

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 5 1 OF 0 2 PAGE (3)

TITLE (4) Residual Heat Removal Suction Isolation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
1	0	0	2	8	4	8	4	0	1	1	0	1	8	4	0	5	0	0	0		

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (8) 5	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	XX 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME: A. R. Koon, Jr., Assoc. Mgr., Regulatory Compliance TELEPHONE NUMBER: 8 0 3 3 4 5 - 5 2 0 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS
X	B, P			Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) XXX NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces; i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On October 2, 1984, the Plant was in Mode 5 with Train "B" of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System in service. At 1055 hours, an Instrument and Control (I & C) technician removed two (2) fuses in Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Cabinet XPN-7020 for personnel safety during implementation of a modification. The fuses were immediately replaced when the technician heard a relay activate. The de-energized circuit caused the Train "A" RHR suction isolation valves XVG-8702 A & B (one valve in each RHR train) to close. Operations personnel immediately restored Train "B" RHR to service after the valve closure. The cause was determined to be drawing errors.

At 1700 hours during performance of the same modification on SSPS Cabinet XPN-7010, a similar RHR isolation occurred via the Train "B" RHR suction isolation valves XVG-8701 A & B (one valve in each RHR train). The I & C technician was lifting leads affected by the modification to prevent a repeat of the previously mentioned isolation when a defective fuse holder interrupted power to the Train "B" circuitry. Operations personnel immediately restored Train "B" RHR to service after the valve closure.

To prevent a potential recurrence, the Licensee initiated a drawing revision and replaced the defective fuse holder on October 9 and October 10, 1984, respectively.

8411130369 841101  
PDR ADOCK 05000395  
S PDR

IE22  
11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 9 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR 8 4	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER - 0 4 4	REVISION NUMBER - 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On October 2, 1984, the Plant was in Mode 5 with Train "B" of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System in service. Train "A" RHR was tagged out-of-service for routine maintenance.

At 1055 hours, during the performance of a modification on Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Train "A" Cabinet, XPN-7020, an Instrument and Control (I & C) technician removed two (2) fuses for personnel safety. Prior to the fuse removal, a review of the applicable AC Power Distribution drawings had indicated that there should be no adverse consequences from de-energizing the circuits. When a relay activated on circuit de-energization, the I & C technician realized that the previous evaluation was in error and immediately replaced the fuses.

The fuse removal had de-energized portions of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Wide Range Pressure Channel PT-402 which caused RCS pressure to indicate greater than 700 PSIG. The SSPS Train "A" interlock automatically initiated the closure of the RHR Suction Isolation Valves XVG-8702 A & B (one valve in each RHR train). Operations personnel in the control room noted erratic RHR flow and secured RHR Pump "B". The RHR Train "B" suction valve was then reopened and RHR Pump "B" was immediately started.

The cause of this event is attributed to drawing error. The AC Power Distribution drawing did not indicate the interconnecting wiring between the fused power source and the RCS Wide Range Pressure channels. To prevent a possible recurrence, the Licensee initiated a drawing revision on October 9, 1984.

At 1700 hours on October 2, 1984, during performance of the same modification on SSPS Train "B" Cabinet, XPN-7010, a similar RHR isolation occurred. The I & C technician was lifting leads affected by the modification to prevent a repeat of the previous event when a faulty fuse holder interrupted power to the redundant RCS Wide Range Pressure Channel PT-403 and initiated the closure of SSPS Train "B" RHR Suction Isolation Valves XVG-8701 A & B (one valve in each RHR train). Operations personnel immediately restored the system to service after the suction valve closure.

Operations personnel removed and tagged out electrical power to the Train "B" RHR suction isolation valves on October 2, 1984. The removal of electrical power to the valves effectively disabled the interlock, which is not required to be operable in Mode 5 by Technical Specifications. The defective component was replaced on October 10, 1984.

A followup investigation determined that external movement of the fuse holder terminal post caused an internal loss of electrical continuity. Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station has not experienced previous fuse holder failures similar to the above and therefore considers the event to be isolated. No additional corrective action is planned.

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

POST OFFICE 784

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29218

O. W. DIXON, JR.  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

November 1, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station  
Docket No. 50/395  
Operating License No. NPF-12  
LER 84-044

Dear Sir:

Attached is Licensee Event Report #84-044 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,



O. W. Dixon, Jr.

CJM:OWD/lcd  
Attachment

cc: V. C. Summer	J. F. Heilman
T. C. Nichols, Jr./O. W. Dixon, Jr.	C. L. Ligon (NSRC)
E. H. Crews, Jr.	K. E. Nodland
E. C. Roberts	R. A. Stough
W. A. Williams, Jr.	G. Percival
D. A. Nauman	C. W. Hehl
J. P. O'Reilly	J. B. Knotts, Jr.
Group Managers	INPO Records Center
O. S. Bradham	ANI Library
C. A. Price	NPCF
D. A. Lavigne	File

IE22  
11