Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 201-539-6111

General Public Utilities Corporation

May 23, 1974

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/30

The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached Abnormal Occurrence Report in compliance with paragraph 1.15B of the Technical Specifications.

Enclosed are forty copies of this submittal.

Very truly yours,

Donald A. Ross

Donald A. Ross
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations

pk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region 1

B/537

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/30

Report Date

May 23, 1974

Occurrence Date

May 14, 1974

Identification of Occurrence

Violation of the Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1.A.12, which requires the generator load rejection scram to be operable at turbine steaming rates greater than 40% of rated while in the RUN mode. This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15B.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was shut down for refueling.

Description of Occurrence

While performing routine surveillance testing on the generator load rejection anticipatory scram, it was observed that pressure switch PSH-C failed to trip at the nominal trip pressure of 180 psig. The switch senses third stage extraction pressure from the H.P. turbine and forms a bypass around the PSL-C pressure switch contacts, which senses acceleration relay oil pressure, and the turbine stop valve position switch contacts. These act to initiate a reactor scram through the condenser low vacuum contacts in the scram circuitry (1K11, 1K12, 2K11, and 2K12). As part of the surveillance test, PSH-C was pressurized to 180 psig without the corresponding trip. The pressure was increased to ascertain the trip point and it was found to operate at 197 psig. A third stage extraction pressure of 180 psig corresponds to turbine steam flow of 40% and 197 psig corresponds to a flow of approximately 45%. Therefore, the bypass around the PSL-C and S.V. position switch contacts would have been in effect at 45% turbine flow during power operation instead of 40%. It should be noted that its associated redundant switch PSH-A performed satisfactorily.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Possible mishandling of the switches during the maintenance outage and poor instrument repeatability are considered causes for this occurrence.

Analysis of Occurrence

The safety significance of this occurrence is minimal since the redundant switch (PSH-A) performed satisfactorily. In addition, the purpose of the switch is to bypass the reactor scram due to turbine trip at a point when the bypass valves are able to accept the reactor steam production. The anticipatory scram acts to minimize fuel thermal transients in the event of a turbine trip with failure to bypass at power levels in excess of 40% of rated turbine steam flow. Since the plant is designed to withstand this transient, the switch operation at 45% of rated steam flow would, in the event the redundant switch failed to operate, be of no concern.

Corrective Action

The switch was recalibrated and tested satisfactorily. A lower setpoint is being considered to allow for instrument repeatability error.

Failure Data

Manufacturer: Barksdale #B2T-A12SS
Range: Adjustable from 50-1200 psig
Proof Pressure: 1800 psig