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October 17, 1984

W3P84-2891
3-A1.01.04
3-C41

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Knighton:

Subject: Waterford 3 SES
Docket No. 50-382
Meeting with NRC Staff October 11, 1984

Reference: Significant Construction Deficiency No. 118
"Plant Protection System (PPS)/Plant Monitoring Computer (PMC)
Interface"

This letter is to confirm discussions held during the subject meeting, and to document our position regarding actions in resolving the referenced 10CFR50.55(e) deficiency (SCD-118) which was reported by LP&L to the NRC on September 28, 1984.

In response to a request by the NRC staff for a detailed discussion on SCD-118, members of LP&L, Ebasco Services, and Combustion Engineering met with NRC staff personnel on October 11, 1984. A description of the details of SCD-118 was given with special note made that the condition or failure mode never actually happened (there was no event), and the condition was discovered by plant technicians while troubleshooting a different problem in a related circuit.

The problem is related to only those analog setpoint signals generated in the Plant Protection System (PPS), and in particular only to those process measurements with two dropping resistors in the transmitters current loop. For Waterford 3 this is steam generator (SG) 1 & 2 Level, SG 1 & 2 Pressure, and Containment Pressure for each of four protection channels. Since the failure mode connects the common together effectively altering only one of the setpoint signals, the result is conservative for all but the containment pressure reactor trip signal.

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
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Our analysis of other common mode failures, including complete fusion of the computer input cabinet, shows that the tying together of the commons and connecting them to ground does not compromise or effect the PPS function other than for the above two dropping resistors circuits.

Immediate corrective action has been to disconnect, tag, and log the plug-in connectors at the PPS for the five setpoint signals discussed above. We have obtained concurrence from both Ebasco and CE that the removal of these inputs from the plant computer is acceptable, and this action satisfies all isolation concerns.

We believe that we have comprehensively explained the details of SCD-118 to the staff and are available to discuss it further if you require.

Very truly yours,



K.W. Cook
Nuclear Support & Licensing Manager

KWC:RVS:GEW:sms

cc: E.L. Blake, W.M. Stevenson, J.T. Collins, D.M. Crutchfield, J.H. Wilson,
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