


# Jersey Central Power & Light Company



MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 201-539-6111



August 14, 1975

Mr. Eldon J. Brunner, Chief  
Reactor Operations Branch  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region 1  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Brunner:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station  
Docket No. 50-219  
IE Inspection Report No. 50-219/75-18

In your letter of July 22, 1975, regarding the inspection at Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station by Mr. E. Greenman, there are noted certain activities which appear not to be in full compliance with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's requirements. These activities were set forth in Appendix A to your letter in the Notice of Violation.

The first item addressed refers to the tensioning of the reactor vessel head bolting studs during the interval following the 1975 annual refueling outage without the benefit of head flange temperature measurements, and also to the lack of documentation of head temperature measurements. According to Appendix A, this activity was contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, which includes documentation requirements and evaluation of test results to assure that test requirements are satisfied and Technical Specification 3.3.B which requires that the reactor vessel head bolting studs shall not be under tension unless the temperature of the vessel head flange and head are greater than 100°F.

During the interval May 12-15, 1975, following the annual refueling outage, the tensioning of reactor head bolting was performed in accordance with Procedure 703.1, Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Replacement. Procedure 703.1 provides instructions which require that the vessel head flange and head temperatures remain greater than 100°F during tensioning. At all times during stud tensioning, there was provision for temperature measurement on the reactor vessel head in the area of the reactor vessel head flange; however, the observed temperature readings were not documented.

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August 14, 1975

In order to avoid a recurrence of this item, the subject procedure will be revised to include more detailed instructions for reactor vessel head flange and head temperature measurement with provision within the procedure for documentation of the measurements. Implementation of this corrective action will be completed prior to the next scheduled refueling outage.

The Notice of Violation lists a second activity which according to the statement was contrary to the Technical Specification 3.5.A.5 requiring the primary containment atmosphere to be reduced to less than five percent (5%) oxygen within 24 hours after the reactor mode switch is placed in the run mode. The report indicates that on June 15, 1975, the oxygen analyzer indicated drywell oxygen content was five and one-half percent (5-1/2%) at 11:30 p.m., which was 24 hours after the mode switch had been placed in run, and indicated value remained in excess of five percent (5%) until 11:51 p.m. However, a subsequent test conducted on the oxygen analyzer system the following morning indicated there was a certain amount of air leakage past the seals of the sample pump which resulted in diluting the sample stream sufficiently to cause an increase in the indicated oxygen concentration. When the sample pump was bypassed during the test, the indicated concentration dropped by 1.6% confirming the seal leakage in the sample pump. The conclusion drawn from this test is that at 11:30 p.m., June 15, 1975, the actual drywell oxygen concentration was 3.9%, well within the requirements of Technical Specification 3.5.A.5. Although there was full compliance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission's requirements for this activity, maintenance personnel are investigating the problems with the sample pump seals in order to avoid a recurrence of this nature.

The final item of non-compliance cited in the Notice refers to the omission of initialing log book entries by Control Room Operators and shift turn over responsibilities by Shift Foremen on two occasions each. According to the report, this item was a deficiency in not satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures and Drawings", and Administrative Procedure No. 101. The failure to initial the log entries identified was due largely to a lack of administrative control on our part. In order to avoid recurrences of this nature, corrective action has been initiated in the following manner:

1. A copy of Inspection Report No. 50-219/75-18 has been distributed to all operations personnel as part of the required reading program. The purpose of this action is to reinform all personnel on the requirement to initial required log entries as delineated in a procedure.
2. As part of the Licensed Operator Requalification Program, the applicable sections of Administrative Procedure No. 101 will be included in the procedure review section. The purpose of this action is to insure that all of the licensed operators review the subject procedure and are made aware of specified requirements.

Mr. Brunner


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August 14, 1975

Additionally, the Shift Foremen's logs and the Control Room Operators' logs will continue to be audited by the Operations Supervisor to assure that the requirements for initialing are satisfied.

Item 1 of this corrective action is presently in progress and item 2 is scheduled to be complete at the conclusion of the next training cycle which is due to commence this fall.

Very truly yours,

  
Donald A. Ross, Manager  
Generating Stations-Nuclear

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