


To: James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

From: Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Subject: Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74/ 8

The following is a preliminary report being submitted
in compliance with the Technical Specifications
paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

 1/24/74
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

B/657

Initial Telephone
Report Date: 1/25/74

Date of
Occurrence: 1/17/74

Initial Written
Report Date: 1/25/74

Time of
Occurrence: 1055

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74/ 8

IDENTIFICATION
OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 2.3.5, which requires that isolation condenser system initiation occur with a time delay of <15 seconds after a specified high reactor pressure is reached.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15A.

CONDITIONS PRIOR
TO OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown
<input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby	<input type="checkbox"/> Operation
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During
<input type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/> Operation	

The plant was shutdown with the reactor coolant at <212°F.

DESCRIPTION
OF OCCURRENCE:

While performing a routine surveillance test on the reactor high pressure-isolation condenser initiation switches, contacts on three out of the four associated time delay relays failed to close within the preset time delay of 15 seconds (after each pressure switch was tripped and the associated relay deenergized). The delay times of these three relays were found to be as follows:

6K9 - 20 sec.
6K11 - 16.7 sec.
6K12 - 18 sec.

Each of the involved time delay relays was immediately reset to less than 15 seconds.

APPARENT CAUSE
OF OCCURRENCE:

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Design	<input type="checkbox"/>	Procedure
<input type="checkbox"/>	Manufacture	<input type="checkbox"/>	Unusual Service Condition
<input type="checkbox"/>	Installation/	<input type="checkbox"/>	Inc. Environmental
<input type="checkbox"/>	Construction	<input type="checkbox"/>	Component Failure
<input type="checkbox"/>	Operator	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other (Specify)

Instrument drift has been identified as the cause of these excessive time delays.

ANALYSIS OF
OCCURRENCE:

Four pressure switches in the reactor protection system (RPS) activate the isolation condenser system when there is a persistent 15 second condition with reactor pressure at or above 1060 psig. Two of these pressure switches with associated time delay relays 6K9 and 6K10 are in one RPS channel, and the other two pressure switches with associated time delay relays 6K11 and 6K12 are in the other RPS channel. High pressure signals from two pressure switches, one in each RPS channel, are required to activate the isolation condenser system (coincidence of two RPS channels each of which is tripped by one of two pressure sensors). Accordingly, the excessive time delays of these three time delay relays would have resulted in an isolation condenser system initiation delay time greater than 15 seconds had the isolation pressure been reached. There is no evidence, however, to indicate that isolation condenser system initiation would not have taken place with the three time delay relays operating as found. As detailed in Attachment 65 to the FDSAR, at least one

of the isolation condensers is required to act as a means of heat removal during a postulated loss of coolant accident. The safety significance of the initiation delay time in excess of 15 seconds is being evaluated at this time.

CORRECTIVE
ACTION:

Corrective action will be determined following review of this abnormal occurrence by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

FAILURE DATA:

Pertinent manufacturer data are listed below:

Manufacturer: Agastat
Model: 7022 PIT
Range: 5 to 50 seconds
Coil: 120V DC
Serial Numbers: 6K9 - 1712235
6K11 - 1712237
6K12 - 1712228

Prepared by:



Date:

1/24/74