

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): **Callaway Plant Unit 1** DOCKET NUMBER (2): **0 5 0 0 0 4 8 3 1 OF 0 1 3**

TITLE (4): **Unauthorized Operation of Plant Equipment**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBERS
07	04	84	84	011	00	08	03	84		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): **5**

POWER LEVEL (10): **0 0 0**

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11):

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 20.406(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 72.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 72.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify in Addendum below and in Text: NRC Form 305A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(vii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(vii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.73a(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):

NAME: **Gary R. Pendergraft - Superintendent, Security**

TELEPHONE NUMBER: **3 1 4 6 7 6 - 8 3 1 0 0**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13):

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14): YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE:) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH: , DAY: , YEAR:

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces - i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16):

On 7/4/84 at 1507 CDT, Containment Purge Isolation and Control Room Ventilation Isolation signals (CPIS and CRVIS) were actuated by a Containment radiation alarm from loss of power to radiation elements GT-RE-31 and GT-RE-33, along with a Control Room radiation alarm from loss of power to radiation element GK-RE-4. It was discovered that the 120 volt breakers that feed GT-RT-31, GT-RT-33, and GK-RT-4 (the transmitters for the associated radiation elements) were in the OPEN position along with five other breakers in the same distribution panel (NGO2B-A1). Upon discovery, the eight breakers were reset and the associated systems restored to their normal lineups.

No radiation above normal background was present and the event posed no threat to the public health or safety.

UNION ELECTRIC
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION PER 10 CFR 73.21
WITHHOLD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURES EXEMPTS LETTER
FROM ABOVE REQUIREMENTS

8502280416 841118
PDR FUJA
VARRICC84-671 PDR

FACILITY NAME (1): Callaway Plant Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0600048384	LER NUMBER (3)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		84	011	000	2	OF 03

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3054 a) (17)


On 7/4/84 at 1507 CDT, Containment Purge Isolation and Control Room Ventilation Isolation signals (CPIS and CRVIS) were actuated by a Containment radiation alarm from loss of power to radiation elements GT-RE-31 and GT-RE-33, along with a Control Room radiation alarm from loss of power to radiation element GK-RE-4. At approximately 1510 an Equipment Operator (EO) was dispatched to distribution panel NG02B-A1 in [redacted] to check the panel indication of the respective breakers. The EO found breakers [redacted] and [redacted] to radiation transmitters [redacted] and [redacted] the transmitters to the respective radiation elements, in the OPEN position along with five other breakers. The EO was instructed by the Control Room to return the breakers to the ON position. At 1555, the CPIS and CRVIS were reset in the Control Room, and at 1615 the Control Room ventilation lineup was returned to normal.

An investigation was initiated on 7/4/84 to determine how the breakers had been opened. The investigation entailed numerous interviews of all personnel in the [redacted] at the time of the incident, along with a comparison of fingerprints lifted from the distribution panel to those individuals that were in the [redacted]. For further details of this investigation refer to the Progressive Investigative Report transmitted via ULNRC-890 from Schnell to Keppler.

Despite this substantial investigative effort, the person(s) who opened the breakers in [redacted] remains unknown. In view of this, additional physical security measures have been implemented to ensure incidents of this nature will not be repeated. These measures will remain in effect until such time as the suspect(s) is identified and removed from the site, or until the completion of power ascension testing, based upon this being a time when construction activities would be completed and construction forces greatly reduced. Rooms identified within the [redacted] which contain vital equipment, that would be susceptible to the type of incident that occurred, are as follows:

WAV. 14, 1984

Elevation	Room #	Room Title
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*all rooms
will not be protected
after power ascension
testing*

*also possible
to find
something*

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Callaway Plant Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 8 3	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR 8 4	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER - 0 1 1 1	REVISION NUMBER - 0 0 0			

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 2054's (17))

<u>Elevation</u>	<u>Room #</u>	<u>Room Title</u>
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Access control has been instituted at the portals to the aforementioned rooms, either by the computerized system or the issuance of hard keys. It should be noted that [REDACTED] has a temporary barrier in place to prevent access as the normal entrance has cables which prevent mounting of the door. Alarms generated at these portals shall be responded to in the same manner as alarms generated at vital area doors.

No radiation above normal background was present and the event posed no threat to the public health or safety.

Previous occurrences: none

*① Original
Security Area
Access
② with comp
manual
to watch*

SAFETY INFORMATION

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY

1901 GRATIOT STREET
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

DONALD F. SCHNELL
VICE PRESIDENT

August 9, 1984

MAILING ADDRESS
P. O. BOX 149
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63166

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

ULNRC-890

Dear Mr. Keppler:

UNAUTHORIZED OPERATION OF PLANT EQUIPMENT
CALLAWAY PLANT
DOCKET NUMBER 50-483

Ref: Confirmatory Action Letter dated July 6, 1984

This letter addresses the NRC concerns stated in the referenced letter to Union Electric. A thorough investigation has been conducted in regard to the July 4, 1984 incident. The most probable cause appears to be an intentional act of malicious mischief in the unauthorized opening of circuit breakers. The act resulted in a loss of power to three radiation monitors resulting in the isolation of the control room ventilation and containment purge systems.

Our investigation included interviews of fifty-nine people who were initially indicated by our computerized personnel access log to have had access to the general plant area. None of the initial interviews was conclusive. Thirty-five of these people were subsequently removed from further consideration because their individual card/key transaction records indicated they could not have been in the specific area at the time. The remaining twenty-four people were re-interviewed and all submitted to fingerprinting for comparison with fingerprints taken from the breaker panel in question. Neither the re-interviews nor the fingerprinting yielded any clue as to the identity of the individual.

When the investigation proved inconclusive, Union Electric instituted corrective actions in an effort to prevent recurrence of this type of act. Access controls in the form of the computerized card/key system, hard key issuance and temporary barriers have been instituted for rooms in the

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UNION ELECTRIC
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION PER 10 CFR 79.21
WITHHOLD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE EXEMPTS LETTER
FROM AFOU REQUIREMENTS


B3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Page 2
August 9, 1984

auxiliary building which contain sensitive equipment and which would be susceptible to this type of incident. Sensitive rooms in other buildings have been reviewed and have appropriate monitoring in place. Additionally, I have issued a letter to personnel with unescorted access reminding them of the potential consequences and civil or criminal penalties for acts of this type.

A detailed progressive investigation report regarding this issue as well as the associated Licensee Event Report are attached for your review. Should you have any further questions, Messrs. G. R. Pendergraff, Superintendent-Security, or P. T. Appleby, Assistant Manager, Support Services, were involved in the investigation and are available to provide any required assistance.

Very truly yours,



Donald F. Schnell

DFS/RLP/bjp

cc: W. L. Forney, NRC Region III
NRC Resident Inspectors, Callaway Plant (2)
Missouri Public Service Commission
J. R. Creed, NRC Region III

