U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-483/84-32(DRP)

Docket No. 50-483 License No. NPF-25

Licensee: Union Electric Company
Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400
St. Louis, MO 63166

Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1

Inspection At: Callaway Site, Steedman, MO

Inspection Conducted: July 1 through September 15, 1984

Inspectors: J. Foster, P. Hartman, J. Heller, C. Norelius, J. Neisler, B. Little

Approved By: P.R. Pelke for
W. L. Forney, Chief
Projects Section 1A

10/17/84
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on July 1 through September 15, 1984 (Report No. 50-483/84-32(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors and NRC Region III inspectors of 10 CFR 50.55(e) items; vendor inspection reports; safety evaluation report items; license conditions; operating events; licensee's use of advisors; augmented inspection program; startup test witnessing; maintenance and modifications; NRC site tours; and plant tours. The inspection involved a total of 528 inspector-hours onsite by 6 NRC inspectors including 157 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*S. E. Miltenberger, Manager, Callaway Plant
*D. F. Schnell, Vice President - Nuclear
*C. D. Naslund, Instrumentation and Control Superintendent
J. V. Laux, Supervisor QA Startup
C. A. Brewer, Test Program Coordinator
*A. P. Neuhalfen, Assistant Manager - Operations and Maintenance
*M. E. Taylor, Operations Superintendent
R. H. Leuther, Maintenance Superintendent
*J. E. Davis, Compliance Superintendent
K. L. Wickes, Instrument and Control Supervisor
*J. C. Gearhart, Supervisory Engineer - QA
*D. L. Poole, Advisor to Manager
*R. L. Powers, Assistant Manager, Quality Assurance
*G. L. Randolph, Assistant Manager, Technical Services
*W. R. Robinson, Supervisor, Compliance
*W. H. Sheppard, Superintendent, Engineering
*W. H. Stahl, Supervising Engineer
*W. A. Norton, Quality Assurance Engineer
*A. C. Passwater, Superintendent, Licensing
*D. E. Shafer, Supervisor Engineer, Licensing

*Denotes those present at one or more exit interviews.

In addition, a number of equipment operators, NRC-licensed Reactor Operators and Senior Reactor Operators, and other members of the Operations and Maintenance staffs were contacted.

2. 10 CFR 50.55(e) Item

(Closed) 483/83-21-EE: Cracked limit switch rotors on Limitorque valve controllers. SNUPPS reported cracks in limit switch rotors made of melamine and phenolic materials installed on Limitorque value actuators. Corrective action was to replace the limit switch rotors made of melamine or phenolic materials with rotors made from fibrite materials. Replacement of rotors in safety-related valve actuators has been completed for each valve prior to placing that valve in service. To date no cracking has been identified in the rotors made of fibrite materials. This item is considered to be closed.

3. Vendor Inspection Report 99900861/84-01

The report referred to nonconforming structural steel that Daniel International Corporation (DIC) received at the Callaway Facility.

The steel had been manufactured by Northwestern Steel and Wire Company and supplied to DIC by DuBose Steel, Inc. DIC identified heat number 77052 as being in nonconformance with Callaway specifications and subsequently reported the nonconformance to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 21.

The steel in question at Callaway consisted of 15 (20 feet long) beams. The inspector determined that one beam was sold to a local steel shop, eight beams were used for trailer supports and the remaining six beams were shipped to the licensee's Fenton, Mo. plant to be used as stock material in their training facility. None of the heat number 77052 steel was used in the power block of the Callaway plant. This item, as it pertains to Callaway, is considered to be closed.

4. Safety Evaluation Report (Supplements 3 and 4) Verification Items

The Callaway Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Supplements 3 and 4 contains items which require verification by NRC Region III prior to exceeding 5% power operation. These items are as follows:

Open Item Number	Description	Reference Supplement No.	SER Page
*483/84-32-01	Install properly marked chart paper on recorders	3	22-4
*483/84-32-02	Labeling of Hagen Controllers	3	22-4
*483/84-32-03	Change in meter location for Panel RL017	3	22-4
*483/84-32-04	Completion of Westinghouse Field change Notice SCPM - 10622	4	3-3
483/84-32-05	Setpoint adjustment of Barton Differential Pressure Indicating Switches	4	3-5
*483/84-32-06	Retraining of shift crew on revised shift advisor procedure	4	13-6

*These items are closed, see paragraph 5 of this report.

