

Date: 8/9/84

Report By: J. A. Clark

Progressive Investigative Report

Incident: Unauthorized Operation of Plant Equipment

On 7/5/84, I was advised by Superintendent, Security, G. R. Pendergraff of an incident which occurred on 7/4/84 involving what appeared to be an intentional act of malicious mischief, i.e., tampering with circuit breakers. A description of what occurred is as follows: At approximately 1507 hours, 7/4/84, a person or persons unknown apparently opened breaker panel [REDACTED] in the south electrical penetration room on Grade [REDACTED] at the [REDACTED] and placed eight breakers in the OFF position. Five of the breakers controlled non-sensitive equipment. Three of the breakers supplied power to critical equipment. The three critical breakers fed systems that when turned off caused one radiation monitor in the control room and two radiation monitors in containment to fail which activated the associated isolation systems. Plant management and the Emergency Duty Officer (EDO) were notified of the incident and operations instituted additional measures to determine if other systems were tampered with or affected. The NRC Resident Inspector, Mr. Bruce Little, was notified of the incident at approximately 1700 hours by Mr. Ron Lamb, the on-duty Shift Supervisor. Plant Security was also notified at approximately 1700 hours at which time security force members were queried to determine if any activity (work) could be correlated to the incident and security patrols of the area were increased. Consideration was given to

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
attempting to develop latent prints and to notifying the Callaway County Sheriff's Department however no steps were implemented pending additional information. A printout of [REDACTED] door transactions as recorded by the security system computer from 1505 hours to 1520 hours was requested. Upon receipt and review of this printout, it was determined that accurate assessment of personnel within the [REDACTED] would need to cover a larger time span.

At approximately 1030 hours on 7/5/84, I responded to room [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] which was being secured by an armed Security Officer. My attention was directed to an electrical panel which apparently was the target of the tampering. I proceeded to develop latent prints from the exterior of the panel door. The prints were lifted, marked as evidence, and maintained as such. Attempts to develop prints on the interior of the panel door and the switches met with negative results.

After completion of the recovery of this evidence, the area was returned to normal and the Security Officer was relieved. The security force was instructed to increase patrols in the area as well as other similar areas through the plant.

A computer listing of all [REDACTED] door transactions from 0600 hours through 1800 hours for 7/4/84 was requested. A review of these transactions was initiated to determine the names, badge numbers and employer of all persons in the [REDACTED] at the time of the event.

At approximately 1230 this date, I received a telephone call from Special Agent (SA) R. Mathias of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Pendergraff had attempted to advise them earlier of the event and



was unable to convey the information to an agent at that time, and Mr. Mathias was returning the call. I advised Mr. Mathias of the incident and he replied that he would contact the Jefferson City office and advise the agent there of the incident.

On several occasions during the day, meetings and telecons were held with Mr. A. P. Neuhalfen, Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance; Mr. P. T. Appleby, Assistant Manager, Support Services; Mr. D. C. Poole, Advisor to Manager, Callaway Plant; and Mr. D. F. Schnell, Vice President-Nuclear, to discuss investigation strategies and status. Mr. Neuhalfen was Acting Plant Manager, as Mr. S. E. Miltenberger, Plant Manager, was on vacation and unavailable.

The remainder of the day was spent compiling information on which to initiate an investigation.

Mr. G. Snavely, District Manager for Burns, was contacted and his assistance requested in the investigation. Mr. Snavely responded to the site immediately upon request.

At approximately 1710 hours, this date, I interviewed Mr. K. Swetz who was accompanied by Mr. T. Ramatowski, Shop Steward. Mr. Snavely assisted in the interview. Mr. Swetz was the Equipment Operator (EO) who was dispatched to investigate the alarm on the tripped breakers. Mr. Swetz gave the following account of his involvement: Somewhere between 1505 and 1510 he was contacted by Reactor Operator (RO) Shannon and instructed to check the afore-described breakers to ascertain if they were tripped or opened. When Mr. Swetz received the dispatch, he was located in the equipment operator assembly room which is immediately across the hall from the Control Room on the 2047' level of the Control Building. Mr. Swetz responded to the dispatch and stated that it took

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him approximately ten minutes to get to [REDACTED] which contained the panel. Computerized data indicated that Mr. Swetz entered the [REDACTED] at 1520 hours through door [REDACTED]

