

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Florida Power Corporation  
Crystal River Unit 3

Docket No. 50-302  
License No. DPR-72  
EA 96-118

During an NRC inspection conducted on January 28 through March 9, 1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (60 FR 34381: June 30, 1995/NUREG 1600), the violations are listed below:

- A. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.

Contrary to the above, in October 1989, the licensee failed to implement adequate corrective actions to correct an identified nonconformance of a design basis accident requirement as described in Chapter 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Specifically, FSAR Chapter 14 accident analysis for a High Pressure Injection (HPI) line Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) concurrent with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and the loss of one (either) vital battery train requires that HPI line flow instrumentation be designed to allow the operator to balance the flow in the four HPI lines. In October 1989 the licensee identified that the existing HPI line flow instrumentation was not adequate to allow operators to balance the flow through the four HPI lines and subsequently revised the flow instrumentation to provide adequate HPI line flow indication. In February 1996 the licensee again identified that the HPI line flow instrumentation was not adequate to allow operators to balance the flow through the four HPI lines.

- B. 10 CFR 50.71(e) requires that licensees update the Final Safety Analysis Report periodically, on a frequency of annually or 6 months after each refueling outage provided the interval between successive updates does not exceed 24 months. The revision must reflect all changes up to a maximum of 6 months prior to the date of filing. The revision submittal shall contain all the changes necessary to reflect information and analyses submitted to the NRC or prepared by the licensee per NRC requirements.

1. Contrary to the above, in 1986 the licensee made a modification to the make-up system, regarding an interlock installed to open the borated water storage tank isolation valves, MUV-58 and MUV-73, on a low make-up tank water level and the locking open of the make-up tank isolation valve MUV-64, to satisfy 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requirements, for which a submittal was made to the NRC, but no

revision was made to the FSAR to address the installed interlocks on the valves.

2. Contrary to the above, the design basis of the spent fuel pool system as revised by license amendment 134 issued on April 16, 1991 was not incorporated into the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as follows: FSAR 9.3 incorrectly states that 1180 fuel assemblies is allowed versus the 1357 of license amendment 134; FSAR Table 9-6 incorrectly states 16 refuelings can be handled versus 19 1/3 of license amendment 134; The FSAR incorrectly references a maximum spent fuel temperature of 140°F using spent fuel pool cooling versus the 157°F of amendment 134; and FSAR 9.3.2.2 incorrectly states that leakage from the spent fuel pool through the leak chase trench is monitored daily.

This is a Severity Level IV (Supplement I) Violation.

- C. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, requires that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. This is applicable to all activities affecting the safety related functions of those structures, systems, and components that prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents that could cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Contrary to the above, on January 30, 1996, the licensee determined that a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and the loss of one (either) dc power train could result in the opening of Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Water (SW) system isolation valves to all three Reactor Building coolers. However, the design basis states that the emergency heat transfer rate of the nuclear services closed cycle cooling system is based on removing the design heat load from each component to be cooled during emergency operations with 2 reactor building fan coolers in service (worst case heat rejection to the nuclear services closed cycle cooling system).

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement 1).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Florida Power Corporation is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or

include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia  
this 8th day of April 1996