5. Inspection of Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Items

(Closed) SER Item (483/84-32-01)

Description	SER Section	Page
Install properly marked chart paper on recorders	SER Supplement 3	22-4

The lack of correctly scaled paper for the control room recorders was identified as a human engineering discrepancy during the NRC onsite audit of the Control Room Design Review on February 28 and 29, 1984.

On September 15, 1984, the inspector performed a control room walkdown and verified that the licensee had installed correctly scaled paper in all recorders except for recorders GN PR 934 and GN PR 936 (containment pressure recorders). The licensee stated that the chart paper for the above recorders is on order with expected delivery in October 1984. The status of this item was subsequently discussed with the NRC Licensing Project Manager (LPM). The LPM advised the inspector that the replacement of the chart paper in the above recorders did not warrant an operation mode restraint, but should remain an open item pending replacement (483/84-32-07).

(Closed) SER Item (483/84-32-02)

Description	SER Section	Page
Labeling of Hagen Controllers	SER Supplement 3	22-4

The Hagen Controllers had inconsistent clockwise/counter-clockwise manual operation depending on the desired failure mode of the valve, open or closed. This item was identified as a human engineering discrepancy during an NRC onsite audit of the Control Room Design Review on February 28 and 29, 1984. The licensee's corrective action was to install a label indicating the direction of rotation to open the valve.

The installation of labels was accomplished as part of licensee's Field Change Work Plan (FCWP) No. FJ-200-203, Rev. 0. The inspector reviewed the FCWP and through visual inspection of the Hagen Controllers, verified that the appropriate labeling had been completed. This item is considered to be closed.

(Closed) SER Item (483/84-32-03)

Description	SER Section	Page
Change in meter location for Panel RL017	SER Supplement 3	22-4

During the NRC onsite audit of the Control Room Design Review, the partially mirror-imaged array of the displays on Panel RL017 was considered as a potential for operator error. Licensee corrective action was to interchange the location of indicators EN-FI-5 (No. 141) and EN-FI-13A (No. 144) on Panel RL017. This work was accomplished by Callaway Modification Package CMP-84-04-09A and Work Request No. 027658. The inspector performed a control room walkdown and verified that the subject modification had been completed. This item is considered to be closed.

(Closed) SER Item (483/84-32-04)

Description	SER Section	Page
Completion of Westinghouse Field Change Notice SPCM-10622	SER Supplement 4	3-3

During seismic qualification testing of the Thermocouple Monitoring Instrument System (TMIS), intermittent output of the EPS-2 power supply was experienced. Resolution of this deficiency involved wiring and hardware modifications and retesting. The modification was defined by Field Change Notice (FCN) SPCM-10622 and authorized by Work Request (WR) No. 016927 for installation and WR No. 026023 for checkout and functional testing.

The inspector verified through inplant inspection of hardware and by review of QA work records that the modification to the TMIS had been completed and satisfactorily tested. This item is considered to be closed.

(Closed) SER Item (483/84-32-06)

Description	SER Section	Page
Retraining of Shift Crew on Revised Shift Advisor Procedure	SER Supplement 4	13-6

Callaway Operating Licensee (NPF-25), Attachment 2, contains the requirements for operating staff experience at Callaway. These requirements specify the use of shift advisors for those shifts where the licensed senior operator does not meet the operating experience requirements and requires that the shift crews be trained in the role of the shift advisors prior to exceeding 5% power.

Licensee procedure APA-ZZ-00010, Rev. 4, "Conduct of Operations", was issued August 15, 1984. The revised procedure defines the duties and responsibilities of the shift advisors. During the review of this matter the inspector interviewed shift advisors and shift crews. Those interviewed were knowledgeable of the revised procedure and of the shift advisors' role. The licensee conducted on-shift seminars for the training of shift crews relative to the revised procedure. This training was documented on the Training Documentation Form (CA-39). The inspector found that the licensee has completed the required retraining of shift crews. This item is considered to be closed.