Mr. Swetz went on to state that when he arrived at the panel, he found a total of eight breakers in the OFF position. Mr. Swetz explained that when the breakers are in the OFF position, it indicates that someone placed them in that position; and when they are in the tripped position, it indicates that excessive power to the breaker caused them to go to that position. Upon observance of the position of the breakers [REDACTED] Mr. Swetz advised RO Shannon of their position and was instructed to return the breakers to the ON position. Mr. Swetz interjected at this point that at about a minute or two prior to being dispatched, he had heard an announcement on the Gai-tronics to the effect, "Happy Fourth of July." (Mr. Ramatowski interrupted to add that the announcement said, "Happy Fourth of July, Union Electric.")

After returning the breakers to the ON position, Mr. Swetz stated that he returned to the Control Room. Upon his return, he was asked by SS Lamb if there were any other breakers on the panel that were in the open position. Mr. Swetz stated that he replied that there were others and he was instructed to return to the room and call in the other breaker numbers that were open. When Mr. Swetz returned to room [REDACTED] he reported the numbers of the other breakers [REDACTED] to the Control Room and was instructed to return all the breakers to the ON position except for the spares. After Mr. Swetz completed this task he returned to the Control Room. In response to questions, Mr. Swetz stated that he could not recall seeing anyone in the [REDACTED]

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[redacted] on his way to room [redacted] nor did he see anyone in room [redacted]. He estimated the announcement mentioned was made by a male, approximately 25 to 35 years of age with a higher than normal pitch of voice. Mr. Swetz advised that on his second trip to room [redacted] as he exited the room, he encountered two Burns personnel who were apparently dispatched to the area. Nothing else of interest was noted in the interview.

On 7/5/84, at approximately 1800 hours, Mr. Snavelly and myself contacted Mr. D. Heinlein, Assistant Superintendent-Operations, and obtained copies of the RO's log and the SS's log for 7/4/84. Upon reviewing these logs, it was learned that RO Shannon logged the alarms receipt at 1509 hours. The SS's log indicated that the alarms were at 1510 hours. The plant computer logged the receipt of Containment Purge Isolation Signal and the Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal at 15:07:53. Copies of these reports will become a part of the investigative file. Union Electric (UE) management was briefed to include the Vice President-Nuclear on the progress of the investigation. The UE Public Relations Department was notified of the incident. Mr. G. Pirtle, Region III NRC, arrived on site at approximately 1800 hours and was briefed by Mr. A. P. Neuhalfen, Mr. P. T. Appleby, Mr. D. C. Poole, Mr. G. R. Pendergraff, Mr. J. W. Smith, and myself.

On 7/6/84, I checked with both Daniel and Union Electric personnel offices and was advised that there had been no reports of disciplinary actions on the date in question. Using computerized data, a list of personnel who had been in the [redacted] at the time of the occurrence was completed. Personnel on this list were initially considered suspect in that it appeared that they had the opportunity to commit the act. The plan of action was to interview all personnel who

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had the opportunity to commit the act, as a motive for the act had yet to be established. The list originally contained a total of 65 personnel. At approximately 1200 hours on 7/6/84, interviews were initiated of the craft personnel who were present in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at the time of the incident. The determination was made to interview the craft workers first, due to their transient nature; the security personnel second, due to their responsibility to observe and report unusual acts; and Union Electric personnel third, with UE contractors interviewed as time allowed, intermingled with the other personnel.

In addition to initiation of the interviews, on this date I received a call from Special Agent J. Hamilton of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the circumstances surrounding the incident. He advised me that due to other commitments, it would be the first of the week (July 9, 10, 11) before he could respond to the site. I advised Mr. Hamilton that his assistance would be appreciated.

On 7/7/84, interviews were continued with the previously identified personnel. UE management was kept apprised of the progress of the investigation.

On 7/8/84, attempts were made to contact the Callaway County Sheriff's Department however, the investigator for the department was not available. A decision was made not to brief the Sheriff's dispatcher of the occurrence due to the sensitivity of the information. During the preceding day of the investigation, the Security Department was obtaining additional computerized data, checking and cross-checking the validity of the original personnel access list, in order to ensure that anyone who would have had the opportunity to commit the act had been identified. Patrol [REDACTED] which is a continuous patrol of the [REDACTED] was established.

