


To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08751

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/29

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications,
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:


J. T. Carroll, Jr. 4/26/74
Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

9563

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/29

IDENTIFICATION
OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 2.3.4,
Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Switches, 1A83B and
1A83D, were found to trip at pressures in excess of the maxi-
mum allowable value of 1070 psig.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as de-
fined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15A.

CONDITIONS PRIOR
TO OCCURRENCE:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power | <input type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby | <input type="checkbox"/> Operation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown | <input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown | <input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Operation | |

The reactor mode switch was in the REFUEL position with
reactor coolant temperature approximately 100°F.

DESCRIPTION
OF OCCURRENCE:

On Tuesday, April 23, 1974, while performing surveillance
on the five Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Switches, it
was found that 1A83B and 1A83D tripped at 1090 psig and
1096 psig, respectively. These values are in excess of the
maximum allowable trip points of 1084 psig and 1082 psig,
respectively, which are derived by adding appropriate head
correction factors to the Technical Specification limit of
1070 psig. It is noted here that switches 1A83B and 1A83D
are associated with valves NR108B and NR108D, respectively.

The "as found" and "as left" switch settings were:

<u>Switch</u>	<u>Associated Valve</u>	<u>"As Found" Setting</u>	<u>"As Left" Setting</u>
1A83A	NR108A	1079 psig	1079 psig
1A83B	NR108B	1090 psig	1084 psig
1A83C	NR108C	1077 psig	1077 psig
1A83D	NR108D	1096 psig	1082 psig
1A83E	NR108E	1082 psig	1082 psig

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Design | <input type="checkbox"/> Procedure |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Manufacture | <input type="checkbox"/> Unusual Service Condition |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Installation/Construction | <input type="checkbox"/> Inc. Environmental |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Operator | <input type="checkbox"/> Component Failure |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) |

Instrument drift has been tentatively identified as the cause of this occurrence.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The relief valves are provided to remove sufficient energy from the primary system to prevent the safety valves from lifting during a transient. The limiting pressure transient is that which is produced upon a turbine trip from rated design power with a failure of the bypass system to function. Under these conditions, the five (5) relief valves are required to operate in order to prevent reaching the lowest set point of the primary system safety valves. It should be noted that a 25 psi margin exists between the resulting peak pressure and the lowest safety valve set point as added assurance that the safety valves will not lift during this transient. With valves NR108B and NR108D actuating at 6 psig and 14 psig, respectively, above the maximum allowable trip point of 1070 psig, and assuming the most limiting

pressure transient had occurred, the lowest set point safety valve or valves may have been required to actuate in order to limit the pressure transient. Since the safety valve capacity is based upon providing sufficient vessel over-pressure protection upon failure of all pressure release devices, in addition to a failure of the reactor to scram, over-pressurization of the vessel would not have occurred.

**CORRECTIVE
ACTION:**


The involved pressure switches, 1A83B and 1A83D, were immediately reset to trip at allowable pressure levels. Additional items of corrective action will be determined following review of this occurrence by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

FAILURE DATA:

Manufacturer data pertinent to these switches are as follows:

Manufacturer - Dresser
Type - 1539VX
Serial Nos. - BK3339 (1A83B)
 BK3338 (1A83D)

Prepared by: _____



Date: _____

4/26/74