6. Inspection of License Conditions

The Callaway Operating License (NPF-25), Attachment 1, contains license conditions which the licensee must complete before specified operational modes. Inspection of the following items has been completed.

a. (Closed) Attachment 1, Item A: Complete preoperational test CS-03-GN02 (Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) Cooling Test). This item remained open pending licensee completion of the flow balancing section of CS-03-GN02. Flow balancing and temperature data were required to assure adequate CRDM and cavity cooling.

The above test was completed using test procedure C-06HV01 (HVAC System Air Balancing). During the cavity cooling flow test, Fans

CGN02A and CGN02B produced flow rates of 15,707 and 15,069 cubic feet per minute (cfm), respectively. The specified flows for each fan is 16,000 cfm. This flow variance was documented on a Request for Resolution (RFR), RFR-00319. Subsequent evaluation by Bechtel determined that the flow rates obtained provide adequate cooling.

During the review of this matter the inspector witnessed portions of inprogress testing and verified that the Technical Specification L.C.O. 3.6.1.5, "Primary Containment Average Air Temperature", was maintained below the specified maximum of 120°F. The inspector also reviewed the test procedure, test data and related quality records. This item is considered to be closed.

b. (Closed) Attachment 1, Item B (483/82-11-07): Demonstrate four channel power assignment independence of the engineering safety features actuation system and the reactor protection system. The licensee demonstrated four channel power assignment independence by the performance of the engineering test (ETT-SB-02001) "Protection Instrumentation Electrical Independence Verification". The inspector reviewed the test procedure ETT-SB-02001, including test data, test summary and test results approval. The test method and test data demonstrate four channel power assignment independence. This license condition is considered to be closed.

c. (Closed) Attachment 1, Item C.4 (483/84-16-06): Modify door 33044 (turbine building to auxiliary building) to permit access route for the collection of post-accident samples. The licensee has completed the modification to door 33044, which permits access from the turbine building 2000 ft. level into room 1312 of the auxiliary building. The work was accomplished in accordance with Work Request No. 022410 and Callaway Modification Package 84-04-59A. The inspector performed a visual inspection of the modified door and reviewed the completed work package. This item is considered to be closed.

d. (Closed) Attachment 1, Item G.3 (483/84-15-07): Prepare and implement procedures which specify local closing of the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PPORV) block valves in the event of a spurious PPORV actuation during a control room fire. The inspector reviewed Callaway procedure OTO-ZZ-00001, Revision 3, dated May 30, 1984, and verified that the requirement to close the PPORV block valves at the local breaker panels has been included in Revision 3 of the procedure. This item is considered to be closed.

e. (Closed) Attachment 1, Item G.4 (483/84-15-08): Prepare and implement procedures specifying necessary on-shift staffing levels to support concurrent remote shutdown and fire brigade activities. The inspector reviewed Callaway procedure APA-ZZ-00010, Revision 3, and APA-ZZ-00032, Revision 4, to verify that staffing levels to support concurrent remote shutdown and fire brigade activities were adequate. APA-ZZ-00010, Revision 3, establishes minimum staffing levels for shifts that provide sufficient personnel for remote shutdown and fire

brigade manning. APA-ZZ-00032, Revision 4, designates the two radchem helpers assigned to the fire brigade. This item is considered to be closed.

f. (Closed) Attachment 1, Item G.5 (483/84-15-09): Prepare and implement procedures prescribing manual loading of the diesel generators if required during a control room fire. The inspector's review of Callaway procedure OTO-ZZ-00001, Revision 3, Attachment 3, dated May 30, 1984, verified that the prescription for manual loading of diesel generators if required during a control room fire is included in current procedures. This items is considered to be closed.

g. (Closed) Attachment 1, Item G.6 (483/84-15-10): Prepare and implement procedures specifying periodic verification of diesel generator fuel oil availability and diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump restoration in the event that pump control is disabled during a control room fire. The inspector's review of Callaway procedure OTO-ZZ-00001, Revision 3, Attachment 3, Steps 5.1 and 5.2, verified that monitoring the diesel generator fuel oil day tank and manually starting the transfer pump from the motor control center if required during a control room fire had been included in the procedure. This item is considered to be closed.

