

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort St. Vrain, Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 7
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TITLE (4)
Ultrasonic Detectors Inoperable Due To Instrument Drift

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES												
DETERMINED									N/A												
1	0	1	2	8	4	8	4	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	8	4	DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 1		

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.408(a)	20.408(a)(1)(i)	20.408(a)(1)(ii)	20.408(a)(1)(iii)	20.408(a)(1)(iv)	20.408(a)(1)(v)	20.408(a)(1)(vi)	80.73(a)(2)(i)	80.73(a)(2)(ii)	80.73(a)(2)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	80.73(a)(2)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(vi)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) 50.72(b)(2)(iii)
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)										TELEPHONE NUMBER			
NAME Jim Eggebroten, Technical Services Engineering Supervisor										AREA CODE 3 0 3			
										7 8 1 5 - 1 2 2 4			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	
X	J	C	M	I	K	E	H	1	6	5
				Y						

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input type="checkbox"/> NO	0 5	0 1 9	8 1 5

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During the performance of a scheduled Surveillance Test, five of twelve ultrasonic detectors for steam pipe rupture under the prestressed concrete reactor vessel (PCR V), and one of twelve ultrasonic detectors for steam pipe rupture outside the PCR V were found out of tolerance limits.

As a result of the detectors being out of tolerance, it was conservatively determined that a condition existed which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

The ultrasonic detectors are designed to identify the specific secondary coolant loop within the reactor building containing a steam leak by detecting and tripping at twice normal background noise level. Actuation of the ultrasonic detectors in combination with high reactor building pressure or temperature initiates a loop shutdown.

Instrument drift has been determined to be a generic problem for these detectors, and the problem is presently under investigation through engineering analysis.

Related Licensee Event Reports: 81-012, 82-040, and 82-051.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort St. Vrain, Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	- 0 1 1	- 0 1	0 2	OF	0 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

The steam pipe rupture detection system involves a combination of ultrasonic detectors, differential pressure switches, and temperature switches (Figures 1 and 2). The basic system utilizes the ultrasonic detectors to establish in which of two secondary coolant loops a steam leak exists and differential reactor building pressure or temperature switches to confirm that the magnitude of the leak is such that automatic action is necessary. The logic system requires two out of three ultrasonic detectors to trip in the same area plus either a high building pressure or temperature trip.

The automatic action initiated is secondary coolant loop shutdown. This involves tripping of the two helium circulators and shutting off feedwater and steam to and from the steam generator of one loop. The source of feedwater/steam is also shut off.

It has been evaluated that small steam leaks (approximately 20 lb/sec. or less) can be handled by the normal building ventilation system and do not cause a building pressure rise sufficient to cause a trip. These small leaks would be detected by the ultrasonic detectors and action initiated upon an increase in building temperature.

On September 25, 26, and 27, 1984, a temporary surveillance, SR-RE-17-SA, "Ultrasonic Detector Check", was performed. The purpose for this temporary surveillance is to check for instrument drift in the ultrasonic detector channels. The test requires that a calibrated ultrasonic noise source be applied to the individual microphones (elements), and that the response of the channel falls between 40% and 90% of full scale meter reading for the elements located under the PCRV, and between 20% and 80% of full scale meter reading for the elements located outside of the PCRV. The data taken during the performance of the surveillance are given in Table 1.

The tolerance limits of SR-RE-17-SA are based on the Technical Specification surveillances SR-5.4.1.2.1j-R, "Steam Pipe Rupture (Pipe Cavity) Calibration", and SR-5.4.1.2.2j-R, "Steam Pipe Rupture (Under PCRV) Calibration", which are performed each refueling. The Technical Specification surveillances are calibration testing procedures for the ultrasonic detectors. These three surveillances test the lower limit of the acceptable range of noise necessary to identify small leaks.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort St. Vrain, Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7 8 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
			- 0 1 1	- 0 1	0 3	OF 0 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

TABLE 1

UNDER PCRV - RANGE 40% TO 90%

LOOP/ LOCATION	MICROPHONE	I-10 SWITCH	TRANSMITTER OUTPUT % (READ ON XSH METER)	
			AS FOUND	AS LEFT
Loop 1/ South Side	XE-93479-A	XSH-93471-A	0 1	80
	XE-93479-B	XSH-93471-B	80	80
	XE-93479-C	XSH-93471-C	0 1	40
Loop 1/ North Side	XE-93471-A	XSH-93471-A	80	80
	XE-93471-B	XSH-93471-B	40	40
	XE-93471-C	XSH-93471-C	40	40
Loop 2/ South Side	XE-93480-A	XSH-93470-A	0 1	65
	XE-93480-B	XSH-93470-B	50	50
	XE-93480-C	XSH-93470-C	>100 2	60
Loop 2/ North Side	XE-93470-A	XSH-93470-A	>100 2	65
	XE-93470-B	XSH-93470-B	85	85
	XE-93470-C	XSH-93470-C	70	70

