

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I
OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATION REPORT

EXAMINATION REPORT NO. 50-572/84-02 (OL)

FACILITY DOCKET NO. 50-572

LICENSEE: Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Box 598
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230

FACILITY: Nuclear Training Services Facility

EXAMINATION DATES: December 18-20, 1984

CHIEF EXAMINER:	<u>Original Signed By:</u> D. Johnson Lead Reactor Engineer (Examiner)	<u>FEB 1 1985</u> Date
REVIEWED BY:	<u>Original Signed By:</u> R. Keller, Chief Reactor Projects Section 1C	<u>FEB 1 1985</u> Date
APPROVED BY:	<u>Original Signed By:</u> Harry B. Kister, Chief Projects Branch No. 1	<u>JAN 3 1 1985</u> Date

SUMMARY: Nine candidates for Instructor Certifications were examined and nine Instructor Certificates were issued. Generic weaknesses included the lack of knowledge concerning 10CFR20 radioactive waste release requirements, equipment affected by loss of plant a.c. busses, lack of understanding of interlocks pertaining to safety related control valves and logics associated with nuclear excore instrumentation.

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REPORT DETAILS

TYPE OF EXAMS: Initial ____ Replacement X Requalification ____

EXAM RESULTS:

	RO Pass/Fail	SRO Pass/Fail	Inst. Cert Pass/Fail	Fuel Handler Pass/Fail
Written Exam	/	/	9/0	/
Oral Exam	/	/	*7/0	/
Simulator Exam	/	/	*7/0	/
Overall	/	/	9/0	/

*2 Candidates received oral/simulator waivers

1. EXAMINERS: A. J. Vinnola INEL
R. L. Sailor INEL
P. T. Isaksen INEL
2. PERSONS EXAMINED Instructor Certifications

W. Detwiler
S. Fowler
G. Harris
J. Lamonby
L. Pisano
P. Pyle
G. Richelle
R. Schluter
C. Smith

1. Summary of generic strengths or deficiencies noted on oral exams:

Candidates were not familiar with the 10 CFR 20 radioactive liquid and gaseous waste release requirements, equipment that was affected by loss of plant a.c. busses, interlocks that pertained to containment sump suction control valves and the logics associated with nuclear excore instrumentation.

2. Summary of generic strengths or deficiencies noted from grading of written exams:

Candidates failed to discuss the actions as a result of P-12 interlock prevent steam dump cooldown, also showed weaknesses in their knowledge of which Reactor Trip breakers send signals to the two steam dump controllers (plant trip & load rejection). A lack of understanding of the mechanism for tripping the Emergency Diesel Generators was demonstrated. Weaknesses were discovered in the knowledge of automatic actions associated with high radiation level detected by the radiation process monitors. Most candidates were unaware of the 300 mrem weekly whole body dose administrative limit placed upon penetrating radiation.

3. Comments on availability of, and candidate familiarization with plant reference material in the control room:

Candidates were above average in their familiarization with Technical Specification, however, they were below average in the familiarization with prints and logic diagrams.

4. Improvements noted in training programs as a result of prior operator licensing examinations/suggestions, etc.:

Continued overall excellent performance on examinations was noted.

5. Personnel Present at Exit Interview:

NRC Contractor Personnel

A. J. Vinnola
R. L. Sailor
P. T. Isaksen

Facility Personnel

Anthony Nowinowski
Dave Helling
John Fischer
Steve Slavichak

6. Summary of NRC Comments made at exit interview:

Six of seven candidates were clear passes as a result of the operating portion of the examination. Generic weaknesses, as delineated above under item 1., were discussed. In addition, it was noted that the examiners did not receive the facilities logic diagrams nor the offnormal/emergency procedures for their use in examination preparation. It was noted that candidates were using procedures that had handwritten notes throughout the procedural steps, and the facility did not have procedures concerning the administration of out-of-service equipment.

7. Changes made to written exam during examination review:

<u>Answer No.</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Reason</u>
5.02.b.4	"No change"	Minimum CHF does not depend upon power.
6.04.a	P-12 or 550 degrees was accepted as final temperature.	Either answer displays the correct knowledge for the cooldown transient.
6.04.c	Delete "steam dumps would open on trip."	Actual plant response indicates dumps do not open.
6.04.c	Trip Controller to Load Rejection Controller.	Train B trip breaker did not open therefore trip controller output is blocked.
6.06.a	Delete "The SI signal blocks the S/D sequencer and sheds non-safety loads".	Question does not elicit this passive information.
7.01.a	Add as an acceptable answer "Maintains back pressure on #1 seal".	Technical Manual states this information.
7.03	Delete "Power changes of this magnitude cause large variations in fuel pin pressure" and accept as a viable answer "detect high amount of fission products in the reactor coolant".	Question does not elicit all the original information and the other viable answer is supplied in reference material provided.
8.02.a	Added "within 15 minutes of going out of the target band".	To clarify the answer key to be more correct.
8.04.a.1	Added "greater than 1.02".	To be consistent with T.S.
8.06	Changed "below the saturation pressure" to "above the saturation pressure".	To reflect the correct answer in accordance with provided reference.

Attachments:

1. Written Examination(s) and Answer Key(s) (SRO/RO)