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
CALLAWAY PLANT
SECURITY DEPARTMENT PROCEDURE
SDP-ZZ-PP003

DISCOVERY OF SABOTAGE DEVICES OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF SABOTAGE

RESP. DEPT. Security PREPARED BY Leroy Walling

APPROVED BY Steve E. Nuttall DATE 10-15-82

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DEFICIENCY LIST

Section	Deficiency Description	Constraints
3.4 & 3.6	SDP-ZZ-PP007 Reporting of Security Events to NRC not developed.	Refer to APA-ZZ-TAP02
3.7 & 3.8	CAS/SAS Operators positions are unfilled.	Unitl positions are filled, the Shift Security Supervisors assume the responsibilities.

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DISCOVERY OF SABOTAGE DEVICES
OR OTHER EVIDENCE OF SABOTAGE

1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This procedure indicates steps to be taken to mitigate or prevent damage to the plant from a bomb, or in the event of sabotage, or attempted sabotage.

2.0 DEFINITIONS

2.1 ALL CLEAR

Term Used to indicate that a threat no longer exists, return to normal operations.

2.2 SECURITY EMERGENCY

The term used to describe the state of readiness of the plant and Security Force personnel to respond to security-related situations that pose a clear or immediate threat or danger to the plant from unknown intruders and call for a prompt response by Security, law enforcement officers and plant personnel. When a Security Emergency is declared, emergency procedures are placed in effect and the CSD is contacted with a request for assistance.

2.3 CSD

Callaway County Sheriff Department.

2.4 CAS/SAS

Central Alarm Station/Secondary Alarm Station.

2.5 Sabotage

Willful damage and tampering or destruction to property or equipment for political, economic or other reason.

1507 event
~ 1645 Security alerted

- 3.0 PROCEDURE
- 3.1 ~~Any employee discovering sabotage, attempted sabotage, a suspicious device, or a bomb shall call the Emergency Extension 8325 to notify Security or the Shift Supervisor/Operating Supervisor. The employee shall not touch or tamper with any bomb, suspicious device or evidence of sabotage.~~
- 3.2 Trained law enforcement personnel are responsible for investigating sabotage and removing any bomb or suspicious device.
- 3.3 ~~Manager, Callaway Plant/EDO or his designee~~ shall ensure the following items are performed:
 - 3.3.1 ~~Notify the appropriate corporate officials.~~
 - 3.3.2 ~~Determine if sabotage or bomb could affect vital areas.~~
 - 3.3.3 Take steps to mitigate the consequences of sabotage or an explosion.
 - 3.3.4 ~~Determine the impact of possible damage to the health and safety of the public and plant personnel.~~
 - 3.3.5 Evacuate the unessential personnel, as necessary.
 - 3.3.6 Declare Security Emergency if necessary.
 - 3.3.7 ~~Consider shutting down plant based on information received concerning the sabotage or device.~~
 - 3.3.8 Execute portions of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan as necessary.
 - 3.3.9 Ensure repairs are made on damaged systems.
 - 3.3.10 When danger is over, declare All Clear.
 - 3.3.11 Receive formal report from Superintendent, Security.

- 3.4 Superintendent, Security or Security Supervisor or his designee shall ensure the following items are performed:
 - 3.4.1 Declare Security Emergency, as necessary.
 - 3.4.2 Notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with plant procedures.
 - 3.4.3 When danger is over, declare All Clear.
 - 3.4.4 Investigate incident and submit formal report to Manager, Callaway Plant.
- 3.5 ~~Shift Supervisor/Operating Supervisor~~ or his designee shall ensure the following items are performed:
 - 3.5.1 ~~Inform Emergency Duty Officer.~~
 - 3.5.2 ~~Determine the type or nature of suspected sabotage device.~~ Explosive devices should not be approached for inspection. Determination may be made by interviewing the person(s) discovering the device or by viewing from a remote location.
 - ~~3.5.3~~ Determine the type and extent of damage or possible damage to the plant.
 - ~~3.5.4~~ Determine if sabotage could affect vital areas.
 - 3.5.5 Take steps to mitigate the consequences of sabotage, attempted sabotage or an explosion.
 - 3.5.6 Declare Security Emergency, as necessary.
 - 2.5.7 Determine the impact of possible damage to the health and safety of the public and plant personnel.
 - 3.5.8 Evacuate unessential personnel, as necessary.
 - 3.5.9 Execute portions of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan as necessary.
 - 3.5.10 Determine the status of affected vital systems.

- 3.5.11 Determine the operability of affected vital systems.
- 3.5.12 Take steps to mitigate the effects of degraded vital systems.
- 3.5.13 Shutdown the plant, should the need arise.
- 3.6 Shift Security Supervisor or his designee shall ensure the following are performed:
 - 3.6.1 Notify Shift Supervisor/Operating Supervisor and Superintendent, Security.
 - 3.6.2 Determine the type or nature of suspected sabotage device. Explosive devices should not be approached for inspection. Determination may be made by interviewing the person(s) discovering the device or by viewing from a remote location.
 - 3.6.3 Contact CSD and request assistance to include bomb disposal assistance should a bomb be located.
 - 3.6.4 Notify Nuclear Regulatory Commission in accordance with plant procedures.
- 3.7 CAS/SAS operator shall:
 - 3.7.1 Contact CSD and request assistance to include bomb disposal assistance should a bomb be located.
 - 3.7.2 Maintain communication with CSD.
- 3.8 Security Officers (Investigators) shall:
 - 3.8.1 Determine the size, type or nature of bomb or sabotage device. Explosive devices should not be approached for inspection. Determination may be made by interviewing the person(s) discovering the device or by viewing from a remote location.
 - 3.8.2 Limit use of 2-way radios.