OUTSIDE PCRV - RANGE 20% TO 80%


LOOP/ LOCATION	MICROPHONE	I-10 SWITCH	TRANSMITTER OUTPUT % (READ ON XSH METER)	
			AS FOUND	AS LEFT
Loop 1/ South Wall	XE-93457-A	XSH-93457-A	60	60
	XE-93457-B	XSH-93457-B	20	20
	XE-93457-C	XSH-93457-C	60	60
Loop 1/ North Wall	XE-93455-A	XSH-93455-A	60	60
	XE-93455-B	XSH-93455-B	25	25
	XE-93455-C	XSH-93455-C	60	60
Loop 2/ South Wall	XE-93456-A	XSH-93456-A	10 1	25
	XE-93456-B	XSH-93456-B	60	60
	XE-93456-C	XSH-93456-C	50	50
Loop 2/ North Wall	XE-93454-A	XSH-93454-A	40	40
	XE-93454-B	XSH-93454-B	40	40
	XE-93454-C	XSH-93454-C	65	65

- 1 Instruments found out of limits (component failure)
- 2 Instruments found out of limits, but in a conservative direction

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort St. Vrain, Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7 8 4	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8	4	- 0 1 1	- 0 1 1	0 4 OF 0 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)




Pipe Rupture Detection System Below PCRV - Plan View

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort St. Vrain, Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7 8 4	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
			- 0 1 1 1	- 0 1	0 5	OF

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)



Pipe Rupture Detection System Below PCRV - Elevation

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort St. Vrain, Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 4	- 0 1 1	- 0 1	0 6	OF 0 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Two of the elements were found with outputs above the acceptable limits required by Surveillance Test SR-RE-17-SA. This would not affect the safety function of these detectors; it would cause the logic channels to be actuated at less than the tested noise level.

The output of element XE-93480-A associated with logic channel XSH-93470-A, Loop 2 on the south side under the PCRIV, and the output of element XE-93456-A associated with logic channel XSH-93456-A, loop 2 on the south wall outside the PCRIV, were both found to be below the limits specified by Surveillance Test SR-RE-17-SA. In both cases, the output of the other two detectors associated with these areas were within or above the specified limits, thus they would have operated as designed, and satisfied the "two out of three" logic required to correctly identify a leaking loop.

The outputs of elements XE-93479-A and XE-93479-C were both below the allowable limits specified by SR-RE-17-SA, and both are associated with Loop 1 on the south side of the PCRIV. These detectors protect the same area under the PCRIV, and are associated with separate logic channels, XSH-93471-A and XSH-93471-C. Therefore, the two out of three logic would not have been satisfied for a small steam leak equivalent to that simulated by SR-RE-17-SA. Because these detectors, in combination with differential pressure and temperature switches, actuate the loop shutdown circuitry, and because the loop shutdown circuitry is considered part of the Plant Protective System, their inability to meet the surveillance acceptance criteria has been conservatively determined to constitute a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

If the ultrasonic detectors were unable to perform their safety function, reactor building temperature/pressure would increase and alarm in the control room. Operator's could then use other instrument parameters to determine which loop should be isolated and take the appropriate corrective action.

As evaluated in the FSAR, the detectors are designed to identify small leaks as well as large ruptures. For small leaks, the building pressure and temperature sensors are only postulated to actuate when the magnitude of the leak is such that automatic action is required. Fort St. Vrain FSAR analyses for worst case steam pipe ruptures and the subsequent bases for environmental qualification of safe shutdown equipment conservatively assume that the steam pipe rupture detection system fails to initiate automatic protective action (FSAR Sections 1.4.5.4, I.6). Due to equipment protection features and qualification testing it was verified that safe shutdown equipment will remain operable during and following all postulated steam pipe rupture accidents, assuming alternate detection and manual isolation actions.

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FACILITY NAME (1) Fort St. Vrain, Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 7 8 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
					0 7	OF 0 7

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION:


The cause of these instruments being out of tolerance has been attributed to instrument drift. This has been determined to be a generic problem with these detectors.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The microphones found out of tolerance were adjusted to acceptable values, and the surveillance was successfully completed.


Surveillance Test SR-RE-17-SA, "Ultrasonic Detector Check" is being performed as scheduled on a semi-annual basis. The next surveillance is scheduled for March, 1985.


| The relationship between the calibrated noise source used in
| SR-RE-17-SA, and the Technical Specification limit of 9 volts DC
| (LCO 4.4.1, Table 4.4-2) is being investigated. Possible solutions
| for the instrument drift problem are also under analysis. A
| supplemental report will follow.



Laurie S. Banagas
Technical Services Technician


Jim Eggebroten
Technical Services Engineering Supervisor

Licensing Review By:


Jim Gramling
Nuclear Licensing-Operations Supervisor


C. H. Fuller
Station Manager


J. W. Gahm
Manager, Nuclear Production




Public Service Company of Colorado

16805 WCR 19 1/2, Platteville, Colorado 80651

February 8, 1985
Fort St. Vrain
Unit #1
P-85051

Regional Administrator
Region IV
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

ATTN: Mr. Eric H. Johnson



Docket No. 50-267

REFERENCE: Facility Operating
License No. DPR-34

SUBJECT: Licensee Event
Report 84-011,
Supplemental Report

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Enclosed please find a copy of Licensee Event Report
No. 50-267/84-011, Supplemental, submitted per the requirements of
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) and 50.72(b)(2)(iii).

Sincerely,

J. W. Gahm
Manager, Nuclear Production

Enclosure

cc: Director, MIPC

JWG/djm

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TO RIV
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