


To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/ 6

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:


J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date 1/23/74

cc: Mr. A. Gianbussò

B1661

Report Date: 1/23/74

Occurrence: 1000

Initial Telephone Report Date: 1/22/74

Date of Occurrence: 1/22/74

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/ 6

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.A.6. Twenty-four hours after placing the mode selector switch into RUN, the torus atmosphere contained 6.2% O₂, which is above the limit of 5.0% O₂.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15B.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power | <input type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby | <input type="checkbox"/> Operation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown | <input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown | <input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Operation | |

Reactor Power - 1075 MWt, ~340 MWe
 Recirculation Flow - 7.4 X 10⁶ gpm
 Feedwater Flow - 3.8 X 10⁶ lb/hr
 Feedwater Temperature - 275°F
 Reactor Pressure - 1020 psig
 Reactor Water Level - 78" Yarway

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2030 on January 21, 1974, the primary containment inerting process was initiated by first performing a calibration on the torus/drywell O₂ analyzer, as per the operating procedure. The torus atmosphere was then inerted with nitrogen to 4.8% O₂ as indicated in the drywell/torus oxygen recorder and drywell inerting was then commenced. During this process, a "zero check" on the analyzer showed that the instrument "zero" was low. Correcting this condition brought the indicated O₂ level

in the torus to 6.2%. Since drywell inerting was already in progress, it was decided to reinert the torus after drywell inerting was complete. Due to a misunderstanding on the part of the duty Shift Foreman, an attempt was made to inert the drywell to less than 1% O₂ content. Prior to attaining this condition, the plant nitrogen supply reached a level where further consumption in the inerting process would have exhausted the operational supply needed for the nitrogen/air system in the drywell.

An orderly plant shutdown was started 24 hours after going into the RUN mode at 1000 on January 22, 1974 at a 30 MWe/hr. rate. Power was reduced to 292 MWe at which time a temporary Technical Specification change was obtained which allowed operation at 50% reactor power with greater than 5% O₂ concentration in the primary containment until 1230 on January 24, 1974.

APPARENT CAUSE
OF OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Design	<input type="checkbox"/>	Procedure
<input type="checkbox"/>	Manufacture	<input type="checkbox"/>	Unusual Service Condition
<input type="checkbox"/>	Installation/ Construction	<input type="checkbox"/>	Inc. Environmental Component Failure
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Operator	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other (Specify)

The duty Shift Foreman in charge of this operation misjudged the capacity of the plant nitrogen system. In addition, the Foreman was informed that a nitrogen truck was enroute and would arrive Tuesday morning with the additional nitrogen needed to complete the inerting process. Unfortunately, due to internal problems, the nitrogen vendor was unable to meet the required delivery time.

ANALYSIS OF
OCCURRENCE:

The significance of this event lies in operating the reactor at power with an inadequately inerted containment which, under design bases LOCA conditions, would have created a condition whereby the probability of experiencing an explosive concentration of oxygen and hydrogen in the containment would have been increased.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION.

Corrective action to prevent recurrence of this event is to be determined after the appropriate review process by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

FAILURE DATA.

Not applicable.

Prepared by: Arthur H. Rose Date: 1/22/74