7. Inspection of Operating Events

During the period June 11 through September 15, 1984, the licensee issued 38 Licensee Event Reports (LERs). The licensee notified the NRC of nine additional events determined to be potentially reportable LERs but are not yet issued. Of the LERs issued, 15 involved the Security Department, the remaining 23 describe events involving plant hardware, procedure deficiencies and personnel errors.

The licensee promptly notified the resident inspectors as events were identified, providing event details, apparent causes and immediate corrective actions taken. The inspectors have performed initial onsite review of the events including interviews with licensee personnel and review of logs and incident reports. The inspector's initial evaluation determined that the events are being factually documented, reported and are receiving appropriate licensee attention.

The licensee's response to events has resulted in a comprehensive evaluation of the events and root causes. The licensee assigned a Supervisory Operations Assistance Panel (SOAP) to perform a thorough evaluation of events, to identify casual factors and root causes, and to report recommended corrective actions to the Plant Manager (for SOAP functions see Paragraph 8 of this report).

The licensee obtained an Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) assistance visit and interviewed shift crew personnel. To reduce the number of events and improve overall performance, the licensee has taken the following actions:

- Restricted personnel access in the control room (the processing of work requests is performed without personnel requiring access to the control room);

- Assignment of the Superintendent of Operation and assistants on shift as shift coordinators;

- Removed certain administrative functions from the control room; and

- Implemented a 4 shift, 12 hour shift rotation schedule to reduce the number of shift turnovers and provide additional personnel on shift.

The inspectors are closely monitoring control room activities and shift crew performance to assess the effectiveness of the actions taken. The inspectors have observed an overall improvement in control room activities and that plant operations are being conducted in a more deliberate and controlled manner.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Licensee's Use of Advisors

To supplement the experience levels on the UE staff, the licensee has developed a program for the use of advisors who have operating experience. There are shift advisors, who advise those shifts where the UE crew does not meet the minimum experience requirements, there is an Advisor to the Plant Manager, and there is a Supervisory Operations Assistance Panel (SOAP). The activities and formation of the SOAP were the subject of inspection.

The SOAP is composed of the Advisor to the Plant Manager and two other individuals, one who normally works in the QA Department and a second who works in the licensee's planning organization. The Advisor to the Plant Manager was formerly a manager of another nuclear power plant for over two years and has substantial experience in operations and training. The second individual was formerly a plant manager and also served as a technical services manager and a maintenance manager. The third individual served as an assistant plant manager, and also worked in the areas of quality assurance, nuclear support services, nuclear operations, and engineering.

One of the members of the SOAP panel and the Plant Manager were both interviewed to determine the activities of the SOAP. The description of the SOAP charter indicated that the group would act as a panel in their evaluation of operating events and recommendations. In practice the Advisor to the Plant Manager serves as the Chairman of the SOAP and has assigned evaluations to only one panel member. The evaluations have been done by that individual, but the report is concurred in by one additional member of the panel before being sent to the Plant Manager for action. Six formal reports have been completed and contain approximately 50 recommendations. These reports were reviewed and appeared to be comprehensive with recommendations that appear to address the major findings

of the inspection. The individual who performed these evaluations was interviewed and stated he has spent an estimated 50 percent of his time on SOAP activities; the other individual has spent considerably less.

Generally, it appears that the SOAP panel, although not operating precisely as described in the charter, has provided indepth evaluations of the specific events which have been assigned to them, and have provided good recommendations based on these reviews. These recommendations are formally given to the Plant Manager for issuance to the staff for corrective action. The SOAP panel tracks completion of the specific recommendations. These are provided to the Plant Manager in a weekly summary report.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Augmented Inspection Program

The augmented inspection program was implemented at the Callaway Plant on August 29, 1984, when the plant first entered operational Mode 3 (Hot Standby). In addition to the Callaway senior resident inspectors, the program provides NRC Region III resident inspectors and regional based reactor inspectors. The program was implemented to provide additional onsite inspection of operational activities during the initial startup and power ascension phase to better assess the licensee's personnel and plant readiness for full power operation. Specifically, the following items were observed.

