NRC Form 366 (9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Limerick Generating Station - Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 5 2	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)
Failure to Comply with the Primary Containment Isolation Requirements

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 1	1 5	8 5	8 5	— 0 0 6	— 0 0	0 2	1 9	8 5		0 5 0 0 0
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OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
2		20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 0 4		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
John C. Nagle, Engineer - Special Projects	AREA CODE 2 1 5 8 4 1 - 5 1 8 4

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Abstract: 85-006

On January 15, 1985, at 0920 hours, with Unit 1 in the startup mode at 3.6 percent power while performing ST-6-107-590-1, "DAILY SURVEILLANCE LOG/OPCONS 1, 2, 3", an operator opened the feeder breakers supplying power to the motor operators of the outboard suction isolation valve and the inboard suction isolation valve of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system. Both isolation valves were in the open position at the time the breakers were opened. De-energization of the motor operators to these RWCU isolation valves defeated the ability to automatically isolate the RWCU. Defeating the ability of the inboard and outboard suction valves to automatically isolate the RWCU prevents compliance with the primary containment isolation provisions of Technical Specification 3.6.3.

The de-energization of the motor operators to these valves was performed in order to avoid a spurious RWCU isolation during the recording of ambient temperatures within the RWCU rooms. Power was restored to the motor operators of the isolation suction valves by closing the feeder breakers after reading the temperatures, at 0927 hours the same morning.

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Description of the Event:

On January 15, 1985, at 0920 hours with Unit 1 in the startup mode at 3.6 percent power, an operator opened the power supply feeder breakers to the motor operators of the inboard suction isolation valve (HV-44-1F001) and the outboard suction isolation valve (HV-44-1F004). This was done to prevent RWCU isolation during the performance of channel checks of the area temperature transmitter switches of the RWCU area temperature monitors. The surveillance testing was completed and the power restored to the motor operators of the isolation valves in seven minutes. During these seven minutes, the operator positioned a non-licensed operator at the feeder breakers to restore power to both the valve operator motors if needed.

Prior to the de-energization of the isolation valves, the control room operator had been directed by the shift supervisor to perform channel checks of the temperature monitors with the feeder breakers to each of the motor operators for the isolation suction valves opened to prevent RWCU isolations that had been occurring when using the "READ" switch of the temperature switch.

Consequences of the Event:

The consequences of the event were minimal because, during the seven minutes both valves were incapable of automatically closing, operators were positioned to resupply power to the valve operator motor of each isolation valve.

Cause of the Event:

The event was caused by poor communication between the shift supervisor and the operator. The operator mistakenly assumed that the order to open the feeder breakers prior to performing the channel checks of the area temperature transmitters in the RWCU rooms allowed him to open the feeder breakers to the motor

operator of both the inboard suction and outboard suction isolation valves simultaneously. An underlying cause of this event may be the hardware problem associated with the "READ" switch of the RWCU area temperature and differential temperature transmitter switch.

Corrective Actions:

The operations personnel involved with this event were interviewed and counseled as to the need to clearly communicate and understand communications. In addition, a Temporary Procedure Change (TPC) has been made to Surveillance Test, ST-6-107-590-1, 'DAILY SURVEILLANCE LOG/OPCONS 1, 2, 3." This TPC requires that the feeder breaker to the valve operator motor to the inboard suction isolation valve and the feeder breaker to the outboard isolation valve be de-energized one at a time. An operator aid has been posted on the panel in the auxiliary equipment room where the RWCU room temperatures are recorded. The aid, which was posted on January 16, 1985, directs the operator to render only one isolation valve inoperable at any one time pursuant to Technical Specification 3.6.3. A modification to the "READ" circuit is being pursued, which will prevent inadvertent trips when using the "READ" switch on the temperature switch.

Furthermore, this event has identified the need for reactor operators to receive additional training in understanding the Limerick Generating Station Technical Specifications, in addition to the interpretative training they received on Standard Technical Specifications. In addition to the controlled copy of the Technical Specifications available in the control room for reference, controlled copies of the existing Technical Specifications were issued to each senior reactor operator, reactor operator, shift technical advisor, and shift advisor for his personal use.

The Licensed Operator continuing training program has been enhanced to provide 24 hours of Limerick Generating Station specific Technical Specification training. This additional training includes 16 hours of classroom and 8 hours of simulator training and will be included in the requalification training cycle beginning February 26, 1985.

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

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February 19, 1985

Docket No. 50-352

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report
Limerick Generating Station - Unit 1

This LER concerns the failure to comply with the primary containment isolation requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.3.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-352
Report Number:	85-006
Revision Number:	00
Event Date:	January 15, 1985
Report Date:	February 19, 1985
Facility:	Limerick Generating Station P.O. Box A, Sanatoga, PA 19464

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i).

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We regret the late submission date of the LER. The delay in the reporting of this LER was the result of our desire to provide an enhanced description of the corrective actions taken by Philadelphia Electric Company in response to this event.

Very truly yours,

W. T. Ullrich
Superintendent
Nuclear Generation Division

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January 16, 1985