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On 7/9/84, phone contacts with the FBI were made and Mr. Hamilton responded to the site and reviewed the investigative methods and advised security management that the methods of pursuing the investigation were in line with what he felt was acceptable and sound investigative procedures, and that he could offer no additional guidance in the continuance of the investigation. On this same date investigator Mr. K. Bishop of the Callaway County Sheriff's Department was notified of the incident. He did not offer to respond but offered to assist if requested. It was determined during these communications that the necessary elements of a criminal act could not be established with the information available at that time. Interviews continued and UE management was advised of the progress.

On 7/10/84, Mr. Pendergraft reviewed the personnel files of the UE employees for possible investigative leads. Burns personnel reviewed their personnel files for the same type of indications, and the screening files of the contractor personnel who had participated in UE's background screening process were also reviewed. No information that would be of assistance in the investigation was developed during this review.

On 7/10/84, I contacted Mr. S. Hughes, Supervisor, UE Personnel Services. Mr. Hughes supervises the psychological evaluation program. I inquired if the results of this evaluation would be of assistance in an attempt to develop discrepancies in statements. Mr. Hughes was of the opinion that the test would not be of value as it was designed to give a snapshot of the individual's psychological makeup at the time of the examination. A letter was received from Ms. A. Femmer, Manager-Personnel Services, that reaffirmed Mr. Hughes' statement. The decision was also made by management to fingerprint all personnel who had the

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opportunity to commit the act and to ask each one if he/she would be willing to take a polygraph examination.

On 7/12/84 and 7/13/84, interviews of supervisors were conducted and personnel were re-interviewed and fingerprinted. All personnel agreed to being printed. The consensus of the personnel interviewed was that they would submit to a polygraph examination if required. No one refused to take the test, however, two individuals stated that they would make that decision when they were actually requested to take the test. During the day, UE management was advised of the results of the re-interviews and response in general to the questions concerning the polygraph.

On 7/14/84, Mr. Snavelly and I met and discussed the results of the investigation, and reviewed transaction logs for mistakes. The prints taken were submitted to an expert for comparison to those prints developed at the breaker panel.

Based on the information accumulated at this point of the investigation, it is the opinion of the investigators that no credible evidence had been developed to identify the individual(s) who may have been involved in committing the incident. Areas that remained open at this point were as follows:

1. Results of the print comparison.
2. Determination on use of the polygraph.

It is the opinion of the investigative team (J. Clark and G. Snavelly) that the feasibility of subjecting a large number of personnel to a polygraph examination is not appropriate in this case.

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Summary

Of the original list of 65 people, 6 were eliminated prior to their interview as computerized data indicated they were physically somewhere else at the time of the incident such as in containment, radwaste, etc. To date, a total of 59 initial interviews have been conducted with personnel who were believed to have had the opportunity to open the circuit breakers in Room [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] at 1507 hours on 7/4/84. Of these original personnel, a review of computerized data (individual card/key transaction records) eliminated 35 people. These remaining personnel were re-interviewed and each person was requested to submit to fingerprinting and asked if they would submit to a polygraph examination, if requested. Two had reservations about being fingerprinted however, all eventually complied with the request. In addition to the above, the supervisors of the personnel who remained after the elimination process were re-interviewed in an attempt to identify discrepancies in statements given by the possible suspects. It should be noted that no discrepancies of substance were noted.

The prints recovered from the scene, as well as those taken from possible suspects, were submitted for comparison to a qualified expert. On 7/30/84, I was advised by Mr. Snavely that the comparison of the prints lifted from the breaker panel in Room 1409 and those collected by the Security Department had been completed and that there were not enough characteristics to classify or match with those submitted as suspect or elimination prints. The prints recovered from the panel will be returned to me in the event a suspect should be developed in the future.

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Consideration was given to utilization of the polygraph in order to attempt to identify the person who tripped the circuit breakers on July 4, 1984. Based on the information available, the decision was made by UE Management not to use the polygraph unless the number of suspect personnel was drastically reduced.

