

FEB 13 1985

Docket Nos. 50-317; 50-318

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
Vice President, Supply
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Gentlemen:

Subject: Combined Inspection 50-317/84-18; 50-318/84-18

This refers to your letter dated October 12, 1984, in response to our letter dated September 14, 1984. We apologize for the delay in our reply.

We have reviewed your request for reconsideration of the noncompliance pertaining to the Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee's administrative handling of changes pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. In your letter, you indicate that a written safety evaluation was not required to determine whether an unreviewed safety question was created. After careful review of your additional information and the appropriate regulation, we cannot agree with your position. Paragraph 50.59(b) states, in part, "The licensee shall also maintain records of tests and experiments carried out pursuant to Paragraph (a) of this section. The records shall include a written safety evaluation which provides the basis for the determination that the change, test or experiment does not involve an unreviewed safety question." An evaluation which documents the basis for that determination is required by 10 CFR 50.59 and should have been performed in this case. The information supplied in your letter (Items 1 thru 5) now provides the written basis required by 50.59(b).

Through discussions between the senior resident inspector, Mr. T. Foley, and Messrs. L. Russell and R. Denton of your staff, we believe we have conveyed the NRC position on this matter, including providing you with the NRC's Inspection and Enforcement Manual Interpretation of 10 CFR 50.59. We understand that you have revised your procedures to incorporate this guidance and your plans were to fully implement this action by January 1, 1985. These actions will be examined during future inspections of your licensed program.

If our understanding is inaccurate or should you have additional questions regarding this matter, please let us know.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely,
Original Signed By:

Richard W. Starostecki, Director
Division of Reactor Projects

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FEB 13 1985

cc:

- R. M. Douglass, Manager, Quality Assurance
- L. B. Russell, Plant Superintendent
- S. M. Davis, General Supervisor, Operations QA
- Thomas Magette, Administrator, Nuclear Evaluations
- R. C. L. Olson, Principal Engineer
- J. A. Tiernan, Manager, Nuclear Power
- R. E. Denton, General Supervisor, Training and Technical Services
- Public Document Room (PDR)
- Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
- Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
- NRC Resident Inspector
- State of Maryland (2)

bcc:

- Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
- DPRP Section Chief

RI: DPRP
for *to*
 Asars/meo
 1/3/85

RI: DPRP
to
 Foley
for 2/8/85

RI: DPRP
for
 Ferlic
 2/8/85

RI: DPRP
for
 Elsasser
 2/8/85

RI: DPRP
[Signature]
 Wenzinger
 2/8/85

RI: DPRP
[Signature]
 Starostecki
 2/13/85

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY



CHARLES CENTER • P. O. BOX 1475 • BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203

October 22, 1984

ARTHUR E. LUNDVALL, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
SUPPLY

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Docket Nos. 50-317
50-318
License Nos. DPR-53
DPR-69

ATTENTION: Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
Division of Project & Resident Programs

Gentlemen:

Inspection Report 50-317/84-18, 50-318/84-18; identified one item of apparent noncompliance with NRC regulations. The apparent noncompliance concerned the Plant Operations & Safety Review Committee's (POSRC) evaluation of a system and procedure change pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. A thorough review of our evaluation indicates that it adequately addressed the criteria of 10 CFR 50.59 and that no written safety evaluation was required in determining whether an unreviewed safety question was created,

At a POSRC meeting in early June 1984, a Committee member questioned whether the reliability of the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) system line-up (i.e., both #11(21), #12(22), and #13(23) HPSI pumps in "normal") was the most reliable alternative. The Committee instructed one member to contact the NSSS vendor to determine if the line-up was, in fact, the most reliable. After several conversations over a two or three week period, the NSSS vendor responded by letter to the POSRC and proposed through a written evaluation an alternate line-up to enhance system reliability. Upon receipt of the vendor recommendation, the POSRC felt compelled to take prompt action instituting an HPSI system realignment. As a result, HPSI pump #12(22) was placed in "pull-to-lock" on June 14, 1984, to enhance the reliability of the HPSI system. This change ensures the operability of one HPSI pump and its suction paths from the Refueling Water Tank and Containment Sump in the event of an accident involving a loss of off-site power and any single active failure.

The procedure and system change which placed #12(22) HPSI pump in "pull-to-lock" was subsequently reviewed by the POSRC within 14 days as required by Technical Specification 6.8.3. In approving this change to the operation of #12(22) HPSI pump, the POSRC determined that a safety evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 was not required. This determination was based on the following facts:

1. The "pull-to-lock" feature of #12(22) HPSI pump is part of the approved plant design.
2. No change was made to the facility design, because the logic for the #12(22) HPSI pump is fully described in Chapter 7 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

~~8411020235 opp.~~


Mr. R. W. Starostecki
October 22, 1984
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3. The HPSI system contains three 100% capacity pumps, one more than is credited in Chapter 14 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
4. The requirements of Technical Specification 3.5.2 were satisfied since #11(21) and #13(23) HPSI pumps remained fully operable on independent subsystems. Placing #12(22) HPSI pump in "pull-to-lock" was permitted by the Limiting Conditions for Operation which requires that two independent ECCS subsystems be operable in **MODES** 1, 2, and 3.
5. The Operating Instruction for the HPSI system is not described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

In light of the information provided above, we feel the intent of 10 CFR 50.59 was met through the combination of the POSRC's review, the written analysis from the NSSS vendor, and the safety evaluations in Chapter 14 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report which assumes only two operable HPSI pumps. It is our view, that a written safety evaluation was not needed to authorize defeating the automatic start of #12(22) HPSI pump.

Based on the information provided above, we request you reconsider the issuance of the subject item of noncompliance. Should you have further questions regarding this reply, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,



AEL/SRC/gla

cc: D. A. Brune, Esquire
G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire
D. H. Jaffe, NRC
T. Foley, NRC