

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I

IE Inspection Report No: 50-219/75-27
Licensee: Jersey Central Power and Light
Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road
Morristown, N. J. 07960
Location: Oyster Creek, Forked River, New Jersey
Type of Licensee: BWR(GE) 1930 MWT
Type of Inspection: Special Inspection, Announced
Dates of Inspection: 12-16-75
Inspection period Covered N/A
Dates of Previous Inspection: N/A

Docket No: 50-219
License No: DPR-16
Priority: C
Category: _____
Safeguards Group: 4

Reporting Inspector: *Michael E. Rogers*
M. Rogers, Physical Security Inspector

1/26/76
DATE

Accompanying Inspectors: *R. Smith*
R. Smith, Investigation Specialist

1/26/76
DATE

DATE

DATE

Other Accompanying Personnel: _____

DATE

Reviewed By: *James W. Devlin*
James W. Devlin
Acting Chief, Security and Investigation Section

1/26/76
DATE

B/693

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The following report covers two incidents reported by the licensee, concerning shipments of spent fuel from Oyster Creek to Nuclear Fuel Services, West Valley, New York on September 17, 1975 (Shipment No. 68) and December 9, 1975. (Shipment No. 110)

Enforcement Action

Items of Noncompliance

A. Violations

None

B. Infractions

None

C. Deficiencies

None

Licensee Identified Items of Noncompliance

Contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, the Oyster Creek Quality Assurance Plan, Section V, Technical Specifications Section 6. and Station Procedure 219.0 revision 3, section 8.56, on September 17, 1975 a spent fuel cask, NFS-4(b) was shipped by road with only two (2) of the four (4) impact limiter head bolts installed. (Details II.A and III.A)

Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Action

None identified

Design Changes

Not applicable

Other Significant Findings

A. Current Findings

1. Shipment No. 68

As a result of the problems experienced with shipment #68, the licensee has modified procedure 219.0 (NFS-4 Spent Fuel Cask Handling Procedure) to require separate verification by the individual actually performing specific steps as well as the foreman supervising the loading operation.

2. Shipment No. 110

The licensee has concluded its present contract with NFS and will not be shipping irradiated fuel elements for several years. Representatives of the licensee advised that separate procedures would be drafted covering the release of spent fuel shipments and the location of loaded trailers within the protected area.

B. Unresolved Items

None

Licensee Action on Previously Unresolved Items

None identified

Unusual Occurrences

None

Management Interview

Licensee was advised telephonically on January 23, 1976, that the failure to follow procedures, which was reported in a timely manner and corrective action taken would be contained in the inspection report as an item of noncompliance identified by the licensee.

DETAILS

I. Persons Contacted

J. Carroll, Station Manager
R. Baron, Site Security Officer
F. Rodies, Engineer Assistant
K. Baenziger, Wackenhut Security Corporation

II. Reason for Investigation

A. Shipment No. 68

By letter dated October 17, 1975, the licensee advised the office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, of the following incident. Shipment #68 (9-17-75) from Oyster Creek to Nuclear Fuel Services, had arrived with the upper impact limiter fastened by only two of the four bolts required. The licensee further advised that a safety analysis report was conducted and additional controls instituted to prevent future incidents of a similar nature.

- (1) A memorandum was issued to all personnel involved with the handling of spent fuel shipments, outlining the incident, and possible consequences, while stressing the importance of procedural compliance.
- (2) Procedure 219.0 (NFS-4 Spent Fuel Cask Handling Procedure) was modified to require verification by the individual actually performing the step as well as the foreman in charge of cask handling.

B. Shipment No. 110

On December 10, 1975 a representative of the licensee contacted Region I telephonically to report the details of an incident involving the shipment of spent fuel to N.F.S. West Valley, N.Y.

The representative stated that during the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight shift 12-9-75 a Tri-State truck arrived at Oyster Creek to pick up spent Fuel Cask #110 to be transported to NFS, West Valley, N.Y. After picking up the trailer and after all papers were signed the driver removed the trailer from the protected area. Before leaving the owner controlled area of Oyster Creek a mechanical problem developed in the tractor, forcing the driver to park the trailer carrying the spent fuel cask in the contractor parking lot, east of the plant, outside of the protected area.

The driver reported his problem to Tri-State and was directed to turn the papers and load over to a second Tri-State driver, who was scheduled to pick up Spent Cask No. 111 on the following day, 12-10-75. Spent Cask No. 111 was still in the truck bay of the fuel handling building.

The following morning, 12-10-75, at approximately 8:00 a.m. a third Tri-State truck arrived at Oyster Creek to pick up an empty Rad Waste container to be transported to Nine Mile Point, Scriba, N.Y. The Tri-State driver did not know the number of the Radwaste cask for some reason, and was directed by the guard to the trailer parked in the contractors parking lot that was loaded with the Spent Fuel Cask No. 110. The driver hooked up this trailer containing the spent fuel cask and drove away.

Approximately one hour later the Tri-State driver, who was directed to pick-up Spent Cask No. 110 arrived at Oyster Creek. It was at this point that it was discovered that Cask No. 110 was missing. This driver called Tri-State dispatch office, Joplin, Mo. The Safety Director for Tri-State (301-287-2520) notified the State Police of New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York State to assist in locating the truck. The Safety Director had arrived at Oyster Creek at approximately 11:00 am to direct the operation.

During the intervening time the driver, who mistakenly took Spent Fuel Cask No. 110, discovered that the weight of the load exceeded that which was stated on his shipping papers. He found this overweight when his trailer was weighed at the Pocono Truck Stop, Bartensville, Pa. The driver called his dispatcher to report this discrepancy. He was directed to stay at this location and the empty Rad-Waste Cask was brought to him by the Tri-State driver who had the papers for the Spent Fuel Cask No. 110. The trailers were exchanged at approximately 7:00 p.m., 12-10-75.

