



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

September 27, 1984
(NMP2L 0170)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Division of Project and Resident Programs
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) for the problem concerning internal corrosion of the main steam isolation valves. This problem was reported via tel-con to your staff on July 20, 1984. An interim report was submitted via our letter dated August 20, 1984.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangan
Vice President
Nuclear Engineering and Licensing

CVM/GG/pbd

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

R. A. Gramm, NRC Resident Inspector
Project File (2)

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report for the Problem
Concerning Internal Corrosion of the
Main steam Isolation Valves
(55(e)-84-26)

Description of the Problem

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation has become aware of a problem involving valve leakage in excess of the design allowable. The problem with the Crosby-supplied main steam isolation valves occurred during preoperative testing at Liebstadt, Switzerland, and at Midland Station of Consumers Power. Inspection of the valves revealed that corrosion between the inside surfaces of the valve body and the spool seat had developed. The corrosion is believed to be the cause of the leakage. Communication with the vendor confirmed that a similar condition could occur with the Nine Mile Point Unit 2 main steam isolation valves.

Analysis of Safety Implications

Excessive leakage of the subject valves could have resulted in a loss of primary containment isolation capability and Reactor Pressure Vessel pressure boundary. If this problem were to have remained uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant. However, excessive leakage of these isolation valves would have been determined during the Type C testing for containment integrity.

Corrective Action

The subject condition has been documented on Non-Conformance and Disposition Report (N&D) No. 8258. The potential problem will be avoided by cladding the pertinent interior surfaces of the valve bodies with a corrosion-resistant alloy, Inconel 625. The valves will be tested upon reassembly to prove their leak tightness in accordance with applicable Technical Specifications.