- Operators are attentive and responsive to plant parameters and conditions,
- Plant evolutions and testing are planned and properly authorized,
- Procedures are used and followed as required by plant policy,
- Equipment status changes are appropriately documented and communicated to appropriate shift personnel,
- The operating conditions of plant equipment are effectively monitored, and appropriate corrective action is initiated when required, and
- Control room activities are conducted in a professional manner.

This inspection effort has resulted in NRC onsite inspections during each shift including weekends and shift turnovers. Inspection findings are categorized as follows:

Control of Operational Activities. The inspectors observed plant and operator performance during two operational mode cycles between mode 4 and mode 3 including associated plant heatups and cooldowns. The inspectors observed that during these operational cycles, operators were aware of and complied with technical specifications, that plant operating and administrative procedures were utilized and adhered to and that plant

temperatures during heatups and cooldowns were closely monitored and plotted. The shift supervisors held detailed crew briefings prior to changing plant line-ups or equipment status. The shift technical and operating shift advisors were integrated into these briefings. Activities involving the starting or stopping of reactor cooling pumps or residual heat removal pumps were communicated within the control room and announced over the plant speakers. Response to technical questions presented to the shift crews by the inspectors indicated that both supervisors and operators had good working knowledge of plant status, technical specifications and procedures. The shift crew performance during plant evolutions demonstrated the crews' ability to effectively operate the plant.

Compliance with Callaway Plant Technical Specifications. Through inplant inspections of system line-ups, control room valve and breaker indications, the review of chemistry logs, calibration data and plant records, the inspectors verified compliance with the following technical specifications:

Technical Specification 3.1.2.1	Boration Systems Flow Path - Shutdown
Technical Specification 3.4.1.3	Reactor Coolant System Hot Shutdown
Technical Specification 3.4.3	Reactor Coolant System - Pressurizer
Technical Specification 3.4.6.2	Reactor Coolant System - Operational Leakage
Technical Specification 3.4.7	Reactor Coolant System Chemistry
Technical Specification 3.5.1	ECCS Accumulators
Technical Specification 3.5.2	ECCS Subsystems Average Temperature Above 350°F

Control of Operational Events. The inspectors observed operator performance during the occurrence of the following unplanned events:

- Excessive Safety Injection (S.I.) accumulator vent valve leakage
- S.I. accumulator in leakage from the reactor coolant system
- Loss of control air system pressure
- Actuation of the control room ventilation isolation system
- High source range nuclear instrumentation trip
- Various control room alarms

The operators' responses to abnormal conditions and alarms demonstrated a good working knowledge of plant systems and procedures. The operators were attentive to alarms and appropriate technical specification action and surveillance requirements. Initial operator response and recovery actions were performed in a professional manner.

Routine Control Room Activities. Inspection in this area included observations of shift crew performance during 30 shift turnovers, processing and control of work requests, temporary modifications, startup and surveillance testing, the maintenance of operating logs and equipment out of service logs and the reporting of incidents and events.

The inspectors observed that shift turnovers were performed in a very detailed and professional manner. The supervisors, operators and advisors routinely exceeded 30 minutes in the turnover process; which included a review of logs, control room panel walkdowns and detailed discussions of past, current and planned activities.

Shift personnel frequently referred to plant procedures and drawings during the processing of work requests and temporary modifications. Test and surveillance procedures were properly authorized and scheduled. Plant incidents and reportable events were appropriately documented and communicated.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

10. Startup Test Witnessing

The inspector witnessed the licensee's performance of Engineering Test Procedure ETT-BB-07020, "Pressurizer Heater and Spray Capability Test". This test was performed to demonstrate the rate of pressure response during operation of all pressurizer heaters and with both spray valves fully open. The allowable deviation was provided by "Nominal Pressure Response Curves", which were attached to the procedure and listed as acceptance criteria.

The inspector verified that the test procedure in use was the latest revision, and that temporary changes had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspector observed that test prerequisites had been accomplished and that the test was performed in accordance with the procedure. The inspector reviewed the test data (time/pressure curves) which indicated that the pressurizer response met the acceptance criteria.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11. Maintenance and Modification Activities

The inspectors performed routine observations of ongoing maintenance and modification of safety-related systems to ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, technical specifications and appropriate industrial codes and standards.

