




GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

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January 18, 1985
RBG- 19939
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.1
* CORRECTED COPY

Mr. Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, Texas 76011



Dear Mr. Martin:

River Bend Station Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458
Final Report/DR-182

* On December 19, 1984, GSU notified Region IV by telephone that it had determined DR-182 concerning a Limitorque motor operator failure on a feedwater isolation valve to be reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). The attachment to this letter is GSU's final 30-day written report pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e)(3) with regard to this deficiency.

Sincerely,

for J. E. Booker
Manager-Engineering,
Nuclear Fuels & Licensing
River Bend Nuclear Group

8502250740 850118
PDR ADOCK 05000458
S PDR

JEB/PJD/lp

Attachment

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector-Site

INPO

IE-27
1/1

ATTACHMENT

January 18, 1985

DR-182/Limitorque Motor Operator Failure
on Feedwater Isolation Valve

Background and Description of the Problem

This deficiency concerns a Limitorque motor operator failure on a feedwater isolation valve as identified in Nonconformance and Disposition Report (N&D) No. 5458.

During testing at the River Bend jobsite of feedwater system valve 1FWS*MOV7B, the drive sleeve for the valve operator failed. The failure of the drive sleeve prevented any subsequent operation of the valve prior to repair. Although failures of this type have been limited to one valve, valves 1FWS*MOV7A, 1B21*MOVFO65A and B, and 1B21*MOVFO98A through D are equipped with the same style operators. The operators for 1FWS*MOV7A and B are equipped with smaller motors than the other valves. No other problems have been noted with the other valves.

A review of the condition of the operator by the Seller did not show the cause of failure. However, the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) shop inspector reported that the Seller suspects one of the following:

1. The torque switch was wired incorrectly.
2. The motor was misphased and produced stall torque a number of times.

Safety Implication

Valve 1FWS*MOV7B does not affect short-term containment isolation. However, this valve is required for long-term containment isolation following a loss of coolant design basis accident.

Corrective Action

In accordance with N&D No. 5458, the operator was returned to the vendor shop and all damaged parts were replaced. The vendor tested the operator to insure proper operation, proper torque, proper motor current, and proper limit and torque switch setting and operation.