

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Monticello	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 3	PAGE (3) 1 OF 02
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TITLE (4)  
ESF Actuation During Diesel Generator Testing

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
01	13	85	85	002	00	02	12	85			0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) N	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.38(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Lawrence H Pudlick, Engineer II	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 6 1 2    2 9 5 - 5 1 5 1
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE: )     NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While performing Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Fast Start Initiation Test, procedure inadequacy during the degraded and loss of voltage relay restoration resulted in the transfer of one essential 4KV bus to the auxiliary reserve transformer. The momentary loss of voltage caused a Half Scram, Group II Isolation, EFT and Standby Gas Treatment System initiations and load shed of all non-essential motor control centers supplied by the essential 4KV bus. The emergency diesel generators were isolated at the time of the event for this test procedure and therefore did not start.

Essential bus was promptly returned to its normal source. The Half Scram, Group II Isolation and Standby Gas Treatment System were reset. The EFT was returned to its normal mode and the load shed motor control centers were re-energized. The degraded and loss of voltage restoration section of the test procedure will be revised to prevent a similar event.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
			0   0   2	0   0	0   2	OF 0   2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 13, 1985 at 1155 CST, with the plant in cold shutdown for refueling and maintenance, wire restoration in accordance with the Emergency Diesel generator Automatic Fast Start Initiation test procedure resulted in the trip of the source air circuit breaker (52) to one of the emergency safeguard buses (EB). The emergency safeguard bus automatically transferred to the auxiliary reserve transformer (EA) due to the loss of voltage. The momentary loss of voltage caused a Half Scram (JC), Group II Isolation (JM) and initiation of the EFT (VI) and Standby Gas Treatment Systems (BH). In addition, all non-essential motor control centers (EC) supplied by the emergency safeguard bus were load shed during the bus transfer. The emergency Diesel generators (EK) were isolated at the time of the event and therefore did not start.

The emergency safeguard bus was restored to its normal source by the licensed control room operator. Subsequent operator action reset the Half Scram, and Group II Isolation, restored the EFT and Standby Gas Treatment Systems and re-energized the motor control centers.

Investigation revealed that the test procedure did not adequately address the restoration process for the loss and degraded voltage relay schemes. This inadequacy resulted in the trip of the emergency safeguard bus source air circuit breaker and subsequent ESF actuations during the degraded and loss of voltage relay restoration.

To prevent a similar event, the degraded and loss of voltage restoration section of the test procedure will be revised.

During the event, Tech Spec required systems were operable.

No safety consequences resulted from the event.

All safety systems functioned as designed. There have been no reportable events of a similar nature.



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February 12, 1985

U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT  
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22

ESF Actuation During Diesel Generator Testing

The License Event Report for this occurrence is attached.

This event was reported via Emergency Notification System per 10 CFR Part 72 on January 13, 1985.

*for Monica Vik*  
David Musolf  
Manager - Nuclear Support Services

DMM/MMV/dab

c: Regional Administrator-III, NRC  
NRR Project Manager, NRC  
Resident Inspector, NRC  
MPCA  
Attn: J W Ferman

Attachment

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