NRC Form 366
(9/83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

SPURIOUS TOXIC GAS ISOLATION SYSTEM (TGIS) ACTUATION

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										SONGS UNIT 3	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2
0 9	2 8	8 4	8 4	—	0 5 5	— 0 0	1 0	2 9	8 4		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0		20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
			20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
			20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
			20.405(a)(1)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
			20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
			20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER	7 1 4 — 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On September 28, 1984, at 1905, with Units 2 and 3 in Mode 1 at 100% and 95% power, respectively, a spurious Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) Train 'B' actuation occurred. Subsequent to this date, spurious Train 'A' actuations occurred on October 24 at 0456 and October 25 at 0505. The Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) actuated on each TGIS. For each occurrence, the actuation was verified to be spurious by confirming that the meter indications on the TGIS panel were less than their respective setpoints, and TGIS was immediately reset. See also LERs 84-006, 012, 021, 026, 032, 037, 042, and 052 (Docket No. 50-361).

Spurious TGIS actuations have been a recurring event, and have been the result of one or more of the following conditions: overly conservative alarm setpoints; electrical noise; rapid temperature and pressure changes; radio transmissions; vibration; and dust and dirt accumulation. Implementation of corrective actions has reduced the number of spurious TGIS actuations to only three in the period from September 12 to October 25, 1984.

There are no reasonable or credible circumstances which could have increased the severity of these events. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQ. NUMBER	REV. NUMBER	
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1	8 4	- 0 5 5	- 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On September 28, 1984, at 1905, with Units 2 and 3 in Mode 1 at 100% and 95% power, respectively, a spurious Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) Train 'B' (EIIS System Identifier JF) actuation occurred. Subsequent to this date, spurious Train 'A' actuations occurred on October 24 at 0456 and October 25 at 0505. The Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACUS) (EIIS System Identifier VI) actuated on each TGIS. For each occurrence, the actuation was verified to be spurious by confirming that the meter indications on the TGIS panel were less than their respective setpoints, and TGIS was immediately reset. No plant systems or components failed as a result of these events. See also LERs 84-006, 012, 021, 026, 032, 037, 042, and 052 (Docket No. 50-361).

Spurious TGIS actuations have been a recurring event, and have been the result of one or more of the following conditions: overly conservative alarm setpoints; electrical noise levels; rapid temperature and pressure changes; radio transmissions; vibration; and dust and dirt accumulation.

Several corrective actions were implemented in 1983 that were effective in reducing, but not eliminating, the spurious TGIS actuations. These actions include: sealing the door in the corridor housing the TGIS, which has reduced rapid temperature and pressure changes and dust accumulation; banning radios in the area; and reducing calibration and surveillance intervals on the TGIS analyzers. In September 1984, the time delay for the ammonia and carbon dioxide analyzers was increased, which has been effective in reducing the number of spurious actuations such that there have been only three during the period from September 12 to October 25, 1984. Because the frequency of spurious actuations has been significantly reduced, we no longer plan to request a reporting exemption for spurious TGIS actuations, as was reported in the previously referenced LERs. However, we are continuing to pursue the proposed Technical Specification amendment submitted on April 27, 1984, requesting more appropriate TGIS setpoints. This should further reduce the number of spurious actuations.

There are no reasonable or credible circumstances which could have increased the severity of these events. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected.

Southern California Edison Company

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J. G. HAYNES
STATION MANAGER

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October 29, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
30 Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 84-055
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), this submittai provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for three occurrences involving the actuation of the Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS). Since these events involved shared systems between Units 2 and 3, these events have been combined into a single report in accordance with NUREG-1022. Neither the health and safety of plant personnel nor the public were affected by these events.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

J G Haynes

Enclosure: LER No 84-055

cc: F. R. Huey (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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