Despite this substantial investigative effort, the person(s) who tripped the breakers in Room [redacted] on 7/4/84 remains unknown. In view of this, Union Electric has implemented additional physical security measures to ensure incidents of this nature will not be repeated. These measures will remain in effect until such time as the suspect(s) is identified and removed from the site, or [redacted]


[redacted]

Rooms identified within the [redacted] which contain [redacted] which would be susceptible to the type of incident that occurred are as follows:

<u>Elev.</u>	<u>Room#</u>	<u>Room Title</u>
[redacted]		

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Elev. Room# Room Title



Access control will be instituted at the portals to these rooms, either by the computerized system or the issuance of hard keys. It should be noted that room [REDACTED] houses the thermal-expansion computers utilized during power ascension and that the normal entrance has cables preventing mounting of the door. However, a temporary barrier is in place that will control access to room [REDACTED]. In addition, access to [REDACTED] is through a hatch [REDACTED]. Because of safety concerns, the hatch cannot be locked; however, it is alarmed to prevent undetected access from being gained. Alarms generated at these portals shall be responded to in the same manner as alarms generated at vital area doors.

As of this date Union Electric has exhausted all apparent leads in attempting to identify the suspect with negative results. The incident will remain open in our files in the event that information or evidence develops that would warrant further investigation.

We feel these precautions are sufficient to deter recurrence of unauthorized operation of plant equipment.

*Gary R. Pendergrass
for James A. Clark*

James A. Clark
Asst. Superintendent,
Security

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STATE OF MISSOURI)
) S S
CITY OF ST. LOUIS)

Donald F. Schnell, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is Vice President-Nuclear and an officer of Union Electric Company; that he has read the foregoing document and knows the content thereof; that he has executed the same for and on behalf of said company with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

By Donald F. Schnell
Donald F. Schnell
Vice President
Nuclear

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 9th day of August, 1984

Barbara J. Pfaff
BARBARA J. PFAFF
NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF MISSOURI
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES APRIL 22, 1985
ST. LOUIS COUNTY

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY
SECURITY DOCUMENT RECEIPT FORM

TO: Mr. James G. Keppler
FROM: UE Nuclear Engineering Department
SUBJECT: Transmittal and Acknowledgements

DATE: 8-10-84

TRANSMITTAL: ULNRC-890

Attached is _____

NOTE: SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION - The attached documents contain information within the scope of 10 CFR 73.21 and is not for public disclosure. Distribution should be restricted on a "need to know" basis. Do not reproduce unless authorized.

Please sign, date, and return this sheet to:

Mr. Jerome Gross (Code 470)
RMS Supervisor - General Office
Union Electric Company
P.O. Box 149
St. Louis, MO 63166

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: I have received the above documents and have read the note concerning the nature of the information contained in them. I shall control these documents in accordance with the Union Electric Nuclear Engineering or our appropriate procedure for processing, control, and maintenance of security documents containing Safeguards Information.

Signature _____ Date _____

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AUG 15 1984

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT

Institute for Policy Studies
1901 Que Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009

(202) 234-9382

August 7, 1984

Joseph Felton, Director
Office of Administration
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT REQUEST

FOIA-84-671
Rec'd 8-13-84

Dear Mr. Felton:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552, the Government Accountability Project requests copies of any and all agency records and information, including but not limited to notes, letters, memoranda, drafts, minutes, diaries, logs, calendars, tapes, transcripts, summaries, interview reports, procedures, instructions, engineering analyses, drawings, files, graphs, charts, maps, photographs, agreements, handwritten notes, studies, data sheets, notebooks, books, telephone messages, computations, voice recordings, and any other data compilations, interim and/or final reports, status reports, and any and all other records relevant to and/or generated in connection with either of the following:


- 1) An incident at the Callaway nuclear plant, occurring on or about July 4, 1984, in which eight circuit breakers were switched off, cutting power to certain plant equipment; and
- 2) An incident at the Callaway nuclear plant, occurring on or about June 2 and 3, 1984, in which a large amount of water was spilled onto the floor of the reactor building.

GAP requests that fees be waived, because providing the requested information "can be considered as primarily benefitting the general public," 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(A). GAP is a non-profit, non-partisan public interest organization concerned with honest and open government. Through legal representation, advice, national conferences, films, publications and public outreach, the Project promotes whistleblowers as agents of governmental accountability. GAP is currently working with citizen groups in the Missouri area concerning the Callaway nuclear power plant.

For any documents or portions of documents that you deny access to, please provide an index, as required by Vaughn v. Rosen (484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974)), itemizing and describing the documents or portions of documents withheld, and providing a detailed justification of your grounds for claiming each exemption.

Thank you for your prompt and thorough response to this request. We look forward to your response to this request within ten days.

Very truly yours,



John Clewett, Esq.

SD-453

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