- 3.9 Other plant employees shall:
 - 3.9.1 Determine the size, type or nature of bomb or sabotage device. Explosive devices should not be approached for inspection. Determination may be made by interviewing the person(s) discovering the device or by viewing from a remote location.
 - 3.9.2 Take steps to mitigate the consequences of sabotage.
 - 3.9.3 Determine the status of affected vital systems.
 - 3.9.4 Determine the operability of affected vital systems.
 - 3.9.5 Shutdown plant if directed by Manager, Callaway Plant/EDO or Shift Supervisor/Operating Supervisor.
 - 3.9.6 Take steps to mitigate the effects of degraded vital systems.
- 3.10 Bomb Disposal Unit shall:
 - 3.10.1 Determine the extent of possible damage to the plant.
 - 3.10.2 Dispose of suspected bomb.
- 3.11 Termination of Threat.
 - 3.11.1 Upon notification by plant management that a threat no longer exists, Superintendent, Security, Security Supervisor or his designee will declare "All Clear".

4.0 REFERENCES

4.1 Callaway Plant Security Plans (Physical Security Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, Security Force Training and Qualification Plan)

5.0 ATTACHMENTS

None

6.0 RECORDS

6.1 QA RECORDS

None

6.2 COMMERCIAL RECORDS

6.2.1 Incident Report.

SECURITY INFORMATION

11/11/84
FBI/DOJ
FBI/DOJ

CALLAWAY EQUIPMENT TAMPERING INCIDENT
ON JULY 4, 1984

On July 4, 1984 at 3:07 p.m. (CDT), Containment Purge Isolation and Control Room Ventilation Isolation signals (CPIS & CRVIS) were actuated. The cause was due to three circuit breakers being opened in an AC distribution panel (NG 02B-A1). The panel is located at the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The licensee's follow-up actions showed that the circuit breakers were manually opened and not due to a trip. The event was reported to the NRC at 5:58 p.m. (CDT), on July 4, 1984.

A Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued to the licensee on July 6, 1984 that required (1) The licensee to conduct a thorough investigation of the event to determine the most probable causes, and (2) Provide the results of their investigation to the NRC for review and acceptance. The above actions were to be completed prior to the Plant Manager's approval to take the reactor critical.

A. Licensee's Actions Since July 4, 1984

- . Assigned two security managers (one licensee and one security contractor manager) to conduct the investigation. Both persons have criminal investigation experience and expended approximately 200 hours of effort.
- . Conducted reviews of computer printouts to determine who was in the [REDACTED] when the incident occurred.
 - 65 persons were initially identified within the [REDACTED] at the time of the ^{incident} inspection; 41 of the 65 were eliminated as suspects based upon access control records which showed that they could not have been in [REDACTED] at 3:07 p.m. on July 4, 1984.
- . Notified the Kansas City and Jefferson City Offices of the FBI and Callaway Sheriff's Office.
 - Both offices declined to investigate the incident. Determined not a criminal act within their jurisdiction.
 - Jefferson City FBI SA visited site, discussed investigative methods and had no recommendations to change investigative methodology.
- . Latent fingerprint was obtained from AC distribution panel.
- . Additional [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED]
- . Conducted initial interviews of 59 individuals.
- . Conducted follow-up interviews of 24 individuals.

B1

B1

SECURITY INFORMATION

- . Fingerprinted 24 persons for comparisons with latent fingerprint obtained from the distribution panel.
- . All persons involved in follow-up interview submitted to providing fingerprint cards and agreed to take a polygraph examination if investigative results implicated them.
- . Fingerprints and latent print provided to offsite person considered as an expert in fingerprint identification. Insufficient points in latent print for identification purposes.
- . 14 supervisors, Union Electric (EU) and contractor, interviewed to confirm information received through follow-up interviews. No discrepancies were noted.
- . UE and contractor (Daniels) personnel offices contacted to determine if a report of disciplinary action was initiated for July 4, 1984.
- . Onsite personnel files of UE employees scheduled for follow-up interviews were reviewed for investigative leads. No results.
- . The guard contractor reviewed onsite personnel and screening records for security force personnel scheduled for follow-up interviews. No investigative leads developed.
- . Onsite screening files for contractor personnel scheduled for follow-up interviews and who were screened by UE were reviewed. No investigative leads developed.
- . Vice President Nuclear published letter advising all personnel of the serious consequences of equipment tampering and pledging use of necessary resources to investigate all such incidents.


B. Investigative Results

- . Identity of person(s) who tampered with the circuit breakers in the AC distribution panel was not established.

C. Interim Security Measures Implemented

- . An additional [REDACTED] was initiated [REDACTED]
- . To deter future incidents of tampering and reduce safety consequences if another such event occurs in the future, the licensee has [REDACTED] within the [REDACTED] to include:
 - [REDACTED] additional [REDACTED] (etc.) will have access controlled by use of the security computer or hard keys.
 - Alarms from the additional portals will be responded to by the security force.

The above interim security measures would remain in effect until



DRSS Conclusions:

- . Licensee conducted an in-depth investigation to determine the cause(s) and identity of persons(s) who tampered with the circuit breakers.
- . The interim security measures are appropriate and should deter and reduce safety consequences if a future incident of equipment tampering occurs.
- . The licensee's investigative actions should deter future incidents of tampering with equipment and have shown employees the licensee's willingness to commit substantial resources and time to investigate such incidents.

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

- . Advise the licensee that the provisions of the July 6, 1984 CAL have been complied with as far as they are capable of complying with it. Therefore, the restriction in the CAL pertaining to taking the reactor critical can be terminated.
- . Postpone the decision about interim [redacted] being [redacted] upon completion of the [redacted]. Confirm that construction activities will be completed and the construction forces greatly reduced prior to [redacted]. This final decision should be made immediately prior to completion of the [redacted].