



NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION / 300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202 / TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

October 12, 1984
(NMP2L 0200)

Mr. R. W. Starostecki, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
Division of Project and Resident Programs
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Re: Nine Mile Point - Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

Dear Mr. Starostecki:

Enclosed is a final report for the problem concerning HEA relays manufactured by General Electric. This problem was reported via tel-con to Mr. R. Gallo of your staff on November 21, 1983. An interim report was submitted via our letter dated December 21, 1983.

Very truly yours,

C. V. Mangano
Vice President
Nuclear Engineering and Licensing

CVM/GG/pbd

xc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. R. A. Gramm, Resident Inspector
Project File (2)

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION
NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2
DOCKET NO. 50-410

Final Report for a Problem
Concerning HEA Relays

Description of the Problem

General Electric letter dated October 14, 1983 stated that some of the HEA relays manufactured between September 1980 and August 1983 may malfunction due to the reasons explained in this letter.

Niagara Mohawk has determined that HEA relays covered in the General Electric letter were supplied to Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Site. Testing was performed on the relays with the date codes identified in the General Electric letter as well as relays with missing or indeterminate date codes. It was found that two relays could have tripped with a force less than 500 grams. These relays are located in Class 1E switchgear 2ENS*SWG101 in cubicle Nos. 3 (Residual Heat Removal System Loop A) and 10 (alternate offsite power).

Analysis of Safety Implications

As stated in the General Electric letter, the problem could have resulted in malfunction of these relays. As a result, it could have prevented the switchgear from performing the design function and thus could have affected the Division I Residual Heat Removal System Loop A and alternate offsite power capability. Therefore, if this problem were to have remained uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant.

Corrective Action

The two relays that could have tripped with a force less than 500 grams were documented on N&D 8899 and will be replaced.