NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Oyster Creek, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)
Degradation of Secondary Containment

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 9	2 2	8 4	8 4	- 0 0 9	- 0 0	1 0	2 2	8 4		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
N		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Kenneth Bass, Mechanical Engineering	AREA CODE 6 0 9 — 9 7 1 - 4 9 0 8

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Both doors of a reactor building personnel access airlock were opened simultaneously by contractor personnel in order to bring a length of pipe into the building. The interlock was purposefully defeated to accomplish this. As a result, secondary containment integrity was degraded for a short while. The incident was critiqued and the cause is attributed to personnel error. The requirement to maintain secondary containment integrity has been reinforced with all contractor firms.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

OCCURRENCE DATE

September 22, 1984

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Both doors of a Reactor Building personnel access airlock were open simultaneously for an undetermined period of time. This constitutes a degradation of Secondary Containment Integrity as all of the conditions of Technical Specification 3.5.B.1 were not met.

This event is considered to be reportable as defined in 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(vi).

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The plant was shutdown for refueling and maintenance. The mode switch was in Refuel and the reactor coolant temperature was 159°F.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On Saturday, September 22, 1984, contractor workers were bringing a 20-foot section of pipe into the Reactor Building. The piping was brought into the building through personnel airlock doors. The length of time the doors were open is unknown, but because of the nature of the incident the duration is believed to have been short.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The cause is attributed to personnel error.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

Secondary Containment Integrity is required to minimize ground level release of airborne radioactive material and to provide for controlled, elevated release of the reactor building atmosphere under accident conditions. The ability of Secondary Containment to perform its function with both personnel access airlock doors open is degraded. However, the duration of this occurrence is believed to be short due to its nature.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION

Once the piping was inside the Reactor Building, both doors were closed and the Control Room notified. All Reactor Building airlock doors were subsequently checked and found to be operating satisfactorily.

The incident was reviewed with the personnel involved. As a result of the critique of this incident, the responsible individual was dismissed. A memorandum was addressed to all onsite contractor firms to reinforce training on this matter which is already provided via the General Employee Training (GET) program. Signs posted at each personnel access airlock warn personnel that the interlocks must not be defeated.

GPU Nuclear

GPU Nuclear Corporation
Post Office Box 388
Route 9 South
Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388
609 971-4000
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

October 22, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report

This letter forwards one (1) copy of Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 84-009.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:dam
Enclosures

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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