Routine Maintenance. The inspector observed routine I & C maintenance involving the change out of shop tested process control cards for feedwater flow for steam generators A, C, and D. The Shift Supervisor (SS) discussed the activity to be performed with the instrument technicians and reactor operator. The SS authorized the card change out, specified the sequence and instructed the technicians to notify the reactor operator prior to each card exchange. The activity was completed in a deliberate and professional manner.

Corrective Maintenance. The mechanical seal on the "B" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump was replaced due to excessive shaft seal leakage. The work involved disconnecting the motor and disassembly of the pump internals for inspection and seal replacement, and reassembly and post maintenance testing. The work was accomplished in accordance with Work Requests Nos. 25010 and 33115 and Workers Protection Assurance 84-6175. The inspectors observed portions of the maintenance, including disassembly, reassembly, inspection and post maintenance pump operation. The work was monitored by licensee quality assurance and quality control personnel (QC). The QC witnessing specified in the procedure was performed. The work was appropriately documented in the plant operating logs and equipment out of service log. The maintenance crew exercised care in handling the pump components and cleanliness controls were established and maintained.

Modifications. The inspector witnessed portions of modifications made to the Nuclear Source Range Channels N-31 and N-32, including the post modification (monthly functional) test of N-31. This work involved wiring changes to provide automatic shut off and reinitiation of the flux doubling (Two Phi) circuit. The inspector reviewed the work authorization documents which included Callaway Modification Package No. 84-0062, Work Request No. 21697, the Engineering Safety Review and Functional Test ISF-SE-N-31. The modification was appropriately reviewed and approved and performed in accordance with procedure.

A temporary modification was made to the safety injection accumulator vent lines. This work involved threading and installation of vent line caps. The modification was made to prevent gas leakage through the solenoid operated accumulator vent valves.

At the time of inspector's review, three vent caps had been installed. The work was documented on Temporary Modification (TM) No. 84-M-207. The TM was issued in accordance with plant procedure APA-ZZ-00389 "Temporary System Modification", and the engineering safety review was documented on Callaway Form CA133. The engineering review determined that the TM did not effect the SI accumulators "Operability".

The inspector reviewed the associated work documents and administrative procedures. In approving the TM, the Shift Supervisor placed a restriction on primary system pressure, pending approval of Callaway Modification Request (CMR) No. 840550. Processing the CMR includes the Plant Manager's approval. The system pressure restriction of less than 950

psig was applied to maintain system pressure below the technical specification for operability of the SI accumulators.

In review of this matter the inspector found that the current revision of APA-ZZ-00380 did not provide for the Plant Manager's approval prior to making temporary modifications to safety-related systems. Such changes made without prior Plant Manager's approval would not meet the requirements of Section 6, Paragraph 6.5.3, "Technical Review and Control", of the Technical Specification.

The inspector advised the licensee of the apparent procedure deficiency. APA-ZZ-00380 was subsequently revised and issued on September 6, 1984. The inspector has completed review of the revised procedure. The procedure specifies that the Plant Manager's approval is required prior to the installation of temporary modifications to safety-related equipment.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

12. NRC Site Tours

During this inspection period the senior resident inspectors accompanied NRC Commissioners and Region III Management during site tours, interviews with licensee management and staff, interviews with licensed and non-licensed operators and observation of licensed operators performance during plant simulator drills. The following visits were performed to assess the operational readiness of the Callaway Plant and personnel.

July 24 - 26	R. Warnick, W. Forney, NRC Region III, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
August 23	Commissioner L. Zech and Staff, B. Davis, NRC Region III Deputy Administrator, and W. Forney, NRC Region III (DRP)
August 27	Chairman N. Palladino and Staff, and C. Norelius, NRC Region III (DRP)

During these visits the licensee discussed organization and staffing, staff training and operator experience. The licensee also discussed reportable events, cause of events and the related corrective action taken.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

13. Plant Tours

The inspectors toured site and plant areas frequently during this inspection period to observe housekeeping conditions and practices, ongoing startup activities, and maintenance and surveillance testing activities. The inspectors reviewed control room logs and observed shift turnovers.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

14. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 4 & 5.

15. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the inspection period. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings as reported herein.