


# Jersey Central Power & Light Company



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MEMBER OF THE  
General  Public Utilities Corporation  
SYSTEM

January 27, 1976

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region 1  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
I&E Inspection Report No. 50-219/75-26

This is in reply to your letter of December 31, 1975 to Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr., regarding the inspection conducted by Mr. E. Greenman on November 17-21, 1975 at our Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

In regard to Item A of Appendix A, which involves the drilling of two penetrations adjacent to the reactor control room into the cable spreading room, we wish to comment as follows:

Plant Procedure No. 105, "Maintenance, Repair, and Modification Control", and Oyster Creek Quality Assurance Procedure No. 2006, "Modification, Non-Routine Maintenance and Repair" are both tied to the Quality Assurance Systems List (QASL). The cable spreading room does not appear on this list. Also, by the same list restrictions on cable penetrations apply only to the primary and secondary containment systems. It is our opinion, therefore, that a design review, a written safety evaluation, nor a formalized work authorization were required for the work project of concern. However, recognizing that the cable spreading room contains cables of many safety-related systems, we believe that this room, including penetrations, should be placed on the QASL. The necessary steps will be taken to have this done.

In response to Item B of Appendix A, which involved violations of Technical Specification 6.2.A.1 and 6.2.c and Operating Procedure No. 304, we wish to notify you of the following:

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Operations personnel will be advised via a memorandum of the details of the event, the critical importance of system valve lineup checks, and the importance of immediately reporting instances in which valves are found to be incorrectly positioned. The review of this memorandum by Operations personnel should be completed by February 14, 1976.

In response to Item C of Appendix A, which involved violations of our commitment to ANSI N45.2.3-1973, Section 3.2.3, "Fire Protection and Prevention", please be advised of the following:

Instructions, which address fire prevention measures regarding combustible materials during welding or other processes which may involve ignition sources, have been drafted and will be formalized in an overall administration procedure. These instructions include requirements for fire preventive equipment and precautions to be employed to provide protection for combustible material. Review and approval of the procedure is expected to be completed by March 15, 1976. It should be noted that fire prevention considerations are being included, as applicable, in each of the various maintenance procedures utilized at the station and that the need for sound fire prevention practices has been stressed at recent plant-wide safety meetings with station personnel and with contractor supervisory personnel who are directing various maintenance activities.

Very truly yours,



Donald A. Ross, Manager  
Nuclear Generating Stations

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