



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
 DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
 REGION I
 100 PARK AVENUE
 KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

MAY 15 1974

Jersey Central Power and Light Company
 Attention: Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr.
 Vice President
 260 Cherry Hill Road
 Parsippany, New Jersey 07054

Docket No. 050-363
 License No. CPPR-96

Gentlemen:

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. Brown of this office on April 23-26, 1974 at Klein, Schanzlin & Becker Company (KSB) plant located in Frankenthal, Germany of activities authorized by AEC License No. CPPR-96 and to the discussions of our findings held by Mr. Brown with Mr. Avers of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during this inspection are described in the Regulatory Operations Inspection Report which is enclosed with this letter. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

Within the scope of this inspection, no violations ^{OR} safety items were observed.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the AEC's "Rules of Practice", Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the AEC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you (or your contractor) believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you make a written application within 20 days to this office to withhold such information from public disclosure. Any such application must include a full statement of the reasons on the basis of which it is claimed that the information is proprietary, and should be prepared so that proprietary information identified in the application is contained in a separate part of the document. If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified period, the report will be placed in the Public Document Room.

B/548

OFFICE ▶	CRESS				
SURNAME ▶	Brown/mjd	Tillou	Carlson	O'Reilly	
DATE ▶	5/13/74	5-15-74	5/15		

Form AEC-318 (Rev. 9-53) AECM 0240

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No reply to this letter is required; however, should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

Robert T. Carlson, Chief
Facility Construction and Engineering
Support Branch

Enclosure:
RO Inspection Report No. 50-363/74-01

bcc (w/encls):
RO Chief, FS&EB
RO:HQ (5)
DL (4 w/encls plus 9 cys of Report Only)
DR Central Files
RS (3)
PDR
Local PDR
RO Files
NSIC
DTIE
State of New Jersey
RO Regional Directors (4 w/encls)
OGC

OFFICE ▶						
SURNAME ▶						
DATE ▶						

To:

James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From:


Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject:

Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/30

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications,
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:


J. T. Carroll, Jr. 5/15/74
Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

~~236111444~~ (4/R)

B/549

Initial Telephone
Report Date: 5/15/74

Date of
Occurrence: 5/14/74

Initial Written
Report Date: 5/15/74

Time of
Occurrence: 1540

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/30

IDENTIFICATION
OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1.A.12, which requires the generator load rejection scram to be operable at turbine steaming rates greater than 40% of rated while in the RUN mode.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15B.

CONDITIONS PRIOR
TO OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown
<input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby	<input type="checkbox"/> Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/> Operation	

DESCRIPTION
OF OCCURRENCE:

While performing routine surveillance testing on the generator load rejection anticipatory scram, it was observed that pressure switch PSH-C failed to trip at the nominal trip pressure of 180 psig. The switch senses third stage extraction pressure from the H. P. turbine and forms a bypass around the PSL-C pressure switch contacts, which senses acceleration relay oil pressure, and the turbine stop valve position switch contacts. These act

to initiate a reactor scram through the condenser low vacuum contacts in the scram circuitry (1K11, 1F12, 2K11, and 2F12). As part of the surveillance test, PSH-C was pressurized to 180 psig without the corresponding trip. The pressure was increased to ascertain the trip point and it was found to operate at 197 psig. A third stage extraction pressure of 180 psig corresponds to turbine steam flow of 40% and 197 psig corresponds to a flow of approximately 45%. Therefore, the bypass around the PSL-C and S. V. position switch contacts would have been in effect at 45% turbine flow during power operation instead of 40%. It should be noted that its associated redundant switch PSH-A performed satisfactorily.

APPARENT CAUSE
OF OCCURRENCE:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Design | <input type="checkbox"/> Procedure |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Manufacture | <input type="checkbox"/> Unusual Service Condition |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Installation/
Construction | <input type="checkbox"/> Inc. Environmental |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Operator | <input type="checkbox"/> Component Failure |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) |

The cause of the occurrence is presently under investigation.

ANALYSIS OF
OCCURRENCE:

The safety significance of this occurrence is minimal since the redundant switch (PSH-A) performed satisfactorily. In addition the purpose of the switch is to bypass the reactor scram due to turbine trip at a point when the bypass valves are able to accept the reactor steam production. The anticipatory scram acts to minimize fuel thermal transients in the event of a turbine trip with failure to bypass at power levels in excess of 1600 MWt.

Since the plant is designed to withstand this transient at 1600 MWt, the switch operation at 44% of rated steam flow would, in the event the redundant switch failed to operate, be of no concern.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The switch was recalibrated and tested satisfactorily.

FAILURE DATA:

Manufacturer: Barksdale #B2T-A12SS
Range: Adjustable from 50-1200 psig
Proof Pressure: 1800 psig

Prepared by:

Arthur H. Ponce

Date:

5/15/74