The Department of Transportation was advised of the above details. It is their stated opinion that the situation amounted to an honest mistake which had been corrected, therefore the DOT does not contemplate any enforcement action by the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety.

III. Interviews

On December 16, 1975 NRC Region I representative met with Oyster Creek personnel (listed in item 1 above) at Forked River, New Jersey. During the course of interviews, the following information was obtained.

A. Shipment #68

By letter dated September 26, 1975 Nuclear Fuel Services advised the licensee that NFS-4B fuel cask arrived on 9-18-75 with two of the four impact limiter bolts not screwed into position. It was determined after removal of the impact limiter that the lid bolt lock wires had been run across the cask lid and blocked two of the bolt holes.

Licensee's procedure 219.0 called for the cask handling foreman to approve the following steps:

- (1) Page 33 section 8.56 "attach lid impact limiter to cask (torque four, 1 in. bolts. 50 to 70 ft lbs.
- (2) Page 37 - "Bolts and Port Covers lock wired."
- (3) Page 38 "Lid impact limiter bolted to cask."

Representatives of the licensee stated that there are no records to show which of the operations personnel actually performed these steps and certified their completion to the foreman.

Licensee representatives stated that once identified this incident was reported to the NRC in a timely manner and the following corrective measures taken.

- (1) A memorandum was issued to all operations personnel, describing the incident and stressing compliance with procedures.
- (2) Procedure 219.0 was modified to require separate verification by the individual performing a step as well as by the foreman.

The licensee made available for inspection a copy of the revised 219.0 procedure which confirmed the corrective action outlined in #2 above.

B. Shipment #110

On December 12, 1975, a representative of Tri-State Motor Transit Company contacted Region I telephonically and furnished the following information based on interviews with the drivers involved in the incident:

1. There are two teams of drivers hauling spent fuel from Oyster Creek to NFS.
2. On the evening of December 9, 1975 driver #11 picked up spent fuel cask #110 at the Oyster Creek facility. After performing his required safety check, outside the gate, he called his dispatcher to report a problem. The dispatcher instructed him to leave the trailer, report to the N.E. Terminal for repairs, and turn his shipping papers over to the #2 team, waiting in Toms River to pick up spent fuel shipment #110.
3. On December 10, 1975, at 7:00 a.m., a third Tri-State driver arrived at Oyster Creek to pick up trailer #128100. This trailer contained empty Hittman radwaste casks, to be delivered to Nine Mile Point, Oswego, New York. The driver entered the guard house and showed his dispatch paper stating he was to pick up trailer No. 128100 and asked the guard where it was. He was told he had to wait until 8:00 a.m. This was not questioned by the driver to Russell's knowledge. At 8:00 a.m. the guard said "O.K.", pointed to the trailer containing the spent fuel and identified it as the trailer he was to pick up. The driver hooked up and left. Guard log had him leaving site at 8:35 a.m.
4. At 9:00 a.m., driver #2, with the correct shipping papers arrived to pick up shipment #110. When he was unable to locate the trailer, he contacted driver #1 at the Motel in Toms River, who explained where he had parked the trailer. It was at this time the error was discovered.
5. The representative stated that he was within a mile of Oyster Creek, on other business when he was notified. He proceeded to the plant and after initial inquiries, contacted the N.J., N.Y. and Pa. State Police and requested they flag the truck carrying the spent fuel cask.
6. At 2:10 p.m. the driver called in from Union 76 truck stop at Bartonsville, Pa. (Intersection of I-80 and 33). He stated he received a commercial weight ticket at truck stop as required and found he was over his gross limit of 73280 lbs. The representative and driver #2 proceeded to the truck stop with the empty waste cask trailer and made the switch.
7. The representative stated that Tri-State was issuing a Safety Bulletin on this to all drivers emphasizing the requirement to verify trailer numbers with dispatch tickets.

A representative, Wackenhut Security Corporation was interviewed on December 16, 1975 and furnished the following information regarding the incident.

On December 10, 1975 at 8:00 a.m. a Tri-State driver arrived at the main guard station, identified himself and stated he was there to pick up the "cask." The driver signed the visitor registration and the guard attempted to reach the maintenance Foreman, who was unavailable so the guard contacted the shift Foreman who authorized the removal of the spent fuel cask. The driver presented no shipping papers to the guard and left the site at 8:30 a.m. He hooked up to the spent cask and departed the owner controlled area.

At approximately 9:00 a.m. two Tri-State relief drivers presented themselves at the main guard station with the proper shipping papers for the spent fuel cask. It was at this time the mistake was realized and steps taken to locate the first driver. The Tri-State representative arrived at Oyster Creek at 10:55 a.m. to investigate the situation and direct the operation.

Representatives of the licensee stated that the present contract with N.F.S. is completed and no spent fuel shipments are anticipated for several years. The licensee will however prepare written procedures which will cover the release and transfer of spent fuel shipments, stressing proper identification and surveillance on future shipments.

IV. Documentation Examination

The following records and documents were examined during this investigation.

- (1) Station Procedure 219.0 for shipment 68 and 110. (Showing Revisions)
- (2) NFS Safety Analysis report for Spent fuel cask No. NFS - 4
- (3) Licensee correspondence pertaining to shipment 68
- (4) Visitor registration log for dates of 12-9-75 and 12-10-75
- (5) Guards Daily Incident Reports for 12-9-75, 12-10-75
- (6) MBA Transfer Forms for shipments 68, 110
- (7) Special Instructions issued to Tri-State drivers, by NFS for handling Spent fuel shipments.