure was when the crew was assigned shut down work and this work usually involved systems that were turned over for flush and hydro. He said this work required a high priority. He also said that his crew was [REDACTED] all over the site on the [REDACTED] and that when they were assigned their work, he would have [REDACTED] to supervise them.

[REDACTED] was interviewed and he provided the following information:

He said that he has never acted as a look out and that he was not aware of any crew member intentionally violating procedure. He said he was not aware of any problems which might affect safety. He said that some of the crew complained to him about pressure from [REDACTED] but that when they explained the situation, he felt [REDACTED] was justified in pushing these individuals. He said he has not seen any black sockets which would indicated interpass temperature was violated. He said he has never removed arc strikes without proper

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documentation, nor is he aware of anyone who may have done this. He said that he did feel that [REDACTED] was reacting to pressure from [REDACTED] but that this pressure did not cause any problems.

[REDACTED] was interviewed and he provided the following information:

[REDACTED] said that he did see one or two sockets which had been burned black. He stated that he saw these sockets in the Unit 1 pipe chase, but that he did not know the location of these sockets or who may have welded them. He said that a black residue on SS indicated that the weld was probably overheated. He said that he has never heard of [REDACTED] acting a lookout for the inspectors. He said that some of the crew felt that [REDACTED] was pressuring them to get work done and that [REDACTED] always wanted the crew to hurry up and produce quantity. He said he has never been told to remove arc strikes without paperwork and he has never seen anyone do that. He said he not aware of any willful violations of procedures.

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION  
 RECORD OF CONVERSATION  
 CASE REVIEW / STATUS  
 OTHER

PARTICIPANTS Welder "B"

B. Uryc

FILE NO 84-0012

DATE 03.12.84

TIME 10:15 AM

CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED  YES  NO

TC

SUMMARY I called to advise that he was able to go through some [redacted] and he was able to determine that his crew was checking weld roots out of [redacted] on [redacted]. He said he was also able to determine that at that time he was welding on the [redacted] system.

I was also advised that DPC was going to be briefed on the general nature of our findings and that he could expect to be briefed/interviewed by DPC re this matter. He said he would tell DPC the same thing he told NRC when questioned by them.

PREPARED BY B. Uryc

DATE 03.12.84

ACTION REQUIRED

REVIEWED BY

DATE

04-18-86

MTG w/  
Lewis, Dance, Economics, Blake, Brownlee, Uryc  
Dick - DPC.

0925 PM

at DPC request to brief on status of DPC inv

Dick moving inv at site

appoint non-union man to work case - Roy Helling

WIE Ben w/DPC late 60's

metal experience - well qualified

William Owens brief - appointed - review board to look at  
inv but to assure quality of inv & give independence

Wayne Cobel - Internal Audit Green Green Corp. Qd.

Erin Dale -

Warren requested plan

int welding craft

int other craft

evaluate findings

03/01 Dick gives verbal briefing and

approach -

determine crew that Foreman & Godman worked

" Glen Foreman

prepared list of welders who worked for [redacted] 1980-81

skilled interviewers from employee relations

prepared guide for interview

and prepared facilities -

Interviewed welders:  
foreman  
Edu foreman

interviewees were briefed by Rogus

Interviewed foreman: [redacted] (32)  
welders who were supervised by [redacted] during 8/8  
welders who were supervised for a length of time  
(+2-4 weeks) (19)

present crew - (8)  
randomly selected other welders + craft (63)

if anyone else mentioned they were interviewed (10)

12 technical interviews

147 people interviewed TOTAL

Review Matrix

11 people who felt quality suffered because of production pressure

11 who said they had knowledge of violation of Int Temp

9 " " who said anyone who said bad work were out to get supervisor (grudge)

12 who would not discuss problems w/ supervision  
be comfortable

4 who were told to less than acceptable work  
(his own standard was violated, respected)

3 people said they had been instructed to produce QC work

1 who said he knew of QC work doing production work

1 " " he was told to work on something non-confidential

1 " re concerns of cold springing

2 - level not correct on shop weld

4 - Catowba work excellent - Vendor work not good

3 - who did work w/ paper (process control)

6 - aware that they should look out for things

1 - hydro system + how tested

4 - arc strike removal - process control

1 - concern re material

- 1 - re installation of rod heads - given answers to test - (not a logered certification) C. of fitting
- 1 - missing anchor bolts on columns
- 2 - blowing holes in backing ring and welding tube.
- 1 - half weld process - using left handed + right handed welder - both stainless
- 1 - asked to apply stencil to weld he did not make
- 1 - improper welding tech on tension plate
- 1 - using drop of stainless on carbon ~~steel~~ proximity
- 1 - violation of hold point
- 1 - saw rock in concrete R wall

Major concerns technical

1. Interpass temp - Bill provided brief on what has been done to metalurgy
2. adding drop of SS to carbon
3. unauthorized removal of arc strike  
contradiction: welder + foreman
4. missing anchor bolts in columns  
radiography found a missing, twist
5. 1/2 side sequence technique.

7  
resolution

Employee relations  
Confirmed

Send list =

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION  
 RECORD OF CONVERSATION  
 CASE REVIEW / STATUS  
 OTHER

PARTICIPANTS ALGR  
B. Uryc

FILE NO 84-0012

DATE 07.13.84

TIME 1:00 pm

CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED  YES  NO

SUMMARY Telephone call to ALGR (Welder B) to inquire as to how things were going for him. He said everything was going well and he mentioned that [redacted] had been moved from a [redacted] to [redacted]. ALGR inquired as to status of work being done and I told him things were progressing and that we expected a report from DPC in early August 84. He said he has still not heard anything from DPC and I assured him they would be in touch with him. He thanked me for the call.

PAGE 1 OF 1

PREPARED BY

BRUNO URYC, JR.

DATE

07.13.84

ACTION REQUIRED

REVIEWED BY

DATE

ALGR: [REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM TO CASE FILE

TYPE ACTION

- RECORD OF CONVERSATION
- CASE REVIEW / STATUS
- OTHER

PARTICIPANTS

ALGR (Welder B)  
Uryc

FILE NO

84-0012

DATE

AUG 23 1984


TIME

11:15PM

CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED

YES  NO

SUMMARY



I called HOLLINS and advised him of info from ALGR.  
 HOLLINS said he would check and find out why ALGR  
 [REDACTED] and get back to me. HOLLINS said  
 that it appeared that such a [REDACTED] may not be  
 a good idea at this time.

PAGE OF

PREPARED BY

BRUNO URYC, JR. *[Signature]*

DATE

AUG 23 1984

ACTION REQUIRED

REVIEWED BY

DATE