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
July 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas A. Rehm, Assistant for Operations
Office of the Executive Director for Operations

FROM: A. Bert Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator

SUBJECT: CALLAWAY INCIDENT

Enclosed is a fact sheet regarding the incident that we discussed by telephone on July 6, 1984. The information is current as of 12:00 noon that date. Should you have any additional questions please call. We will keep you informed of any significant findings, conclusions, or changes.



A. Bert Davis
Deputy Regional Administrator

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/enclosure:
J. G. Keppler
J. A. Hind
C. E. Norelius

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PDR FOIA
VARRICCB4-671 PDR

DATA SHEET

Callaway Incident of July 4, 1984

1. At 3:10 p.m. on July 4, 1984, the control room operators received Control Room Ventilation and Containment Purge isolation signals which were caused (ultimately) by opened power supply breakers for certain process radiation monitors. The licensee determined that these breakers were physically opened and had not tripped per design. The breakers (120 volt, household type) are located along a highly trafficked path. A "wise remark" was heard on the plant intercom system shortly before or after the incident which stated "Happy 4th of July, UE."
2. The licensee immediately reset the breakers which cleared the isolation signals. They also increased the frequency of security patrols in the area and, later, took other more stringent specific protective actions (10 CFR 73.21 Information). They notified the NRC Operations Center at 5:58 p.m. on July 4, 1984.
3. Additional actions have included:
 - a. A Region III (Chicago) Physical Security Inspector was dispatched to the site on July 5, 1984 to monitor the licensee's investigation.
 - b. Region III notified NRR and the Information Assessment Team (NMSS).
 - c. Determined that licensee's actions need include a thorough investigation to determine most probable cause and that the results be provided for NRC review and acceptance prior to taking the reactor critical. A Confirmatory Action Letter to that effect was issued July 6, 1984.
 - d. A licensee manager and an investigative specialist from their security contractor have been assigned full time to the investigation.
 - e. The local FBI has been contacted for advisory assistance.
 - f. Fingerprints have been taken.
 - g. On the order of 60 interviews have been scheduled.



CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

Arduus
DRP

JUL 06 1984

Docket No. 50-483

Union Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. Donald F. Schnell
Vice President - Nuclear
Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400
St. Louis, MO 63166

Gentlemen:

This refers to a 10 CFR 50.72 reportable event which occurred at 1510 CDT on July 4, 1984. Control room ventilation and containment purge isolation signals were initiated due to a loss of power to three process radiation monitors. Further investigation by your staff revealed manually opened, rather than tripped, power supply breakers in the 120V distribution panel which supplies the radiation monitors.

Based on discussions between you and Mr. C. E. Norelius of my staff, it is our understanding that prior to the Plant Manager's approval to take the reactor critical, you will: (1) conduct a thorough investigation of this event to determine the most probable causes; and (2) provide for NRC review and acceptance, the results of your investigation and corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence.

Please let us know immediately if your understanding differs from that set forth above.

Sincerely,

for James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator

cc: W. H. Weber, Manager, Nuclear
Construction
S. E. Miltenberger, Plant Manager
R. L. Powers, Assistant Manager
Quality Assurance
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII
J. Axelrad, IE
B. Youngblood, NRR
J. Hind, RIII
Region IV
K. Drey
Chris R. Rogers, P.E.
Utility Division, Missouri
Public Service Commission

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