
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT



TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-57

DATE OF EVENT: August 27, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: NI-2, Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor, inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 6, with Power (MWt) = 0 and Load (Gross MWe) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On August 27, 1983, at 0955 hours while hooking up leads for ST 5030.09, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Response Time Test", the Instrument and Control (I&C) technician shorted test leads together causing an essential bus fuse to blow, and as a result, deenergized 120 VAC essential bus Yl. This made N -2 inoperable, and placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.9.2, which requires two source range monitors to be operable in Mode 6. Per the requirements of the action statement, core alterations must be suspended. There were no core alterations in progress at this time.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was due to personnel error. The I&C technician, inadvertently shorted the test leads together while working the the close confinement of the terminal board. Design modifications have previously been made to the terminals in the RPS cabinets intending to preclude recurrence.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The redundant source range monitor, NI-1, was operable and was providing the audible indication in containment and the Control Room.

Corrective Action: Section 4 of SP 1105.02 "Reactor Protection System and Nuclear Instrumentation Operating Procedure" was completed. RPS Channel 1 was re-energized at 1100 hours on August 27, 1983, and NI-2 was declared operable at 1250 hours on August 27, 1983. This removed the unit from the action statement of Technical Specification 3.9.12. A procedure modification was made to Surveillance Test ST 5030.09 to make I&C technicians more conscious of the potential of shorting out essential buses.

Failure Data: There have been no previous occurrences of the loss of a source range monitor due to a similar cause. However, an occurrence has been reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-80-70 (80-050) in which essential bus Y3 was deenergized when insulated alligator clips slipped off the terminals in RPS Channel 3 cabinet during the performance of ST 5030.09.

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February 12, 1985

Log No. K85-126 File: RR 2 (NP-33-83-57)

Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

LER No. 83-045

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1

Date of Occurrence: August 27, 1983

Enclosed is Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report 83-045. The changes to the report are indicated by a "1" in the left margin of each page.

Please replace your previous copy of this report with the attached revision.

Yours truly,

Stephen Me Juenney

Stephen M. Quennoz Plant Manager Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/ljk

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region III

> Mr. Walt Rogers DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

JCS/001

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